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Introduction 
ROBERTHAUPTMAN 
ABSTRACT 
ETHICALCONCERNS HAVE always played a seminal role in the 
traditional professions, but it is only fairly recently that librarians 
have manifested any interest in ethics. Prior to the publication of 
the present editor’s bomb experiment in a 1976 Wilson Library 
Bulletin, there was virtually nothing available in the literature. 
Subsequently, sporadic articles began to appear and as the eighties 
progressed, due in part to the general zeitgeist, the floodgates opened 
and a plethora of articles and two books poured forth. Additionally, 
conferences, seminars, and meetings, all devoted to various aspects 
of ethics and information dissemination, began to take place. Indeed, 
these activities have stimulated researchers to investigate areas that 
heretofore were not considered within this context-e.g., “the ethics 
of book preservation.” Finally, it should be noted, the state of 
Michigan employs a lawyer whose primary responsibility is to help 
librarians who have legal questions and dilemmas of a professional 
nature. 
Libraries are the traditional storehouses of information, but, with 
the recent dramatic change to a postindustrial society, one that values 
information more than any other individual commodity, new sources 
of information have arisen. The edtor of this issue takes a broad 
approach and thus one will find herein articles on such standard 
topics as confidentiality (Garoogian) and medical reference (Wood), 
but also discussions of the censorious practices not of political nor 
religious groups, but instead of scholarly cliques and their charges 
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(Swan), the relationship between ethics and technology (Froehlich), 
the conflict of simultaneous service or public and private employment 
(Stevens, Bjdrner), and the process of disseminating new knowledge 
(Moran, Serebnick). 
This issue of Library Trends is not meant to be a comprehensive 
overview of the broad and diverse range of subjects subsumed under 
the rubric of ethics, but rather a series of essays on some of the most 
important and intellectually stimulating of these topics. Many of 
the authors have already contributed to the growing body of literature 
on information ethics, and it is hoped that these new essays will 
stimulate further discussion of those topics that will be most 
influential during the coming decade. These include the dis-
semination of scholarly information and a reevaluation of the peer 
review process; patron confidentiality; conflict of interest; technology; 
and information liability, including the possibility of malpractice 
suits. 
Ethics in Librarianship: A Management Model 
ROSEMARYRUHIG D u  MONT 
ABSTRACT 
A MANAGEMENT MODEL of ethical decision making in librarianship 
is presented. The model combines individual variables with 
situational variables and shows why policymakers and decision 
makers must exercise moral judgment in performing their duties. 
This article also examines the notion of social responsibility as an 
ethical issue. 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of ethics in the information professions is a subset 
of the study of ethics in general. Thus, a definition of ethics may 
be helpful in clarifying this concept. There is no agreement on the 
exact definition of the term ethics. Some use it to refer to the art 
of determining what is right or good. It is also used in three different 
but related ways signifying: (1) a general pattern or “way of life,” 
(2) a set of rules of conduct or “moral code,” and (3)  inquiry about 
ways of life and rules of conduct (Dwivedi, 1987, p. 22). As a concept, 
the purpose of ethics is to establish principles of behavior that help 
people make choices among alternative modes of action. Making such 
choices of ten involves ethical &lemmas, because these are marked 
by multiple and noncomparable dimensions. The dimensions are the 
results-both benefits and harms-that are going to affect the 
organization, the society, and the individual as a result of a decision 
or action (Hosmer, 1988, p. 10). In essence, ethical behauior is what 
is accepted as “good” and “right” as opposed to “bad” or “wrong” 
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in the context of the governing moral code (Schermerhorn, 1989, p. 
604). 
The determination of what is right rather than what is wrong 
has been generally codified in the form of law, although not all 
situations have been, and can be, covered by any such codification. 
Laws are rationalized for the welfare of society; thus, any behavior 
considered ethical should also be legal in a just and fair society. 
This does not mean, however, that simply because an action is not 
illegal i t  is necessarily ethical. In other words, just living up  to the 
“letter of the law” is not sufficient to guarantee that one’s actions 
can be or should be considered ethical (Schermerhorn, 1989). The 
following examples of ethical questions can be considered in this 
context: 
Is i t  ethical to take longer than necessary to do a task? 
Is it ethical to do personal business on the employer’s time? 
Is it ethical to call in sick to take a day off to catch up on chores 
at home? 
Is it ethical to fail to report rule violations by a co-worker? 
None of these examples is illegal. But many individuals would 
consider one or more of them to be unethical. 
The values held by an individual, group, or society are the basic 
components of an ethical system. Yet uncertainty is a fact of complex 
dynamic organizational life. The interests and values of another 
individual, group, or society and laws regarding both are unclear. 
Ethical standards, therefore, are not universally accepted, but rather 
they are the end product of discretionary decision-making behavior 
affecting the lives and well-being of others (Pearce & Robinson, 1989, 
pp. 148-49). 
Ethics in the information professions is concerned with the 
application of moral standards to the conduct of librarians and other 
individuals involved in information dissemination. It is a type of 
applied ethics concerned with clarifying the obligations and dilemmas 
of librarians and other information professionals who make decisions 
regarding the acquisition, processing, and dissemination of 
information to individuals, groups, and society at large. 
EVOLUTION INOF ETHICALCONCERNS 
INFORMATIONPROFESSIONS 
Tracing the development of ethics as an area of concern for 
information professionals will help in identifying the factors that 
are responsible for and that influenced the evolution of ethical 
behavior. Although ethical issues in librarianship were of some 
concern prior to the 1960s (see Table l), i t  was the rise of the social 
responsibility debate in the decade of the 1960s that caused ethical 
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concerns to become of major importance to librarians and other 
information professionals. 
TABLE1 
STAGESOF ETHICALORIENT-ATION 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Ethical attitudes Traditional (before Stakeholders (1930 Affirmative 
1930s) 1950s) i.e., staff, 
patrons 
action (1960s- 
present) 
Orientation Institutional Institutional Enlightened 
self -interest interest, stake- self-interest, 
holder interest stakeholder 
interest, 
societal 
interest 
Social values Personal and 
user problems must 
be left at home 
Employees have 
needs beyond 
economic needs 
and users have 
Societal 
interest and 
participation is 
fundamental to 
needs beyond our success 
information needs 
Political No government 
involvement 
desired 
Government 
support is a 
necessary evil 
Government and 
information 
agencies must 
cooperate to 
deal with 
societal prob- 
lems 
The concept of social responsibility is fundamentally an ethical 
concept. It involves changing notions of how human needs should 
be met and emphasizes a concern with the social dimensions of 
information service that has to do with improving the quality of 
life. Social responsibility provides a way for the information 
profession to concern itself with the social dimensions of service and 
be aware of the social impact of that service. 
Historically, librarians saw that their major responsibility was 
to the collection; caring for the materials within the library building 
was their primary concern (Du Mont, 1977, p. 24). Many modern 
information professionals now acknowledge that they are responsible 
to any individual or group (i.e., stakeholder) with an information 
need. These stakeholders can be any constituency in the library’s 
environment-users, nonusers, employees, suppliers, government 
agencies, public interest groups, and host communities. 
Table 2 illustrates a four-stage model of a social responsibility 
continuum. Stage one encompasses responsibility for the library 
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collection. Stage two adds responsibility for employees. Stage three 
includes responsibility to library users-those individuals who have 
made a conscious decision to use the library’s information resources. 
Stage four expands responsibility furthest by proposing that 
information professionals are responsible to society in general and 
includes users and nonusers alike. 
TABLE2 
SOCIALRESPONSIBILITY OF AN INFORMATIONCONTINUUM PROFESSIONAL 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage ? Stage 4 
Collection development and + Employees + Information + Society as a 
maintenance only users whole 
What information professionals do in terms of pursuing social 
goals depends on to what or to whom they believe they are responsible. 
A stage one information professional promotes collection de-
velopmen t and maintenance. At stage two, information professionals 
accept responsibility for the employees in their organization and focus 
on human resource concerns. Because they will want to get, keep, 
and motivate good employees, they are concerned with appropriate 
education and training, improved working conditions, expanded 
employee rights, increased job security, and the like. A stage three 
professional expands goals to include high quality service, an 
excellent collection, good relations with the public, and the like. 
A stage four professional aligns with an active interpretation of social 
responsibility. At this stage, professionals see their responsibility to 
society as a whole. Their service is defined in terms of advancing 
the public good. The acceptance of such responsibility means that 
such information professionals actively promote social justice, 
support social and cultural goals, and take political positions even 
if such actions are perceived negatively by some. 
Each stage carries with i t  an increasing level of discretion. As 
professionals move to the right along the continuum, they have to 
make more decisions based upon situational variables not of their 
own making. By the time professionals reach stage four, they are 
required to think about ethical dilemmas not necessarily solely within 
the context of their organizations but to decide what is right and 
what is wrong from a societal perspective. They may follow self- 
chosen ethical principles, upholding values and rights regardless of 
majority opinion (Trevino, 1986). Obviously, not all professionals 
perceive reaching stage four as an appropriate goal. Some stay in 
stage one, which emphasizes responsibility for collection maintenance 
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and development, or stage two, which emphasizes appropriate 
behavior for a librarian as a professional, or stage three, which 
emphasizes fulfilling the duties and obligations of a professional 
librarian through high quality service to users. 
There never has been established any simple right-wrong 
dichotomy to help information professionals make decisions 
regarding their appropriate domain for ethically responsible action. 
The social responsibility movement of the 1960s did provide fuel 
for debate. The concept of intellectual freedom, called the profession’s 
“central ethic,” was used to frame issues as diverse as civil rights, 
the war in Vietnam, women’s rights, and the war on poverty (Bundy 
& Stielow, 1987). On one side, there were those who were in stage 
four on the social responsibility continuum, defining intellectual 
freedom as a series of value judgments supporting a radically 
pluralistic egalitarian society. On the other side were those who viewed 
social responsibility from stages one and two of the continuum, 
defending intellectual freedom from a position of collective and 
individual neutrality (Peattie, 1987, pp. 43-57). 
As the debate waned in the 1970s, i t  was obvious to many 
proponents and opponents of the social responsibility movement that 
there were several key issues in the debate that had not been, and 
perhaps cannot yet be, settled. One key issue concerns the operational 
definition of social responsibility. How shall a library’s resources 
be allocated to help solve social problems? With what specific 
problems shall a given library concern itself? What priorities shall 
be established? What goals or standards of performance shall be 
established? What measures shall be employed to determine if a library 
is socially responsible or socially irresponsible? 
In the, past, the traditional library environment provided little 
or no information to the decision maker that was useful in answering 
the above questions. The concept of social responsibility itself 
provided no clear guidelines for ethical behavior. Given this lack 
of clarity, librarians who wanted to be socially responsible were left 
to follow their own devices or relied on some rather vague 
generalizations about social values and public expectations. 
Another problem with the concept of social responsibility is that 
i t  has not always taken into account the environment in which the 
library functions. In the past, many advocates of social responsibility 
treated the library as an isolated entity that had the ability to engage 
in unilateral social action. Eventually, i t  came to be recognized that 
libraries are severely limited in their ability to respond adequately 
to social problems. There are physical, organizational, and attitudinal 
barriers that have to be overcome (Martin, 1989). 
The last issue that remains unresolved in the debate about social 
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responsibility concerns the moral basis of the notion. The term 
responsibility is fundamentally a moral one that implies an obligation 
to someone or something. It is clear to most people that librarians 
have professional responsibilities to acquire, process, and disseminate 
information products and services efficiently to users of libraries. 
These responsibilities constitute the reason for the existence of 
libraries. But why do librarians have social responsibilities and to 
whom? What are the moral foundations for a concern with the social 
impact of information services? 
The proponents of social responsibility, though well intentioned, 
have produced no clear and generally accepted moral principle that 
would impose on the information professions an obligation to work 
for social change. Various arguments have been made to try to link 
moral behavior of the profession to the performance of libraries. 
Little has been accomplished, however, by way of developing a solid 
and acceptable moral argument for the notion of social responsibility. 
Thus, although those promoting social responsibility are wry 
moralistic in many of their statements, in debate with others, they 
do not articulate a philosophical basis for the social responsibilities 
discussed (Bundy, 1980). 
The emotionally laden nature of the discussion on social 
responsibility presents the possibility that debate on the subject will 
continue indefinitely with little prospect of agreement being reached 
on the scope of the issues involved or their solution. Beginning in 
the late 1970s and continuing through the 198Os, a theoretical and 
conceptual reorientation has begun to take place regarding the 
information profession’s obligations to its various constituencies. The 
new approach can be labeled “social responsiveness” (Pearce & 
Robinson, 1989, pp. 147-48) and it has become clear that the shift 
from responsibility to responsiveness reflects a significant change 
of focus. This new focus has shifted the dwussion from moral 
imperatives related to social responsibility to a more technical and 
neutral approach that includes social responsiveness. 
The Public Library Association’s guidelines for identifying roles 
for public libraries reflects this shift (McClure et al., 1987).The process 
described in the guidelines includes identification of both internal 
and external mechanisms, procedures, arrangements, and behavioral 
patterns of the library’s constituent groups taken collectively. It 
establishes mechanisms to judge the capability of libraries to fulfill 
certain roles. Attempts are made to identify key variables within the 
library that relate to its responsiveness and discover structural changes 
that will enable the library to respond adequately to social demands. 
The important questions are not moral, related to whether a library 
should respond to a social problem out of a sense of social 
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responsibility, but more pragmatic and action oriented, dealing with 
the library’s ability to respond and the changes necessary to enable 
it to respond more effectively. 
One of the advantages of this approach is its managerial 
orientation. The concept ignores the philosophical debate about 
responsibility and obligation and focuses on the problems and 
prospects of making libraries more socially responsive. The process 
lends itself to analytical techniques in utilizing specific methods, 
such as data collection and analysis and numerical interpretation 
of results. The utilization of data through this process can help 
decision makers determine how best to institutionalize social policy 
throughout the library. Organizational structures can be evaluated; 
the roles of information professionals can be delineated; personnel 
policies can be structured to reward appropriate “socially responsive” 
behavior; and goal statements can be formulated that reflect the roles 
identified. 
Even though this approach seems to answer many of the questions 
faced by those concerned with the social responsibility debate, social 
responsiveness does not offer answers to all questions. The concept 
of social responsiveness does not provide guidance on how resources 
should be allocated to fulfill the various library roles. Libraries 
respond to the same problems in different ways and to varying degrees. 
And there is no clear data as to what pattern of responsiveness will 
be the most successful. The philosophy of responsiveness does not 
help a library to decide what roles it should have or what priorities 
should be established. In the final analysis, social responsiveness 
provides no better guidance to management than does social 
responsibility on the best strategies or policies to be adopted for library 
service. It appears that library personnel, by determining the degree 
of social responsiveness and the pressures to which they will respond, 
decide the meaning of the concept and what services will be developed 
as a result. 
There is still a lack of moral principles or theory on which to 
base decisions. Societal pressures are assumed to exist, and libraries 
must respond to these in some manner. Social responsiveness assumes 
a passive attitude to such pressures. The concept of responsiveness 
provides no moral basis for information professionals to respond to 
social problems. There is no explicit moral or ethical theory and 
no specific values for personnel to follow in making responses to 
societal demands. 
This position becomes quite evident when examining the 
statement of professional ethics developed by the American Library 
Association (ALA) in 1981 (ALA. Committee on Professional Ethics, 
1981, p. 335). The 1981 statement makes no mention of the Library 
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Bill of Rights nor any other philosophical statement as a source of 
the foundational ethics of library service. Although a 1980 draft spoke 
of the need for “participation in professional associations [and] 
community activity in support of library programs and legislation” 
(ALA. Committee on Professional Ethics, 1980), this point was left 
out of the adopted version. 
Criticism of the draft document includes the assertion that, “it 
does not deal adequately with the ends and means of the library 
profession. Rather i t  is primarily a guide to attitudes toward work, 
without examining the mission of that work” (Du Mont, 1980, n.p.). 
While the presence of an ethical code can stimulate debate and 
strengthen professional autonomy, these results can only take place 
if the effect of the code is one of clarification of the practice of 
librarianship rather than a clarification of the appropriate demeanor 
of the professional (Kuhn, 1989, p. 25). 
In responding to such criticism, the question of managerial 
guidelines and principles becomes relevant. What criteria, other than 
self-interest, are relevant to guide information professionals in the 
development of socially responsible strategies? Shall these strategies 
be judged solely on their short term effectiveness-i.e., in helping 
a library respond to a patron who wishes to remove a certain book 
from the shelves? Can libraries retain their neutral posture and still 
support those government leaders who support the interests of 
libraries and share traditional values of intellectual freedom and 
access? The nagging question of defining the social good or, in a 
public policy context, of defining the public interest, appears. And 
finally, the absence of a clear moral underpinning for whatever 
strategies are determined continues to present a problem. If 
information professionals become proactive, does such behavior mean 
that they are attempting to minimize the impact of social change? 
Do not information professionals have a moral obligation that goes 
beyond their identified mandate to acquire and disseminate 
information? If information professionals do have social and political 
responsibilities as well as professional responsibilities, what is the 
moral basis for these responsibilities today? 
ETHICALDIMENSION MAKINGOF DECISION 
In answering the preceding questions, the major premise is that 
management is basically an ethical task, and that many management 
decisions have an ethical dimension. In general, an ethical decision 
is one that affects human welfare or human fulfillment in some 
significant manner (Bucholz, 1989): 
An ethical decision can be further defined as a decision where questions 
of justice and rights are serious and relevant moral considerations. These 
concepts are central ethical considerations in human affairs, and an 
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ethical decision is one where a consideration of them is an important 
dimension of the decision. Can the decision be defended on grounds 
of justice? Is it fair and equitable in some sense to all the parties affected? 
Does the decision violate some basic human rights, such that it could 
be labeled an immoral decision? These are the kinds of questions that 
must be asked. (p. 31) 
Bucholz (1989) has identified three levels of ethical issues which 
vary in scope and breadth-the individual level, the organization 
level, and the system level (pp. 30-47). At the individual level, one 
makes day-to-day decisions that mostly involve the application of 
institutional policy to specific situations. When dilemmas arise, 
judgments must be made, some of which have ethical dimensions. 
At the organizational level, decisions are made for the organization 
that will guide the behavior of employees. These decisions may be 
broad in scope and involve consideration of social responsibility. At 
the system level, broad questions can be raised about the ethical 
foundations of information service; such questions are not tied to 
a particular organization. 
The specific nature of the decisions involved at each of these 
levels can be seen if a concrete example is used. Information access 
issues are fraught with ethical dimensions and provide a useful vehicle 
to illustrate ethical dilemmas at each of these levels. Let us assume 
that the basic organizational policy in regard to access is one of “free 
access to all library materials for all individuals.” Ethics enters into 
access decisions at the individual level in borderline or exceptional 
cases that policy does not seem to cover. For example, does free access 
really mean that a ten year old can take out an “R” rated video? 
At the organizational level, the ethical dimensions of decision 
making come into play when selection decisions are made. Decision 
makers must make certain that the criteria and procedures that are 
established to make selection choices do not discriminate against 
certain writers nor points of view nor on the basis of irrelevant factors 
such as race, sex, or religious preference of either the author or selector. 
Self censorship of controversial materials is a constant problem that 
must be addressed. 
At the system level, ethical questions relate to information 
dissemination. Who has access to information and at what cost? How 
does information format affect access? Who is responsible for 
providing information for those who have limited skills to acquire 
it? These kinds of questions are settled through the public policy 
process and the eventual outcome is reflected in laws and regulations 
related to information access at local, state, and federal levels. 
Figure 1 shows these various levels of decision making and the 
ethical issues relevant to each level. Potential clashes exist at all levels. 
Institutional policy may require that a decision maker go against 
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his or her own ethical standards, producing significant internal 
conflict for one so involved. Institutional policy may not always reflect 
the ethical standards of the society at large, which may force society 
to develop laws and regulations to bring about change in institutional 
behavior. 
Decision Rule: Select the best materials for the most people at the least 
cost. 
Individual level: Borderline and extraordinary cases. 
Organization level: Are selection criteria discriminatory? 
System level: Is information access just and equitable? 
Figure 1. Information access decisions 
Another example can be taken from the hiring process for 
librarians (see Figure 2). Many libraries make an ALA-accredited 
degree an entry-level qualification for a professional librarian. 
Applicants for professional positions lacking this qualification are 
rejected. The ALA-accredited degree thus becomes a standard by which 
libraries hope to assure the recruitment of a high quality staff. 
Ethics enters into a decision to hire at the individual level in 
borderline or exceptional cases where applying the policy in a 
mechanical fashion does not seem just or equitable. For example, 
i f  an applicant does not have an ALA-accredited degree, should he 
or she be automatically rejected without looking at other information 
such as previous work experience or other academic credentials? Such 
a decision may not seem fair given the subjective nature of the hiring 
process in general. Suppose a candidate with previous work 
experience, but without an ALA degree, is narrowly rejected for an 
academic library position and another candidate with an ALA-
accredited degree, but no work experience, is accepted for a position. 
Is that fair considering that the work experience and academic 
credentials are not really comparable. And what about exceptional 
cases in which applicants may have other credentials, including 
doctorates? Should they be mechanically rejected without some special 
consideration? 
At the organizational level, ethical considerations come into play 
when one considers justice and rights in relation to the hiring policy 
itself. Does a hiring policy discriminate unjustly on the basis of race 
or sex, or can it  be defended as fair and equitable? Are written 
employment tests biased in favor of white middle class applicants 
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due to the concepts and language used in examinations: Is an 
applicant’s right to equal treatment violated by the use of such 
examinations? And, given the fact that grades mean different things 
depending on the school one attended, is i t  fair that grades are used 
as a factor in making employment decisions? 
At the system level, questions can be asked about the justice 
of public service institutions such as libraries hiring only those who 
are citizens or legal residents of a given community. Do not all 
individuals have a right to apply for employment for which they 
feel qualified, regardless of their legal status or place of residence? 
These are serious ethical questions worthy of debate. 
Decision Rule: Reject applicants who do not meet the standards. 
Individual level: Borderline and extraordinary situations. 
Organization level: Is the required ALA-accredited degree fair and equita
to all groups, including all races and both sexes? 
ble 
System level: Is it fair and just for public service institutions to h
legal qualifications for employment unrelated 
individual expertise? 
ave 
to 
Figure 2. Hiring decisions 
These examples serve to illustrate where ethical questions arise 
at different levels of decision making in libraries. The decisions made 
at all these levels benefit and burden individuals and groups 
differentially. Some individuals gain and others are affected adversely. 
Questions of justice and individual rights become relevant (MacCann, 
1989, pp. 1-11). The question for the manager to answer is, Whose 
rights should be respected and what concept of justice is appropriate? 
(Bucholz, 1989, pp. 35-47). 
ETHICALCONSIDERATIONSFOR MANAGERS 
IN LIBRARIANSHIP 
Librarians as managers are constantly making ethical decisions 
whether they know it or not. They are constantly directing people 
toward or away from information resources that may directly impact 
their ability to enhance their lives or the life of their community. 
They are creating the future for their organizations, for their 
employees, for their users, for those who fund the service, and for 
society as a whole. 
Decisions about information access can affect human well being 
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and social welfare, having ethical impacts that are significant for 
all those touched by the decisions. A recent article in the Chronicle 
of Higher Education discussed “a revolution in the nature of resources 
that provide [political] power” (Coughlin, 1990, pp. 10-11). The 
suggestion is made that access to information resources must now 
be counted as a source of world power. As the ability to access 
information across the globe becomes possible through the use of 
technology, librarians will have more and more opportunity to 
influence decision making on a worldwide scale through appropriate 
information provision. This is an awesome responsibility and one 
that calls for ethical reflection of the highest order. 
Librarians must be encouraged to think more broadly and highly 
of their task. They must recognize that libraries are multiple purpose 
institutions that have many impacts besides cultural enrichment or 
recreation. Moral leadership of such institutions means recognizing 
information agencies as part of an ethical system havingvarious values 
that are important to human welfare. The challenge to librarians 
is to incorporate these values into routine decision making and 
develop methods of analysis that are applicable to identifying 
appropriate goals for themselves and their organizations. 
AN ACTION PLAN 
The implementation of an ethical vision in librarianship requires 
action in several areas. An ethical perspective must be incorporated 
into the workplace as well as into the curriculum through which 
future librarians are being educated. The following areas constitute 
what could be called an ethical agenda for librarians in both of these 
settings. 
1. 	 In the educational setting, such a plan calls for a thorough 
integration of moral and ethical concerns into the library/ 
information science curriculum. Although separate courses in 
ethics may also be offered, integration of ethical concerns into 
basic courses such as Management or Reference is essential to make 
ethics more directly related to the roles and responsibilities of 
information professionals. 
2. Continuing education programs need to develop parallel efforts 
to maintain the work begun in the academic setting. Questions 
about ethics and moral aspects of librarianship must continue to 
be addressed as professionals move through their careers. 
3. 	Library boards of trustees and/or advisory boards must demonstrate 
a concern about ethics by raising ethical questions when 
aDDroDriate. The moral imdications of decisions and actions must 
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Boards can acknowledge the significance of ethical issues by raising 
them in relation to goal setting and long-range planning. 
4. 	Information professionals at all levels must recognize the 
important role they play in institutionalizing ethical responsibility 
throughout their organizations. Professional librarians have many 
channels open to them to shape the library/information center, 
including the setting of objectives for units and individuals, 
developing and implementing the reward structure of staff, 
modifying organizational structure to accomplish goals, and 
developing and utilizing appropriate measures of performance. 
Professional staff not only have responsibility for efficient and 
effective use of material and human resources but also must be 
willing to create a responsible institution that cares about and 
responds to the ethical and moral imperatives of its policies and 
actions. 
5. 	Information policy-making by various government bodies must 
be considered from an ethical point of view. Librarians have a 
role to play in the debate; they can make contributions to the 
discussion and provide insight into the formation of regulations 
regarding the dissemination of information. Librarians must be 
given the freedom to respond to information policy issues out of 
a sense of ethical responsibility; rules and regulations for the 
control of information flow must be evaluated as well as the 
inherent limitations of information dissemination systems. 
6. 	More research must be considered by both library school faculty 
and professional librarians into the ethical aspects of decision 
making by librarians. One of the themes of this article is that 
many in the profession of librarianship are ignorant of ethical 
issues, not having a good understanding of how such matters should 
be analyzed and discussed. Research into ethical and moral issues 
can help overcome this ignorance. Scholars in the field need to 
apply their expertise to ethical questions and combine this with 
the work of those from other professional disciplines who have 
similar concerns. 
This action plan suggests that a consideration of ethical issues 
must become a familiar comfortable part of librarians’ thought 
processes. Ethical ambiguities are always present because no one can 
formulate policies that are going to be morally justified in all 
circumstances and in all places and times. It is important that those 
responsible for formulating, implementing, and evaluating policies 
should be made aware of these ambiguities and be ethically aware 
so as to act in a responsible and moral manner. Ambiguity, i t  should 
be noted, does not diminish the significance of ethical issues, which 
this discussion implies are pervasive in librarianship. In point of 
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fact, the ethical dimension of librarianship represents a generalized 
concern for the improvement of quality of library service and 
professional conduct of librarians. 
A final caveat is in order. Ethical behavior in librarianship does 
not mean that one should take no action, that is, avoid certain actions 
or books or ideas in an effort to keep out of trouble. On the contrary, 
the notion of ethics suggests that librarians take actions that are 
socially just. Only by actively pursuing social aims can librarians 
be ethically responsive. There is evidence to suggest that librarians 
choose not to choose, to “play it safe” with services and collections. 
Instead, librarians ought to exercise ethical judgment in their duties. 
Only by demonstrating the highest standards of ethical decision 
making will librarians inspire confidence and respect in the 
information arena. 
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LibrariadPatron Confidentiality: 
An Ethical Challenge 
RHODAGAROOGIAN 
ABSTRACT 
THEAUTHOR PRESENTS moral, legal, and professional arguments for 
the protection of a patron’s privacy, reviews how some librarians 
have dealt with the issue, and concludes that librarians should lobby 
for legal recognition of librariadpatron privilege of confidentiality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Privacy, as the term is commonly used, means the unavailability 
to others of information about oneself. For many years in our history, 
the need to protect one’s privacy was not an issue. Transactions 
involving personal information were simpler and, if records were 
generated at all, they were generally maintained by the individual. 
As society grew in complexity, so did its need for information. Up 
until recent times, however, this information was still easily protected. 
Much of the records keeping that we did as a society had the protection 
of the fact that getting at the data was so damned difficult. Do you 
remember the old file cabinet? You had to get the drawer open, and 
then you had to g o  through this file and that file. The greatest protection 
of privacy was the old file cabinet that did not have enough oil on the 
drawer.... 
Suddenly the difficulty of opening the file cabinet is no longer there. 
You just push a button. You will get more data than you ever want 
to see about anything and everything. (Blaustein, 1984, p. 11) 
COMPUTER AND PRIVACYTECHNOLOGY 
Society has grown dramatically in complexity, generating an 
enormous increase in the amount of information that is recorded 
and in its capacity for retrieving this information. The government’s 
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appetite for personal information has grown to an insatiable level. 
Surveillance devices have been developed and perfected. Dramatic 
advances in computer technology, perhaps most of all, have 
contributed to the increasing problem of maintaining an individual’s 
privacy. Computers are capable of performing a multitude of repetitive 
tasks and of organizing and storing vast quantities of information, 
two functions that have made the work of the information professional 
infinitely more efficient. Along with the increasing capability of 
computers to manage vast amounts of information, there has been 
an increasing awareness of the computer’s potential to seriously 
compromise the individual’s right to privacy. This major issue has 
been identified in different professions. Business people, lawyers, and 
other professionals, for example, have expressed deepening concern 
for the increasing capability of government surveillance in the name 
of national security. 
HISTORY INVASIONSOF PRIVACY 
In the area of library and information science, the issue of privacy 
existed before computer technology advances became a reality. In 
1970, for example, when there was growing interest on the part of 
the government in subversives, agents began to request slips and 
to make inquiries relating to borrowers of books about explosives. 
In Milwaukee, the city attorney ruled that such records were “public 
records,” at which point the librarian complied. In the Atlanta Public 
Library, the same request was denied in the absence of a subpoena 
(Crookes, 1976, p. 3). The Seattle Public Library released its 1970 
circulation records to the FBI when the agency presented a subpoena 
for the records in connection with a forgery case. In that same year, 
the library in Los Alamos, Texas, refused to turn over records that 
FBI agents had requested regarding individuals included on a 
subversives list (Linowes & Hyman, 1982, p. 495). 
ALA ADOPTSPRIVACYPOLICY 
In 1970, the American Library Association (ALA) adopted its 
“Policy on Confidentiality of Library Records” in response to these 
attempts by U.S. Treasury Agents and others to examine various 
libraries’ circulation records (Krug, 1988, p. 41). It was soon learned 
that the emphasis on voluntary compliance inherent in these 
guidelines was problematic at best. T h e  American Library 
Association, therefore, began lobbying for protection legislation and 
at last report was successful in thirty-nine states and in the District 
of Columbia (Zubrow, 1989, p. 90). 
Nonetheless, state, federal, and local officials continue to attempt 
to gain access to library personal data records. As recently as 1987, 
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FBI agents visited the Math/Science Library at Columbia University 
and asked the clerk who was on duty about foreigners who were 
using the library. This incident led to the disclosure of the now well- 
known FBI “Library Awareness Program” in which i t  was revealed 
that FBI representatives had visited libraries across the country 
seeking to obtain information about specific library patrons’ subject 
interests including the materials they had borrowed (Schmidt, 1989, 
pp. 83-90). 
There may have been a time when this information would have 
been difficult to find, a state of affairs that could have made it easier 
to resist compliance with such requests. As society, however, 
increasingly relies on information and moves into a near total 
technological environment, the issue of the individual’s freedom 
becomes even more crucial. In our eagerness to gain technological 
control of the ever-expanding world of information, are we losing 
sight of the individual’s right to privacy? 
Some of the specific issues that have relevancy for information 
professonals are concerned with circulation and reference records. 
The general image of the librarian’s role is the guardian of circulation 
records as well as provider of answers to reference questions. As such, 
the library has access to certain information about users that may 
be considered confidential. In both capacities, there is a direct link 
between the user whose confidentiality must be protected and the 
professional who is  the protector of this confidentiality. The 
increasing computerization of both circulation and reference systems 
means that access to these records has increased. 
Circulation systems, put simply, are “social surveillance” systems. 
Information on an individual’s past is held in a central place and 
can be called up  anytime. Technology now enables one to query 
the computer concerning the past performance of any patron within 
a few seconds. “Librarians dimly perceive the surveillance nature 
of circulation records.” They have asked for driver’s license numbers, 
social security numbers, place of work, and other data for the purpose 
of circulation. Is this information really necessary to maintain control 
over circulation (Crook, 1976, p. 483)? Furthermore, what does the 
library professional do when a U.S. Treasury Agent or other federal 
representative attempts to obtain information about the habits of 
a library’s borrowers? 
In many cases the reason for controversy is not the release of 
circulation records but rather the disclosure of a person’s reference 
questions-information that is also considered confidential. The 
online phenomenon simply adds to this concern, and the reference 
interview itself may very well infringe on a user’s privacy. 
Librarians must be aware of the pitfalls that can be encountered 
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in collecting, organizing, and disseminating information. Ad- 
ditionally, we must recognize that the lines are not as clearly drawn 
as we would care to have them. There exists a fundamental conflict 
between society’s need for information of many kinds and the 
individual’s right to privacy protection. The “Library Awareness 
Program,” for example, was justified by the FBI on the grounds that 
there was a need to protect the country from foreign spies who had 
exploited libraries by stealing proprietary and sensitive information 
(Schmidt, 1989, p. 84). In a democratic society, information is needed 
for many worthwhile purposes such as provision of services, the 
collection of taxes, protection against crime, and the maintenance 
of a free press. Citizens of a democracy, however, may at times find 
themselves in conflict; there exists a desire to preserve privacy and, 
concomitantly, the benefits of an open society. 
When faced with decisions regarding requests for information 
of a private nature, librarians may often find themselves involved 
in the age old conflict between the common good and the sanctity 
of the individual member of society. What should one do when police 
who are investigating cross burnings seek the names of persons using 
materials on the Ku Klux Klan or when the district attorney’s office 
investigating a rash of child murders seeks information on a suspect’s 
reading habits or when a husband seeks information on materials 
that his wife has taken out in order to prove she was contemplating 
a divorce? 
In all cases, whether it be a request from a family member, a 
law enforcement agent, or a reporter, the librarian is ethically and 
legally bound to make every effort to protect the individual’s right 
to privacy no matter how convincing the argument for the release 
of such information appears in the light of the greater good. The 
individual’s right to privacy should take precedence over the rights 
of society. A person’s independence, dignity, and integrity are violated 
when one’s right to privacy is infringed upon. In the words of Thomas 
Cooley ( 1868): 
i t  is better oftentimes that a crime should go unpunished than that 
the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his trunks 
broken open, his private books, papers, and letters exposed to prying 
curiosity.... (p. 306) 
By extension, it is far better for a crime to go unpunished than to 
have a patron’s reading habits revealed by a third party who is the 
custodian of this information. Librarians are in a very powerful 
position since they have direct access to the private reading and subject 
interests of their users. They have been entrusted with this power. 
It is, therefore, their moral obligation to keep this information 
confidential. 
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What is meant by privacy and is it a justifiable right? Privacy 
has been defined as: 
the claims of individuals ...to determine for themselves when, how and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others. 
(Buchanan, 1982, p. 31) 
the condition enjoyed by one who can control the communication 
of information about himself. (Lusky, 1972, p. 208) 
selective control of access to the self or to one’s group .... (Altman, 
1976, p. 8) 
control over when and by whom various parts of us can be sensed 
by others. By “sensed” is meant simply seen, heard, touched, smelled 
or tasted. (Thomson, 1975, pp. 304-05) 
[the] right that certain steps shall not be taken to find out facts [private 
facts] and ...[the] right that certain uses shall not be made of [these] 
facts. (Thomson, 1975, pp. 304-05) 
having control over information about oneself. (Decew, 1987, p. I71j 
The essence of privacy then is the ability to keep personal information 
from others, whether it be one’s thoughts, feelings, beliefs, fears, plans, 
or fantasies, and the control over if and when this information can 
be shared with others. The right to privacy, furthermore, can be 
justified on both moral and legal grounds. 
According to Edward Blaustein (1984), privacy is related to one 
basic value-the dignity of the individual which “defines man’s 
essence as a unique and self-determining human being” (p. 1000). 
The concept of dignity as i t  relates to essential humanity has its 
roots in religious tradition (Berger et al., 1974, p. 89). Privacy provides 
the rational context for love, trust, friendship, respect, and self-respect, 
without which we would not be human. Brian Johnstone (1984) argues 
that: “Human dignity is closely tied to self-determination since the 
forms of domination and manipulation which deprive people of self- 
determination are a profound affront to human dignity.” An 
individual, therefore, has a claim to privacy based on the requirements 
of self-determination in respect to the person’s basics needs (pp. 86- 
88). Erving Goffman (1973) adds that privacy plays a key role in 
self-identity and personhood. The ability to control access to thoughts 
or actions is closely tied to one’s notions of personal identity and 
selfhood (p. 178). This sense of self, Herbert C. Kelman (1977) believes, 
depends on maintaining a recognized boundary between self and 
environment, thus assuring private space on both physical and 
psychological levels. A central consideration in maintaining private 
space, he adds, is the inviolability of one’s body and personal 
possessions (p. 188). 
If privacy is a basic human need, it follows that, if it is absent, 
negative consequences will follow. Caplan (1982) argues: “Cognitive 
functioning can be impaired, physical and mental disorders can occur, 
the individual’s sense of well-being is harmed, and the sense of 
personhood and of self is injured” (p. 178). People feel intruded upon 
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when questioned about their family affairs, their religious beliefs, 
or their past histories. Questions about personal fantasies, religious 
beliefs, or political opinions may, to varying degrees, be experienced 
as violations of private space. 
Thus, respecting the rights persons have to privacy is as basic 
a requirement as there can be in ethics. “In the absence of privacy, 
there are no persons to serve as either the subjects or the agents 
of moral action and moral description” (Kelman, 1977, p. 188). Privacy 
is a right which must be taken seriously. It is a universal human 
need essential to one’s sense of identity and well being. Since privacy 
is a basic human need, the moral right to privacy achieves a “primacy 
superior to that of other rights” (Beauchamp, 1982, p. 31). 
Although not explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution, there 
are those who argue that the desire for privacy was clearly in the 
minds of its framers when they added the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. According to the U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings, these amendments, taken together, constitute an individual’s 
right to privacy (“How the Constitution Protects Your Right to be 
Left Alone,” 1986, p. 12). 
The development of the legal notion of privacy was first seriously 
addressed by the First Amendment which protects freedom of the 
press, speech, and peaceful assembly. The Fourth Amendment protects 
the right to be secure against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments shield individuals from 
having to testify against themselves. The Ninth Amendment 
acknowledges rights not spelled out but which are equally important. 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in an article written in 1890, 
noted that the violation of an individual’s right to privacy was a 
suitable subject in a court of law. They argued for the recognition 
of the right to privacy based on the principle of “inviolate 
personality”-i.e., “the right to be let alone’’-which they felt was 
a right most valued by civilized men (p.205). 
Until about 1937, the concept of personal privacy was treated 
quite restrictively by American courts. The notion of privacy was 
used primarily to protect the interest of property holders. In the 
late 1930s, the original notion of inviolate personality was restored. 
The right of privacy was now perceived as the right to protection 
against intrusions into an individual’s zone of privacy, which also 
includes the right to control information about oneself. 
In the mid-l960s, a new concept of privacy was introduced when 
the Supreme Court affirmed a right to privacy older than the Bill 
of Rights, older than political parties, older than the school system. 
It could now be claimed that the “right to privacy asserts the 
sacredness of the person.” The notion of privacy as seen in this context 
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existed to protect the individual from the intrusion of others, 
especially government (Johnstone, 1984, p. 76). 
The courts were slow to acknowledge the right to privacy. It 
was not until 1965, in Griswold v .  Connecticut, that the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Constitution guarantees a right to privacy (“How 
the Constitution Protects ...,” 1976, p. 12). In 1973, in the landmark 
Roe v .  Wade decision, the Supreme Court once again relied on the 
constitutional right to privacy to protect the zone of individual choice 
in the matter of abortion (Johnstone, 1984, p. 76). 
Concern about privacy began to increase as record keeping 
became automated, culminating in the Privacy Act of 1974, which 
takes as its basis the fundamental right provided by the Constitution 
to protect individuals from the growing ability, due to technology, 
to gather and control information (Johnstone, 1984, p. 77). “All people 
are by nature free and independent,” the act states, “and have certain 
inalienable rights among which are those of enjoying and defending 
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, and happiness, and privacy” (“Privacy 
Act of 1974,” 1974, p. 1896). Under the act, federal agencies are required 
to establish appropriate measures to protect the confidentiality of 
personal data records. It is also specified that personal data cannot 
be used for a purpose other than the one for which it  has been collected 
nor can i t  be disclosed to other agencies without the written consent 
of the subject (“Privacy Act ...,” 1974, pp. 1896-1910). 
The basis for concern for intrusions into the privacy of personal 
reading habits begins with the First Amendment. Mark Wilson (1980) 
maintains that: “The recognition of a first amendment right to read 
and a finding that this right is unduly burdened by disclosure of 
library circulation records provide an initial basis for the imposition 
of constitutional limitations on access to library borrower lists” (p. 
279). The First Amendment does not explicitly guarantee an 
individual’s right to read or to acquire knowledge. The right to speak 
or to publish, Wilson continues, presupposes listeners or readers and 
their right to receive information. The right to read can be seen 
as a necessary corollary to freedom of the press and to freedom of 
speech (p. 279). 
Wilson argues that a direct attempt to prohibit a reader’s exercise 
of his First Amendment rights would most certainly be struck down 
as unconstitutional (p. 185). He bases his argument on the “chilling 
effect” doctrine in which the Supreme Court has held that the 
uncertainty of litigation and the possibility of erroneous conviction 
create an impermissible First Amendment “chill.” That is, they 
inhibit individuals’ exercise of their rights. The process of “imputing 
the substance of a book” to its readers and using it as a measure 
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of the reader’s state of mind is, at best, a questionable endeavor. If 
reading habits, he continues, were admissible at trial, the possibility 
of improper interpretation and erroneous conviction would, without 
a doubt, inhibit the individual, or other individuals, from fully 
exercising the First Amendment right to read (p. 289). 
The U.S. Congress has not enacted any federal legislation that 
specifically protects library confidentiality. In the 100th Congress, 
a bill was introduced “to preserve personal privacy with respect to 
the rental, purchase, or delivery of videotapes or similar audiovisual 
materials and the use of library materials or services” (Senate Bill 
2361,1988). Joint hearings were held, but when the committee reported 
its findings, the library privacy protection section had been 
eliminated. Although they agreed in principle with the needed 
restriction on disclosure of library borrower records, the subcommittee 
members could not resolve questions regarding problems that might 
occur in the provision of law enforcement. All of the statutory activity 
relating to privacy of library records has been at the state level. Of 
the thirty-nine states that now have statutes, seventeen have broad 
laws protecting all library records (Zubrow, 1989, p. 91). Many allow 
disclosure upon permission or written consent of the person identified 
in that record or to persons authorized to inspect such records. Only 
a few states allow information to be released at the request of a parent 
or custodian of a minor child. Almost all specify that disclosure may 
be made only upon presentation of a court order or a subpoena 
(Million 8c Fisher, 1986, p. 347). 
Thus there is a strong moral and legal basis for protecting the 
confidentiality of a patron’s library records. When confronted with 
a request for information of a private nature from a third party, 
whether i t  be a law enforcement agent, a reporter, or a family member, 
how have some librarians dealt with the challenge of protecting the 
individual’s right to privacy? Several librarians describe the situations 
they were faced with and their responses. (These descriptions derive 
from several interviews that were granted on the proviso that they 
were to be kept confidential and hereafter will be referred to as 
“confidential inter views. ’ ’ ) 
Situation:An individual has gone on a shooting rampage at 3:30 
in the afternoon at the local shopping mall, killing three people 
and seriously injuring seven. She had been in the library at 2:OO 
that same day and had taken out some books. Subsequently, 
reporters and detectives from the criminal investigation division 
and district attorney’s office request information about the books 
the individual has taken out. 
Response: The first request came from a reporter on a local 
newspaper who, when refused, accused the director of protecting 
a cold-blooded killer who did not deserve the same civil rights 
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as others. The heart of the struggle to defend the suspect’s right 
to privacy centered on the endless visits by, and questions from, 
the detectives and staff from the criminal investigation division 
and the district attorney’s office, as well as from the defense 
lawyers. After three months, the district attorney finally decided 
to go ahead and try to get a court order, which was subsequently 
granted. In consultation with the library’s legal adviser, it was 
decided to show the requesters copies of the book cards rather 
than the originals. “Being interrogated by detectives and 
attorneys was a harrowing experience,” the director confides. 
“They hammered at me until I became confused. They tried 
to get me to say things I didn’t want to say. They wrote down 
the most casual remarks and used those responses later in court 
to discredit my testimony. They made me feel as if I were the 
one in the wrong ....The events of the day of my testimony were 
unforgettable,” she continues. “I spent nearly eight hours in a 
small guarded room with ten or more individuals waiting to 
testify. As I took the oath with my hand on the Bible and looked 
across the courtroom, I saw the suspect staring into my eyes. 
I felt guilty. I felt as if I were betraying her right to privacy 
in spite of all I had been through to protect it. I wished for 
something like the librariadpatron privilege” (Interview, 
August 18, 1988). 
Situation: A book is returned to the library. When the circulation 
card is put back, the book drops to the floor falling open and 
revealing a very detailed description of an intended assassination 
plot, including the date, against the President of the United States. 
Response: The director was aware that i t  is against the law not 
to report any knowledge one may have of a crime of this nature 
so she proceeded to contact the Secret Service after she was told 
the FBI was not the appropriate agency. When she told the agent 
what had happened, he asked her to reveal the name of the 
individual who had taken out the book which she would not 
do. She quoted from the state law which covered confidentiality 
of library records. The agent said that “no silly law superceded 
the federal statute.” Subsequently, she discovered there was no 
such statute. They harangued her for five days during which 
they questioned her patriotism and professionalism. They tried 
to exert pressure on the mayor, the personnel director of the city, 
the city clerk, and the library board president. As a result of 
this pressure, these officials tried to persuade her to release the 
name. She would not do it. Eventually she was served with two 
subpoenas, one as an individual and the other as custodian of 
the records. She contends that they had been very clever in doing 
this for i f  they had given her the one subpoena as an individual 
she would have said “I’m not in charge of circulation and don’t 
have that information.” She had no problem in complying once 
she had been served with the subpoena. To infringe on someone’s 
right without it, she contends, would have been troublesome 
to her. “I have a real problem with the release of information 
to begin with ...” she continues “When it involves the life of 
another person, who are we to decide who is to live and who 
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is to die” (Interview, July 28, 1988)? 
Situation: A deputy from the local sheriff’s office, narcotics 
division has requested information on anything the library has 
on people who have been reading books on witchcraft, satanism, 
or the mutilation of animals. He has theorized that people 
involved in satanism tend to be drug users. 
Response: The deputy produced a subpoena after he was told 
that he could not get the information without it. The subpoena 
was signed not only by the judge but by one of the assistant 
district attorneys. To have secured the cooperation of both of 
these officials indicated that they must have strong evidence 
against a particular individual or individuals. But it was soon 
discovered that they were not investigating any specific crimes 
or actions; they simply wanted to develop a file of potential drug 
abusers. In the meantime, the director scheduled a meeting with 
a higher official in the district attorney’s office. He revealed that 
he had no previous knowledge of the subpoena since it had not 
been obtained from any of the higher officials in the department. 
He advised the director not to turn over any information until 
he checked further. The director informed the official that a 
reporter had been calling him to try to get some information 
whereupon the official responded that he thought this was 
supposed to be a secret investigation. Apparently someone had 
revealed details about the investigation without authority, which 
made this an issue of equal importance to that official. 
Subsequently, after discovering that the subpoena had not been 
preceded by a careful scrutiny of the facts, the district attorney’s 
office withdrew it. It appears that the assistant district attorney 
had assumed that the sheriff’s office had a strong need for it. 
He too had had second thoughts about the subpoena’s validity 
since it requested too broad of a search. They had wanted twelve 
months worth of circulation records pertaining to everybody who 
had checked out books on satanism. A newspaper article 
subsequently appeared that outraged several library users. Some 
admitted to being so frightened they wanted to turn in their 
library cards. A mother would not let her son check out a book 
about witchcraft on his library card but rather checked it out 
on her own (Interview, September 6, 1988). 
Situation: The President of the United States has been shot. The 
only piece of information on the alleged perpetrator is a library 
card. Hundreds of telephone calls are received by the library. 
Newsweek representatives appear with a copy of the state’s Open 
Records Act and claim that the library must give them access 
to the perpetrator’s library records. 
Response: After i t  was revealed that the only piece of 
identification that. the alleged assassin had on him was a library 
card, the phone started to ring at the library and continued for 
at least thirty-six hours. 
Everyone, including the London Times,wanted to know what 
he had checked out. The library quoted its library board policy 
which forbade employees from giving out information. At that 
time, the librarian believed, due to the fact that the library still 
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used a microfilm system, that it would have been almost 
impossible to retrieve this information. Now they are automated 
and could respond within seconds. They had not set up strict 
rules that guided the staff in how to deal with requests of this 
nature. In general, they knew they should keep this information 
confidential. Callers besieged several branches wanting to know 
what he had read, where he lived, and had the members of the 
staff seen him? Newsweek people appeared on the scene the next 
day with a copy of the state’s Open Records Act and insisted 
that the library must give them access to the circulation records. 
The librarian refused, but subsequently was told by the county 
attorney that the records must be shown to the requesters. The 
library complied and the Newsweek representatives spent three 
days reviewing all of the records, not only those of the suspect. 
At that time the library press criticized them for having given 
out the information. The librarian declared it was a very difficult 
time. Subsequently, the library director decided the library could 
not function under these constant requests for this information 
and ultimately decided to release the information to United Press 
International. The FBI finally served them with a subpoena, 
and the library turned over the books to them (to this day the 
books have not been returned). Since then the state has enacted 
a Privacy of Library Records Act. At the time of the affair, the 
county attorney said, “I hate to tell you, but courts do not care 
a great deal about what the American Library Association says. 
They never heard of it and could care less.” The lesson learned 
in this case, says the librarian, is the necessity for a state law 
(Confidential interview, August 2, 1988). 
Situation: A woman has asked for circulation records pertaining 
to her stepchildren. Three years before, she and her husband 
(the natural father) had obtained a court order mandating that 
the natural mother use the natural father’s name. Could the 
library tell her what name was being used by the children? 
Response: When the woman asked for the circulation records 
pertaining to her stepchildren, it was explained to her that there 
is a state confidentiality policy within the library and a state 
law that supports the policy. It was further explained that the 
library could give out the information if the patron could present 
a library card or if she could provide them with the patron’s 
card number. The patron proceeded to give them some 
background information on her situation. Her husband had been 
divorced approximately eight years before, and there were two 
children as a result of this first marriage. Both parties had since 
remarried, and the natural mother was using the stepfather’s name 
for the children. Three years before, the patron and her husband 
had obtained a court order that mandated that the natural mother 
use the natural father’s name for the two boys. Apparently the 
court order had been ignored. The librarian sympathized with 
her predicament but could not reveal any information without 
a court order. Subsequently, the subpoena did arrive. The 
librarian conferred with the library’s attorney. “In our data base,” 
she explained, “we have the capability of searching the name 
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which appears on the subpoena in several different ways. In this 
case, it is complicated because the last name is a fairly common 
one and one of the children’s first names was spelled incorrectly 
on the subpoena.” The attorney advised them to supply the 
information only as it is requested on the subpoena. As a result, 
they did not supply the information on the child whose name 
was misspelled. The information pertaining to the second child 
was supplied. Soon after, the father came into the library asking 
if they could search the database by the various spellings. The 
staff member would not comply since the father did not bring 
a court order requesting such a search. Following this, the director 
received a phone call at her home from the father. She explained 
that they had followed the directions given by their attorney, 
but that if he could get another subpoena, which had the correct 
spelling and variations, they would give him the information 
he sought (Confidential interview, August 3, 1988). 
Situation:An individual is caught forging documents in another 
state. He is one of the library’s users. The librarian is handed 
a subpoena from the other state requesting this information. 
Response: When the subpoena was presented, it was sent down 
to the library’s legal counsel who immediately pointed out that 
i t  was not legal in this state. “We could have followed the letter 
of the law,” the librarian explains, “and simply said no, but 
we brought judgment to bear and saw that it would be in our 
best interest to provide the information that was needed.” They 
did feel certain, he adds, that what was asked for in the subpoena 
was legitimate. They did not supply any information beyond 
what was asked for in the subpoena nor did they reveal that 
they did indeed have other information that might be pertinent. 
The authorities wanted to know if the individual had used the 
library during a specific period of time and, if so, for what had 
he been looking. The librarian affirmed that he had been using 
the library during that time, but did not reveal what he had 
read (Confidential interview, June 8.0,1988). 
Whether or not one agrees with the specific actions taken by 
these librarians, i t  is necessary to recognize the context within which 
they were operating-the conflict between the common good and 
the sanctity of the individual. When asked how they view this conflict, 
most agreed that the rights of the individual should take precedence 
over the rights of society. 
I think philosophically I would [say] that the rights of the individual 
are supreme ....Society has a few rights, but I think basically the answer 
would be that the rights of the individual take complete precedence 
(Confidential interview, August 18, 1988). 
Probably the edge should be given to the individual. How much of 
an edge depends on the situation ....One is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. The individual seems to need a little more help sometimes 
when the government seems so much more powerful (Confidential 
interview, June 30, 1988). 
[The] two are equally important, but the rights of the individual take 
more precedence....Society always needs to prove its right to the 
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information whereas the person doesn’t (Confidential interview, August 
2, 1988). 
The right of the individual should take precedence over everything ....If 
there is a legitimate reason to know what a person is reading ...then 
the law should be able to prove it (Confidential interview, July 28, 1988). 
Judith Krug (1988),in her testimony before the Senate Committee 
investigating the feasibility of enacting a Video and Library Privacy 
Protection Act, eloquently reminded the listeners that: 
One of the guiding principles of the library profession in this country 
is intellectual freedom. To librarians, this concept involves two 
inseparable rights. The first is the First Amendment right to seek and 
obtain access to all publicly-available ideas and information. The second 
is the right to have what one has sought and what one has used kept 
private. The right to information cannot help but be inhibited if personal 
reading or research interests can and will become known to others without 
one’s own consent. 
There are people in every community who believe that a person’s 
interest in a subject must reflect not merely his intellectual interests, 
but his character and attitudes. Thus, in the view of some people, a 
person who reads the “underground press” is branded as a radical; a 
person who reads atheistic tracts is marked an atheist; a person who 
reads sexually oriented literature is identified as a libertine ....Such 
characteristics are not justified or warranted by such literary pursuits 
but if charged, they can be personally and professionally damaging. (pp. 
40-41) 
Tenuous at best is the inference involved in probing individuals’ 
mental processes through their reading habits. Recently, when a 
woman in Seattle was accused of putting poison in the Excedrin 
that killed her husband, it was discovered that she had taken out 
several books that discussed cyanide and poisonous doses. The 
prosecution used this information to substantiate theory that she 
had read this material in preparation for the murder. The defendant, 
on the other hand, claimed she had taken out the books for 
“information about poisonous plants because she was concerned 
about potential danger from local toxic plants for her granddaughter 
and children for whom she baby sat” (“Trial Under Way in Cyanide 
Death,” 1988, p. A16). Morally and legally what individuals read or 
what information they seek is nobody else’s business. A library user’s 
privacy has clearly been invaded if a librarian reveals this information 
to an outsider. As indicated in the American Library Association’s 
“Statement on Professional Ethics,” librarians must protect each 
user’s right to privacy with respect to information sought or received 
and materials consulted, borrowed, or acquired (“Librarian’s Code 
of Ethics,” 1982).This places an enormous responsibility of protecting 
the sanctity of the individual’s right to privacy squarely on the 
librarian. 
How can the interests of the library’s patron be best served? 
Librarians should be granted the privilege of library/patron 
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confidentiality. Confidentiality refers to a general standard of 
professional conduct that obliges a professional not to discuss 
information about clients with anyone. It implies a contract not to 
reveal anything about clients without their agreement (Stover, 1987, 
p. 240). Privilege occurs when a certain type of relationship protects 
information derived from that relationship from being legally 
acquired (Stover, 1987, p. 241). 
The profession must be able to legally defend the perspective 
outlined in a 1970 American Libraries editorial: 
What an individual uses in a library may not be used against him; ... 
records of transactions between librarian and client may not be used 
against him in a court of law without his permission; ... a librarian 
[may] not be required to testify on types of material used by any given 
individual. 
The library has long been recognized as a “sanctuary of ideas,” the 
editorial continues: 
If the citizens of a free nation are to have access to materials which 
can express ideas unpopular with segments of its own society including 
the government, they must be free of the fear of intimidation and possible 
incrimination 
Librarians must constantly provide the alternatives in idea and thought 
while respecting the individual right to privacy as he searches for his 
own solutions. (“Editor’s Choice,” 1970, p. 750) 
The public must believe that the library is a sanctuary where 
inhviduals can feel unconstrained by the possibility that the materials 
they use, the books they read, or the questions they ask will become 
public knowledge. If a library earns a reputation for reporting on 
the actions of its citizens, it can be very serious. It could create 
obstructions to patrons’ pursuit of knowledge and have a “chilling” 
effect on their First Amendment right to read. If people cannot use 
the library because of fear, they are being denied free access. The 
following was reported in the Brooklyn Heights Press in 1988: 
On Friday afternoon, a patron telephoned the Central Library to inquire 
whether the published proceedings of the recently-concluded Soviet 
Communist Party Congress were now available. She was told that they 
were not, but that information on the Congress could be found in The 
New York Times, available in the Periodical Division. 
A short time later, the librarian received another call, from a woman 
who said the first caller had been her secretary. She had called the Times 
to obtain reprints of their reporting on the Congress, but was told she 
needed to know the names of the reporters who had filed the stories. 
The librarian told her that she could get this information from The 
New York Times Zndex at the library. At this, the patron asked, “If 
I come and ask for that material, will you report me to the FBI?” 
Despite the librarian’s assurances that no-such thing would happen, 
the woman was unconvinced. She again said that she was concerned 
about sending someone to the library for this information because of 
her fear of the FBI. “I just don’t want to get in trouble with the 
government” she said. (“Seeking Spies,” 1988, p. 10) 
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Respecting the rights that patrons have to privacy is the basic 
requirement of the librarian’s Code of Ethics. It is difficult to infringe 
on this right and feel morally justified in doing so. In the absence 
of a legal doctrine of professional privilege for client communication, 
the librarian, in a court of law, may be required to break 
confidentiality or be sent to jail. Librarians have little recourse to 
disclosures dictated by subpoenas. Subpoenas can be challenged, but 
to do so, the librarian must convince the court that the subpoena 
has been unlawfully issued in respect to a specific law. It is impractical 
for the reader of books or the user of library materials to come forward 
to challenge a subpoena. To do so would reveal the name of the 
individual involved and thus inhibit or “chill” the reader’s desire 
to read certain books. It then becomes the responsibility of the holder 
of the records, the library, to raise the constitutional claims of the 
reader (Wilson, 1981, pp. 317-18). 
If, with the help of legal counsel, i t  is determined that the 
subpoena has been properly issued, can the librarian be held liable 
for violating the First Amendment right of the patron by providing 
the information? (This has yet to be tested in court.) Judgment can 
also be brought to bear in how to respond to a subpoena. Some 
librarians admit to responding to requests in different ways depending 
on the urgency of the situation and how sympathetic they are to 
the request itself. 
Depending on the situation we use some judgement in terms of how 
much or little we talk with them [requesters] .... We read the subpoena 
very carefully and read the request very carefully and though we might 
not agree with what’s being asked for, we wouldn’t go against the law 
and if we disagreed we might cut back the amount of information. We 
would be very precise about what information they asked for and the 
exact date it was delivered. If they were off a day we would be precise 
and say nothing came in on  that day. We would not offer the 
information.... [On the other hand] we can help to get the requester 
to be more focused. (Confidential interview, June 30, 1988) 
In the absence of library/patron privileged communication, there 
are many librarians who have no legal support at all in protecting 
their patrons’ First Amendment rights. Not all states have statutes; 
those statutes that do exist are not necessarily adequate nor is there 
uniformity in their coverage. Judith Krug, testifying at that same 
Congressional Hearing in 1988, elaborates: 
Many of the statutes enacted ...which protect the privacy of library records 
did not adequately anticipate the ways technology has changed the 
character of library use. Thus, many of these statutes apply to only one 
or two kinds of libraries, i.e., public, school and/or academic. In addition, 
many of the statutes refer to materials checked out of libraries. 
Increasingly, however, library patrons use online databases. Moreover, 
none of these statutes protect privacy rights of the information in multi- 
library, not to mention multi-state networks, many of which share not 
only cataloging but also circulation information .... Some of the state 
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laws apply only to public libraries, not to school libraries. Some apply 
only to those libraries receiving state funds. (pp. 45-46) 
In the absence of library/patron privileged communication, are 
librarians morally bound to tell their clients that under certain legal 
conditions they may have to provide information about their research 
or reading interests to law enforcement officers? In other words, when 
patrons take out a book from the library or ask for reference help, 
they may have relinquished their right to privacy. In an effort to 
protect the patron by implementing tight procedures for concealing 
an individual’s reading habits, John C .  Swan (1983) wonders if we 
are not creating “an atmosphere inimical to the informal exchange 
of ideas .... Libraries, are among the last remaining places where people 
openly talk about books ....An environment of secrecy can have a 
‘chilling’ effect on the patron’s First Amendment right to privacy” 
(p. 1650). 
In the absence of librariadpatron privileged communication, 
can we really hope to provide the most efficient service if we are 
bound to keep as little information as possible of a private nature 
about our patrons? Walt Crawford (1988) describes the pitfalls inherent 
in standardizing patron and circulation information. 
The computer makes i t  far easier to standardize patron and circulation 
information. A standard format would make it easier for a library to 
move from one system to another. Library systems could then be linked. 
A patron could conceivably present another library’s card and receive 
service, and the library could gain immediate information as to the 
patron’s status. However, this record has personal information. If the 
system is tapped into, patrons can be linked to materials currently charged 
out and to information within every library to which the system is linked. 
(pp. 15-16) 
The reasons personal information is collected in libraries is to 
help the organization to keep track of materials and to provide better 
service. To use this information in any other way is most unethical. 
The concept of the library as “sanctuary” demands that the librarian 
be extended the same privilege of confidentiality granted to the 
attorney-client, the physician-patient, the accountant-client, or the 
journalist-informant relationships. Librarians thus far have not been 
granted this privilege in a court of law. The profession must, therefore, 
vigorously lobby for such a privilege. Otherwise, its practitioners 
will be facing the continuing problem of finding creative ways in 
which to protect their patrons from intrusions. Or they too may find 
themselves in a courtroom facing a patron and wishing, If only I 
had the protection of the privilege of confidentiality. 
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Dispensing Law at the Front Lines: 
Ethical Dilemmas in Law Librarianship 
MARIAE. PROTTI 
ABSTRACT 
THELAW LIBRARIAN has special ethical dilemmas because transferring 
information is so important in the American legal system. A duty 
exists, the article states, to keep legal queries confidential, but there 
is no clearly defined duty for the librarian not to comment on the 
law. Other concerns discussed are providing services to those neglected 
by lawyers and librarians maintaining more than an arm’s length 
relationship with vendors. The possible establishment of an American 
Association of Law Libraries (AALL) commission to review the ethics 
of law librarian activities is also covered. 
The  day-to-day activities of law librarians present many 
challenges. Like other librarians, law librarians also collect, house, 
and retrieve information. However, the nature of information that 
law librarians manage and the services they provide makes their duty 
different and subject to special concerns. 
In the American adversarial judicial system based on stare decisis 
(meaning to abide by decided cases), adequate knowledge of the law 
is necessary to show convincingly that one has abided by the law 
or has been wronged (Neff u. George, 1936).Legal knowledge depends 
on distilling legal principles from thousands of cases, and the 
presentation of that information to judicial decision makers is 
important for the determination of legal rights of the petitioners. 
The special nature of these library services stems from the fact that 
the judicial system in this country depends upon the transfer of legal 
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information. Collectively, Americans rely on lawyers to ferret out 
facts and principles to present before the bench. Judges are not 
expected to gather information about the case at hand. This reliance 
on lawyers makes obtaining access to legal knowledge a crucial part 
of the adequate presentation of one’s case. 
More specifically, the importance of legal information stems from 
the common law adversarial system-the foundation of American 
law. The whole system is based on the concept that the lawyer or 
petitioner produces evidence and cites precedents that support the 
stance. A key to winning a case is gaining access to evidentiary facts 
and legal opinions decided earlier. In the aggregate, the people who 
have knowledge about legal matters have the power to uphold or 
change the law. They have the power to encourage the distribution 
of resources awarded by judges and the power to help make activity 
illegal. To an individual, knowledge of the law can mean a greater 
chance of not going to a prison, gaining monetary damages, or 
stopping the government or a corporation from taking some action. 
The holder of legal information is able to make a better legal decision 
than the uninformed. Such decisions as when to sue, who to sue, 
who to pay, and the likelihood of winning a suit are made by 
considering what one knows. Knowledge is therefore valuable. 
Individuals and corporations go to great lengths to uncover 
information. The dispersal of information about the law helps a 
democratic America because it  helps to ensure that all have an equal 
position in court. This importance of law argues that law librarians 
should work to inform with seriousness. They should strive to disclose 
the law and enable persons to understand it. 
In  other words, law librarians should work to dispense 
understandable, timely, relevant, complete, and appropriate 
information (the goals were first proposed by Jack N. Behrman [1981] 
who probed the ethical content of business activities). “Under- 
standable” information is intelligible information. To dispense 
convoluted information is to obfuscate the legal workings of this 
democracy and to confuse the patron. “Timely” means current law, 
not superseded law (unless the patron is undertaking historical 
research). Delivering outdated law is extremely dangerous because 
the patron may form opinions and act according to rules and 
regulations no longer in effect. The goal of “relevance” means not 
just providing accurate information but striving to provide 
information useful in helping individuals to make legal decisions. 
“Complete” means making available all general relevant information 
which helps the patron to understand a legal matter (this does not 
mean that all  information on the topic should be given). 
“Appropriateness” calls for highlighting some information in certain 
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instances. For example, detailed reams of statistical data on house 
buying trends should be called to the attention of the legislative 
aide drafting a bill on rent control, but i t  is not necessary to indicate 
to a high school student who wants to know the definition of the 
phrase “rent control.” 
Librarians should attempt to meet ethical objectives based on 
these five standards. To a law librarian employed by the state in 
an academic, court, county, legislative, or prison library, the obligees 
are many and clear. Nonetheless, the librarian employed in the private 
sector should not exclude these standards. The public librarian owes 
understandable, timely, relevant, complete, and appropriate 
information to a community of people. The private librarian is 
directly accountable to the employer. The difference is the obligee 
and not the ethical standards. None of the five should be lacking. 
All of the ethical considerations discussed in this article are really 
just variations of these five standards. 
Stemming from the principle that all Americans should enjoy 
access to legal information, a probable duty exists for a law librarian 
to keep confidential the identity of a patron and the nature of a 
legal query. Anything less than a guarantee of privacy may deter 
the sensitive patron from seeking information and thereby keep a 
patron at a legal disadvantage. This deterrence, in a small way, may 
thwart the workings of the court where justice depends on the transfer 
of information. This is an age in which persons in the middle and 
poor classes do not always have the means to employ lawyers (McKay, 
1986), but they can take advantage of access to law librarians at 
governmental libraries. A law librarian should pledge not to divulge 
information concerning communications between the librarian and 
the patron just as lawyers would pledge the same for their clients 
(of course an exception occurs when a librarian, in giving information, 
is an accessory to a crime to perform an illegal act). A general respect 
for individual privacy will also preclude decent librarians from 
prattling about the details of patrons’ legal inquiries. Most state 
legislatures acknowledged the need for such preclusion when they 
passed into law provisions that disallow librarians to furnish 
circulation records (i.e., the names of library patrons and the books 
they read) to anyone (Kennedy, 1989). 
A recurring and tough ethical dilemma a law librarian faces 
is the conflict between wanting to produce information and the danger 
of practicing law without a license. Many resolve this issue by noting 
that the librarian should not interpret the law. A common belief 
is that librarians should not give legal advice because of the harm 
it could cause laypersons. 
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Laymen come into a law library expecting to find people with legal 
expertise and tend to accept what law library staff members say as accurate 
statements of the law. Thus the inexperienced and uneducated layperson 
can...be easily misled by what we tell him .... [A]n individual who is 
given inaccurate legal advice by an attorney can recover for injuries 
suffered as a result by suing his lawyer for malpractice but one who 
relies to his detriment on  information he is given by law library personnel 
does not have nearly as effective a remedy. (Mills, 1979, p. 180) 
The availability of a remedy for being misled protects the patron 
and should not determine whether a librarian can interpret 
information. Although no known law librarian has been sued for 
malpractice, lawyers are constantly sued for informational deceit or 
misrepresentation. Moreover, adequate causes of negligence and 
concomitant remedies for monetary damages and specific performance 
exist. Information integrity may even improve if the librarian is 
subject to possible malpractice suits and held accountable to patrons. 
In a widely publicized case, the head librarian at a naval air force 
station was held responsible by the military for failure to update 
a maintenance manual used by mechanics who inspected a plane. 
The inspected plane had crashed. The exposure of librarians to similar 
negligence suits does not seem improper especially in the face of 
extreme possible damages such as those arising from a plane crash 
(“Library Head Blamed ..., 1990, p. 940). 
Historically, reference services have been closely scrutinized when 
they are of a legal nature. For at least seventy-five years, writers have 
cautioned law librarians in the United States to restrain their 
librarianship by neither giving legal advice nor interpreting the law 
(Schanck, 1979). Interpretation is clearly employed when one notes 
particular law associated with a factual situation or predicts the 
outcome of a case. But the word interpretation is relative, although 
many claim that a l ine exists between interpretation and 
nonin terpretation. 
Upon reflection, the line demarcating the interpretative area is 
blurred. The stark immediate quandary of a law librarian in helping 
a patron is whether the librarian may find applicable information- 
i.e., applying the facts of an immediate case to the analysis of a 
law. The organization of U.S. legal materials generally follows the 
organization of the branches of government: legislative codes of 
statutes and session laws, judicial case reporters, and executive and 
administrative codes and registers. The very act of selecting a source 
defines the concern at hand as one being controlled by the legislature, 
courts, or an executive leader respectively. To choose to refer to a 
work is to opine a fitting jurisdiction and controlling governmental 
branch. T h e  identification of relevant books involves some 
interpretive application of the facts to the law. Within the books, 
the sections are divided by topic or by jurisdiction, and so the librarian 
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must choose among subjects or legal forums. The mere retrieval of 
a book after viewing a parallel citation is problematic. For example, 
in finding a U.S. Supreme Court case, one is forced to choose between 
locating the case in an official or an unofficial reporter. Any direction 
chosen by a librarian on how to find the law involves a selection 
of certain materials as relevant to the patron’s legal needs as does 
the identification of pertinent law. Yet the fallacy that there is a 
distinct difference between reference and research or reference and 
interpretation persists. In 1989, the Standing Committee on 
Unauthorized Practice of Law of the Virginia State Bar Association 
stated that librarians, assuming that they were not licensed attorneys, 
could not perform legal research because librarians “were untrained 
in the law and unregulated by the profession.” The librarian can 
retrieve and copy specific materials as that action “does not require 
the possession or use of any legal knowledge or skill.” This reasoning 
forces a pretended schism between the integral acts of retrieving and 
researching, and inhibits the ability of a law librarian to perform 
any kind of research however simple (Virginia State Bar, 1989). 
There is another parameter on the degree of legal reference service 
that is not placed on other types of librarians. Couched in ethical 
terms, the American Association of Law Libraries Code of Ethics 
and Law Library teaching handbooks explicitly state that “law 
librarians while engaged in their professional work-have a duty 
neither to engage in the unauthorized practice of law nor to solicit 
an attorney-client relationship” (AALL Code of Ethics, 1989). That 
sentiment, that only lawyers should comment on the law, is so strong 
that lay people who seek legal assistance in a law library may be 
referred automatically elsewhere (Leone, 1980). Referral clearly works 
to the advantage of lawyers collectively who hold a monopoly on 
interpreting legal information. 
Even a law librarian who belongs to a bar is counseled not to 
interpret the law. However, the law librarian specialist may know 
more about the field than the average lawyer with a passing 
acquaintance in the particular subfield. Examples of specialists are 
those law librarians who work at libraries that exclusively center 
on banking, securities, or tax matters. To reject the notion that all 
librarians may not comment on the law, is to reject the legal expertise 
of a double degreed (M.L.S. and J.D.) lawyer. The ethical standard 
here needs to be rethought especially as bar licensed librarians 
multiply. No longer can it  be assumed that a “lawyer usually has 
more complete knowledge of the law” or that a “lawyer understands 
the practical functioning of the legal system” (Schanck, 1979; Public 
Services Liaison Committee, 1990) although the law librarian does 
not. Other librarians are allowed to discuss the contents of the material 
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they manage. If law librarians are competent and able to provide 
the patron with insight into the workings of the law, they should 
not be restrained from speaking (Chicco et al., 1991). First Amendment 
freedom of speech considerations in this area warrant additional 
investigation. 
Further reasons to support the ethical principle that librarians 
should not “advise” are the notions that a “lawyer has better access 
to the facts in the case” and “is able to research the law at length” 
(Schanck, 1979; Public Services Liaison Committee, 1990). These are 
really temporal constraints concerning the opportunity to interview 
the client/patron and to collect information. Librarians who have 
passed a bar and work in the private sector are at times indistin- 
guishable from lawyers. They may not argue in court, but they surely 
retrieve applicable law and discard inapplicable law just as lawyers 
do. Like most lawyers, they have a certain readily identifiable clientele 
(which is largely made up  of lawyers), interview their patrons or 
clients, and even bill for their time. It seems as if the chasm between 
reference work performed by librarian-lawyers and legal advice given 
by lawyers is an imaginary one that benefits the legal profession 
by protecting the profession’s claimed turf of legal elucidation. 
The AALL supports the principle that law librarians should 
not opine on the law’s application (AALL Code of Ethics, 1989). 
A mention of the principle appears to be absent from literature 
concerning ethics promulgated by the American Bar Association 
(ABA). Ironically and recently, the ABA has made some attempts 
to encourage nonlawyers to analyze the law especially when no lawyers 
are available or willing to participate fully in the given case (Krucoff, 
1981). 
Optimally, the law librarian’s business is sharing legal 
information, and the law librarian concertedly should teach and 
demonstrate how to use finding aids-especially to population groups 
that normally do not retain lawyers. The main themes of library 
school (cooperative lending efforts, public knowledge of govern- 
mental information, and outreach to persons who cannot come to 
the library) conflict directly with the adversarial themes of law school 
(“hiding the ball” through the Socratic teaching method, competition 
in oral arguments, and exclusive law review memberships). The 
cooperative philosophy promulgated by librarians is useful in serving 
population groups underserved by lawyers. According to the AALL 
Code of Ethics, the law librarian “has a duty actively to promote 
free and effective access to legal information” (AALL Code of Ethics, 
1989). 
This obligation arises from a law librarianship tradition as well 
as from the knowledge that certain population groups have little 
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recourse in the courts, the main focus of justice in our society, because 
they have little access to legal information. After all, 90 percent of 
U.S. lawyers serve 10 percent of the population (Carter, 1978). The 
middle-class claims to governmental information may be fulfilled 
through tax supported libraries. For this reason, law librarians have 
examined what they can do to help untrained patrons to learn the 
law. One of the examining forums is the AALL‘s “Committee on 
Services to the Public and Legal Resources in Public Libraries.” 
The law librarian’s attitude is one of accommodation and the 
general AALL attitude has been one of service especially to pro se’s 
(individual patrons who are practicing self-help law) (Begg, 1976). 
Pro se patrons deserve the attention of librarians. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has decided that there is a constitutional right to self-
representation in a criminal trial where the accused chooses to 
represent himself (Faretta u. California, 1975). Within this right is 
an implicit subright that grants the pro se defendant an opportunity 
to read the same tools that the opposing party uses and a probable 
duty of the librarian to assist in finding the tools (Leone, 1980). 
Other lay groups that are helped are prisoners and the institu- 
tionalized. Law librarians working in the public sector should 
purchase and make available consumer-oriented self-help law guides 
to serve these special groups based on the premise that Americans 
need more information about the law. Self-help law books are in 
great demand. The major publisher of these books, Nolo Press, keeps 
more than sixty titles in stock (Nolo Press, 1990). 
The relationship between librarians and book dealers or 
publishers provides another ethical consideration. It should be one 
that is in accord with standards of accountability. The law librarian 
should choose vendors based on quality of service and the product 
and of the reasonableness of the price. Also, the librarian should 
provide payment promptly. The librarian should discourage personal 
gratuities and refuse or return any gifts of significant value. One 
common practice that merits review is the publisher/dealer 
sponsorship of events at American Association of Law Libraries’ 
meetings. Lavish breakfasts, receptions, and banquets paid for by 
vendors help the publisher to sell but increase the cost of the product 
involved. At the 1989 summer AALL annual meeting, for example, 
one publisher funded a rodeo solely for the law librarian audience 
complete with a sit down dinner and country band (AALL, 1989). 
The year before at the annual meeting, a publisher hosted an evening 
of “the stars” with prizes, games, clips from the television show “LA 
Law,” and even flew in an actor from the show to shake people’s 
hands at the reception. Altogether, more than 4,200 law librarians 
were invited to each. A law librarian who is responsible for 
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acquisitions who attends such functions has at best a conflict of 
interest and possibly an ethically unsound relationship with the 
vendor. The problem is that attendance can be difficult to avoid. 
Lavish receptions are regularly combined with AALL business and 
professional meetings. Some believe that without such publisher 
subsidy, attendance at the meetings would fall. Nonetheless, the AALL 
might rethink its propensity to rely on vendor sponsorship for social 
events better paid for by the individuals in attendance and on vendor 
sponsorship of educational and professional programs. 
Law librarians should also generally not act as paid consultants 
for a publisher who sells books to the librarian’s employer. An example 
of such action is evidenced by the increasing number of publisher 
advisory boards composed of law librarians. Members of the board 
allow the use of their names for advertising, sometimes fly to funded 
special meetings, and may attend seminars hosted by the vendor by 
invitation only. Yet these same board members work for employers 
who make thousands of dollars in annual payment to the hosting 
publishers. Some laudable board members, who recognize the ethical 
dilemma, donate their advisement fees to their law schools or a 
scholarship fund (Mid-America Law Libraries Association, 1989). 
Law librarians believe that their work necessitates a special code 
of ethics that is not entirely reflected in the American Library 
Association’s Code of Ethics nor in the American Bar Association 
Code of Ethics. The AALL Code, effective September 1978, addresses 
matters of conduct peculiar to this hybrid profession. The drafters 
of that code hoped that the AALL administration would sanction 
those who did not abide by the code. They wanted an “ethics 
commission” to be established with commissioners holding staggered 
terms. The commission would issue advisory opinions on the ethics 
pertinent to any stipulated set of facts presented by any aggrieved 
individual or institutional member of AALL. The purpose of the 
commission would be to decide whether the conduct described in 
the stipulated facts abides by the AALL Code of Ethics. Enforcement 
would rest with the complainant. The commission would create and 
publish a body of advisory opinions that would serve to guide the 
determination of violative conduct and allow for minority opinions 
(Dupont, 1979). For whatever reason, the commission never came 
into being and the AALL now administers no formal sanctions for 
code indiscretions. The absence of opinions on ethical matters limits 
standards. A profession that neither airs ethical grievances nor polices 
itself is missing an opportunity to achieve high levels of service. 
Therefore, members within AALL should work to establish the 
envisioned commission. 
During the last twenty-five years, the amount of litigation in 
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this country has increased at an astounding rate. As persons in our 
technological society become more interdependent, due to 
communication and transportation innovations, the need for legal 
boundaries burgeons. Concomitantly, the role of the law librarian 
in disseminating the law strengthens, especially as lawyers become 
overwhelmed with learning a vast amount of law (Posner, 1987). No 
one profession deals with the law autonomously. Law librarians are 
increasingly called upon to explain, distinguish, and find judicial 
opinions, statutes, and rules. They are exposed to more and more 
diverse and constant ethical dilemmas. Their particular predicaments 
should not go unnoticed. 
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Public Service Ethics in Health Sciences Libraries 
M. SANDRAWOOD 
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ABSTRACT 
REFERENCE IN HEALTH libraries must provide LIBRARIANS SCIENCES 
accurate and up-to-date information in a timely fashion in response 
to the patient care and research needs of the health care profession. 
Discussed here are some of the issues involved in the provision of 
such services: quality of service, access to information, confidentiality, 
intellectual freedom, and liability. Although technologies such as 
online information retrieval, telefacsimile, and CD-ROM have 
improved access to information, they create their own problems, 
including potential for censorship and equal access to information. 
End-user searching raises new questions related to quality and 
information access. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professionalism, malpractice, liability, and ethics are concepts 
that have received increased attention by librarians over the past 
decade. The latest code of ethics was adopted by the American Library 
Association (ALA) (1981). The California Library Association (1978) 
has adopted a statement regarding professional responsibility of 
librarians, and in 1979 the Standards Committee of the Reference 
and Adult Services Division (RASD) of ALA (1979) adopted a section 
on “Ethics of Service” as part of its developmental guidelines. Related 
to these ethical codes is the concept of evaluation of quality of service 
(Judkins, 1986; Schwartz 8c Eakin, 1986). The literature conveys the 
impression that ethical concepts are inviolate and that the librarian 
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must be perfect-the librarian always makes the correct decision in 
sensitive situations, is always good humored and self-effacing, and 
always provides the correct answer in a timely fashion. 
Would that a discussion of professional ethics be so clearcut and 
easily described and that all librarians held the same ethical values. 
The truth is that professional ethics, in many cases, is situational 
and requires decision making on the part of the librarian. Not all 
librarians will make the same decision in any given situation, and 
the same librarian might not make the same decision should a similar 
situation arise again. 
Ethics has been variously defined. It is regarded as “the moral 
principles by which a person is guided” (Murray, 1933, p. 312), “a 
group of moral principles or set of values” (Webster’s Third, 1965, 
p. 780), or “the principles of conduct governing an individual or 
a profession: standards of behavior” (Webster’s Third, 1965, p. 780). 
Certain professions are governed by codes of ethics-for example, 
medicine and law. The foundations of medicine are grounded in 
the Hippocratic Oath. The concept of “medical ethics” has an exact 
meaning, and physicians not adhering to these principles can find 
themselves in both professional and legal difficulties. The medical 
profession has traditionally monitored and censured itself, although 
more and more cases are being resolved in the courts. 
In librarianship, the concept of ethics does not have such a 
historic background, and ethical principles are not well defined. 
Professional associations are without the power to enforce codes of 
conduct-e.g., the ALA Code of Ethics describes only general precepts. 
Over the years such codes have set standards that include everything 
from a librarian’s deportment and good manners to loyalty and 
integrity (Crawford, 1978). Literature aimed at the ethics of 
librarianship of ten approaches the topic on a more personal level, 
frequently incorporating the individual’s own values and ethical 
concepts. 
HEALTHSCIENCESLIBRARIANS 
Medical reference librarians share the same ethical concerns as 
reference librarians in academic, public, and special libraries. These 
concerns include access to information, quality of service, 
confidentiality, neutrality, and intellectual freedom. Two major 
features distinguish reference service in a health sciences library from 
other reference situations. These are, first, the technical nature of 
the literature, which encompasses the biomedical sciences, and second, 
the need for specialized bibliographic services resulting from the 
pressures and time constraints placed on health care personnel (Lewis, 
1970). McClure (1982) indicates that the clientele served-physicians, 
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nurses, and other health care professionals-of ten need information 
immediately for patient care decisions. The reference librarian must 
provide accurate and up-to-date information in a timely fashion to 
meet the needs of a demanding profession. “Clinical emergencies” 
are fairly common occurrences in a health sciences library. New 
technologies such as telefacsimile, full-text databases, and electronic 
mail have made it  easier for medical librarians to handle such requests. 
Whether the information is provided to a physician in a patient care 
setting or to a researcher meeting a grant deadline, immedlacy is 
a critical need in health sciences reference librarianship. The reference 
librarian is also aware that erroneous information can adversely affect 
patient care or hinder vital research. 
The specific issues to be dmussed in this article are quality of 
service, access to information, confidentiality, intellectual freedom, 
end-user searching, and liability in health sciences libraries. The 
discussion, however, is applicable to reference services in other types 
of libraries as well. 
QUALITYOF SERVICE 
Librarians are, or should be, concerned with quality of service. 
Ethics is integral to professionalism, and quality is at the heart of 
professionalism. It infiltrates all aspects of librarianship from 
bibliographic control to answering informational questions. In a 
medical library, quality reference service is especially important 
because responses can influence patient care decisions or alter 
directions of ongoing research. 
Interestingly, quality control is the first standard for reference 
services developed by a committee of the Oregon Health Sciences 
Libraries Association (Judkins, 1986).The other standards proposed 
by this group are appropriateness, accuracy, documentation, 
timeliness of response, accessibility, confidentiality, and evaluation. 
The standards, intended as “components of minimally competent 
reference service,” actually reflect ethical concerns about the provision 
of the reference product. In the process of establishing measurable 
criteria for performance evaluation, reference librarians at The 
University of Michigan’s Alfred Taubman Medical Library developed 
a set of reference service standards that included indicators for 
evaluating these standards (Schwartz & Eakin, 1986). Through the 
use of an anonymous checklist, the reference librarians participated 
in peer review evaluations of their colleagues. Efforts of this type 
within reference departments are aimed at improving quality of 
reference service but ultimately reflect a concern for professional 
ethics. 
Quality is a vague concept, but arguably it  can include accuracy, 
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relevance, completeness, and timeliness. Shedlock (1988), in defining 
the quality of medical reference service, indicates that the “concern 
for quality is generally considered a mark of professionalism” (p. 
49). He further indicates that quality can be defined in terms of 
“personal ideals” (p. 49), and that i t  is often influenced by the user’s 
perception of how the information is delivered. For example, an 
accurate answer may not be perceived as such by the user because 
the librarian is vague concerning the source of the information or 
is simply not authoritative in delivering it. Alternatively, an inaccurate 
answer might be accepted because the librarian is very authoritative 
in delivering it. 
ACCESSTO INFORMATION 
Access to health sciences libraries is easier today than in the 
past. Hospitals, historically, have limited the use of their libraries 
to physicians; some did not admit nurses or other health care personnel 
to the doctors’ library. Although this scenario might still take place 
in some hospitals, times have changed, and health sciences libraries 
have opened their doors not only to health care personnel but to 
patients and the general public as well. Academic health sciences 
libraries have traditionally been more available to the public than 
hospital libraries, although some still limit access. More than a decade 
ago, Jeuell et al. (1977) noted that more than 90 percent of medical 
school libraries opened their doors to the public. 
Seruice Policies 
Access to the collection does not guarantee reference service or 
even access to information. Health sciences libraries have policies 
on the provision of reference services. These policies describe what 
groups will receive reference service, the level of reference service 
offered, and under what circumstances the service will be provided- 
for example, by phone or in person. In some institutions, a distinction 
will be made between users from the institution (primary clientele) 
and users from outside of the institution (secondary clientele). 
Primary and secondary clientele may further be divided by category- 
for example, physicians versus nonphysicians or health care personnel 
versus patients. 
Reference policies generally describe more extensive service to 
primary clientele, while restricting or, in some cases, denying service 
to unaffiliated individuals. Rainey (1988) discusses a detailed reference 
service policy for the provision of drug information by librarians 
at the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science. This library’s 
policy indicates level of user, and services provided or withheld. 
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Service to  Health Care Professionals 
In a health sciences library, a full range of reference services 
will be provided to the library’s primary clientele-that is, the health 
care professionals of the institution. These services include, but are 
not limited to, mediated database searching; interlibrary loan; 
telefacsimile transmission; microcomputer laboratories; CD-ROM 
databases; end-user search services, either through online accounts 
or via a locally mounted database; instructional services; and ready 
reference. The health care professional recognizes the librarian as 
an expert information provider, leaving little room for the librarian 
to offer an opinion. However, the ethical concerns of confidentiality 
and quality, including timeliness and accuracy, are important. 
Academic health sciences centers are beginning to implement 
the concept of Integrated Academic Information Management Systems 
(IAIMS), as espoused by Matheson (1982), wherein the library is seen 
as integral to the flow of information within an institution. Access 
to information not owned by the library is facilitated by telefacsimile 
transmission, electronic transmission, librarian and end-user access 
to bibliographic and full-text databases, and local area networks. With 
these new technologies come the ever present concerns of confi- 
dentiality, data security, and the need for continuing education so 
that the librarian can function in a changing environment. 
Service to Patients and the General Public 
In health sciences libraries, access to the collection and reference 
services to patients and the general public will vary according to 
institutional policy. Most hospital libraries provide information 
services to patients, although the level may be minimal simply due 
to staffing constraints. Some hospitals have established consumer 
health information libraries and make this information available to 
the general public as well. Academic health sciences libraries may 
allow public access to the collection but provide minimal or no 
reference service to the general public. 
Interpretation of information is an ethical issue that arises with 
reference service to the general public. Rainey (1988) points out that 
the librarian is viewed differently as an information provider by a 
health care professional than by the general public and cautions 
against “giving opinions, evaluating the information, or re-
commending therapy based on the ...information” (pp. 60-61). The 
lay person tends to view the health sciences librarian as a subject 
expert who delivers health care information. For this reason, the 
librarian should refrain from providing interpretation or opinion. 
Eakin (1980) has differentiated between health information and health 
education. As an information provider rather than a health educator, 
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the librarian should disseminate the information “without 
interpretation, without opinion or counseling, and with no attempt 
to influence the actions or decision making of the individual” (p. 
223). 
Librarians may work closely with clinical departments, perhaps 
functioning as a Clinical Medical Librarian. When providing 
information to the patient as part of the health care team, the librarian 
either knows or has access to the patient diagnosis so that the patient’s 
information needs can be defined. However, when dealing with a 
request for health care information from the general public, the 
librarian cannot be sure that the individual has the necessary 
information to ask the appropriate question. The reference interview 
is important, but no amount of questioning can elicit the proper 
information when the individual does not know the diagnosis or 
is unsure of what he or she really wants. 
Not all requests from the general public, of course, are related 
to patient care. Some are for high school or college term papers or 
just for general interest. Since health sciences libraries may not collect 
materials for the lay person, it is frequently necessary to refer the 
user to a physician or, when appropriate, to the public or college 
library for relevant materials. Hospital and public libraries have 
joined in formal cooperative efforts to make health care information 
more available to the general public (Goodchild, 1978; Gartenfeld, 
1978). With the increased demand for consumer health information, 
public and medical libraries have become more aware of the services 
that each have to offer (Wood & Renford, 1982). 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Confidentiality is an ethical issue of concern to all librarians. 
The ALA code of ethics states that: “Librarians must protect each 
user’s right to privacy with respect to information sought or received, 
and materials consulted, borrowed, or acquired” (American Library 
Association, 1981, p. 335). According to Stover (1987), the major 
problems related to confidentiality in libraries are that it conflicts 
with freedom of information; that the codes are unenforceable, largely 
undefined, and without penalties; and that they are too broad to 
be effective in real situations. In recent years, this issue has been 
spotlighted by the FBI’s request for cooperation by librarians for 
information on library use by “suspicious” individuals. Many states 
have laws that protect confidentiality of library records, and librarians 
should familiarize themselves with the laws pertaining to their 
individual situation. 
In a health sciences library, concerns about confidentiality arise 
frequently. The importance of confidentiality is most obvious, 
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perhaps, in a clinical situation, where the librarian would have access 
to patient care information. For example, Clinical Medical Librarians 
(CMLs) have existed for about fifteen years. CMLs make rounds with 
the health care team and provide patient-specific information. They 
have access to patient records, are privy to physician-patient 
confidences, and are subject to the same ethical standards governing 
confidentiality as the physician. 
Mediated online searching, a routine activity in most health 
sciences libraries, creates inherent problems regarding confidentiality. 
As Shaver (1985) points out, the patron is required to fill out a form 
for the online search, and many libraries keep an actual copy of 
the search after i t  is completed. Online search records, along with 
the log book kept for statistics, may inadvertently be accessible to 
nonlibrarians and therefore violate the client’s right to privacy. 
Confidentiality may also be violated inadvertently by leaving 
materials to be picked up  at an unattended location. Searches (or 
other materials such as interlibrary loan items) that are not on a 
“reserve shelf” at a reference or information desk, may accidently 
be viewed by others. Materials should always be “packaged” to avoid 
inadvertent breach of confidentiality, especially if the pickup point 
is not attended. 
The online search analyst is often confronted with judgmental 
decisions regarding confidentiality. What should be done when a 
MEDLINE search is requested by a faculty member on the same topic 
as a search requested previously by another physician (Wood & 
Renford, 1982, p. 84)?To reveal the first requester’s name and topic 
to the second requester would be a breach of confidentiality, but 
if the search analyst has reason to believe that the two individuals 
might actually be working together on a project, then the duplicate 
search would waste time and money. The search analyst might ask 
whether the two users had been in touch with each other. 
Shaver (1985) also indicates that the online search analyst should 
ask permission of the client to consult with another librarian about 
a search formulation. This author disagrees with such a viewpoint. 
Physicians do not ask patients for permission to consult with another 
physician. Librarians should not be expected to do so, either. 
Librarians who are consulted about a search formulation should treat 
it in confidence as they would any other request. 
In a corporate setting, where clients and searchers are held 
accountable for costs, it may not be appropriate to protect the 
confidentiality of a search request (Shaver, 1985). It might be argued 
that a similar situation exists in hospitals, where cost effectiveness 
and cost control are vital. Should hospital librarians run a duplicate 
MEDLINE search request when they know that another member of 
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the patient care team already has the necessary information? Respect 
for confidentiality should be tempered by the situation. 
In a health sciences library, medical malpractice questions are 
likely to be received, especially as online search requests, either from 
the prosecuting or defending attorneys (or defending physician). 
Confidentiality can become a major issue when the reference librarian 
receives the same request for information from an outside attorney 
as well as from the institution’s own attorney. In one such situation, 
the librarian was requested to furnish the institution’s lawyer with 
the same information that was provided to the other attorney. In 
another case, the hospital administrator allowed a lawyer, who was 
prosecuting a case against the institution, access to the library but 
then later asked the librarian to provide him with everything that 
the attorney requested. The librarian should refuse to comply with 
requests that would violate the confidentiality of another client (Wood 
& Renford, 1982). 
INTELLECTUALFREEDOM 
Intellectual freedom involves the right of individuals to express 
their opinion without fear of punishment. It represents First 
Amendment rights of freedom of speech, and i t  is a right zealously 
guarded by academia. The intellectual freedom of both the library 
user and the librarian are issues in the provision of information 
services. Librarians as individuals have certain ethical or moral values 
that can come into play in performing their job as librarians. 
Consciously or unconsciously, personal values, societal values, and 
the professional obligation of providing objective information are 
weighed or judged against each other every time a librarian is asked 
to provide an answer to a reference question or to make a book selection 
for the collection. Objectivity, individual rights, and censorship are 
discussed here as components of intellectual freedom. 
0b jectivity /Bias  
Reference librarians in all types of libraries are faced with helping 
library users find answers to questions that may be controversial or 
that may reflect values that conflict with those of the librarian. In 
the process of deciding which sources to consult or what level of 
service to provide, the opportunity for bias (or lack of objectivity) 
arises. White (1990) uses the word even-handedly (p. 73) rather than 
neutrality when speaking of professional responsibility; objectivity 
is used here to mean “without bias.” 
In a health sciences library, these “difficult” questions tend to 
come up  more frequently, perhaps, because the subject matter lends 
itself to issues that involve health care, issues for which there may 
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be multiple viewpoints and no “right” answer. For example, a 
reference librarian who is opposed to abortion and involved in the 
right-to-life effort may be asked by a client for a list of local abortion 
clinics. Librarians cannot let their viewpoint influence the provision 
of information to the client. Similar questions that are routine in 
a medical library might involve topics such as euthanasia, a patient’s 
right to die, a parent’s right to withhold treatment for a child, acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), homosexuality, reproductive 
technologies, and fetal research. The reference librarian, in all cases, 
should avoid bias, approach the topic objectively, and provide the 
best answer possible. Failure to provide information when the proper 
source is known could also be construed as censorship. 
Crowe and Anthes (1988) raise the idea of judging ethical 
significance by considering the consequences. They indicate that 
actions “must be viewed in light of both professional commitments 
and responsibility to society” (p. 129). This concept is further 
illustrated by Hauptman’s ( 1976) “experiment” in which librarians 
who were asked for information about making a bomb provided the 
information requested to the user. The reference librarian in a health 
sciences library who is confronted with a distraught patron who 
requests information on suicide should probably provide the 
information but might also consider contacting the institution’s social 
service department should the circumstances warrant it. 
The Librarian’s Rights 
Librarians may find themselves in situations outside of work 
where their own ethical values conflict with stated institutional 
policies. For example, the librarian who is involved in anti-abortion 
issues may find that the pro-life group with which he or she is working 
is planning to picket the hospital where the librarian is employed. 
The institution has a policy stating that employees who picket the 
hospital will be fired. The librarian will have to decide which is 
more important-the job or the principles. However, librarians’ rights 
to participate in such activities, so long as it does not affect their 
work, must be defended. 
Censorship 
Librarians have fought censorship through the years, but i t  
continues to rear its nasty head in many shapes, sizes, and forms. 
Mika and Shuman (1988) indicate that censorship occurs because 
people, librarians included, have value systems, and it  is these values 
that influence their actions and motives (p. 317). Censorship in 
libraries is discussed most frequently in relation to selection of 
materials. Librarians should not allow their own biases to influence 
WOOD/ETHICS IN HEALTH SCIENCES LIBRARIES 253 
selection, nor should they allow others, through political or other 
pressures, to censor materials for library purchase. 
Another type of censorship that has become prevalent recently 
is due to severe financial problems that all libraries have been 
experiencing. The budget has always limited what could be purchased, 
but the gap between money available and cost of materials is 
increasing. This is especially evident in the selection of reference 
tools where the choices of format have become more varied and the 
costs continue to escalate. Almost all major indexes are now available 
in print format, online, or on CD-ROM. Health sciences libraries 
have the choice of acquiring MEDLINE on CD-ROM in seven 
different versions! CD-ROM databases are expensive. They are usually 
acquired on a lease-only basis with a discount for print subscribers, 
thus discouraging cancellation of the print copy. The equipment 
on which CD-ROM is run is also expensive and requires increased 
staff time for monitoring. Services such as Reference Update and 
Current Contents on Disk offer weekly updates on floppy disks. 
Libraries simply cannot afford to subscribe to all of these new 
technologies. Decisions all too frequently must be made based on 
cost alone, and, despite an obvious need for a resource, acquisition 
of a new service or technology may either be delayed or totally avoided 
due to lack of money. Library users are therefore denied access to 
materials because the library’s budget is inadequate. This also could 
be considered inadvertent censorship. Although librarians have 
responded with resource sharing, networking, and information 
referral services, these methods may not be adequate to avoid 
censorship or guarantee access to information. 
Another form of inadvertent censorship has been alluded to 
earlier in this article. Quality of service is at the heart of ethics and 
is especially important when dealing with new technologies. 
Physicians and biomedical researchers rely heavily on the online 
search analyst to perform MEDLINE searches. Despite the impact 
of end-user searching, described later, health care personnel continue 
to request mediated computer searches on MEDLINE and other online 
databases. The search analyst must conduct a reference interview, 
formulate the search utilizing Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) or 
appropriate terminology, and make decisions on terms to exclude 
or how to narrow a search. As more fully described in an earlier 
article (Wood & Renford, 1982), “quality, or lack of quality, in 
computer search services can be considered a form of censorship” 
(p. 83) and, as discussed later, could involve malpractice. In the past, 
library users have tended to accept what the computer says as final. 
However, as health sciences personnel become more computer literate 
and as more users begin doing their own searching, the limitations 
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of computer searching may become evident. It is possible to retrieve 
information from a computer only if the information was input into 
the computer. The possibility exists for human error (or incompetence) 
on both ends of the process. 
END-USERSEARCHING 
Perhaps the biggest influence on reference librarians in the 1980s 
was the introduction of end-user searching. (End-users are those 
individuals who do their own searching rather than relying on a 
search intermediary.) This has resulted in a changed role for the 
reference librarian. Increasingly, health sciences librarians are 
functioning as information consultants and educators (Schwartz, 
1987). Initially, many librarians experienced conflict when asked to 
train nonlibrarians to search because they feared that their role as 
online search analysts would become extinct. It is now obvious that 
there is room for both search analysts and end-users, but a major 
ethical question remains: are the end-users really getting what they 
want? From the beginning, reference librarians were concerned with 
whether end-users would find what they needed-would they do 
“good searches” (Wykoff, 1985, p. 57)? With the advent of CD-ROM 
technology, end-user searching has exploded. Plutchak ( 1989) 
describes the “satisfied and inept end user” (p. 45), who is totally 
happy with the results, but has in fact run a rather poor search with 
little retrieval. This situation may be more common than might 
originally have been suspected for two reasons. First, i t  has been 
shown that people will accept a response generated by computer in 
preference to the same result from a reference librarian, and second, 
people have difficulty admitting their inadequacies-i.e., that perhaps 
they did not input the correct terms. Users will accept a zero retrieval 
for a search run on CD-ROM MEDLINE because the “computer said 
there was nothing,” although in fact the results were due to a 
typographical error or incorrect input. 
It could be argued that this situation is not any different from 
those who search the card catalog or a printed index and do not 
find what they want. The difference, however, is the technology. 
Library users who search manually for information and cannot find 
it, tend to blame themselves. Library users are now looking at “the 
computer as an information panacea, ...the ultimate solution in 
providing information” (Kibirige, 1988, p. 377). This places more 
responsibility on the librarian to educate the end-user about database 
content and how to search databases. 
Computerized information sources, whether CD-ROM, OPAC 
(Online Public Access Catalog), or online bibliographic database, 
are not always the first choice for finding information. For example, 
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certain factual information is more easily found in a printed directory. 
Even if the client comes to the library with the belief that the answer 
will be found in a computer database, i t  is wrong to direct the client 
to the CD-ROM terminal without explaining that the answer could 
be found faster and easier in a printed directory. The decision to 
use a print versus an online resource may also be an economic one. 
LIABILITY 
Although liability is an issue that has concerned information 
professionals in recent years, there seems to still be some debate as 
to “whether it is a valid concern” (Pritchard & Quigley, 1989, p. 
57). Information professionals, whether librarians or independent 
information brokers, are beginning to realize that the possibility of 
being sued for malpractice is real. The lack of formalized standards 
does not protect the information professional from liability (p. 58). 
Pritchard and Quigley (1989) go on to define “two types of negligence 
that can lead to liability for the information professional: parameter 
negligence-you neglected to consult the correct source [and] 
omission negligence-you consulted the correct source, but failed 
to locate the correct answer(s)” (p. 60). Because of the technical nature 
of the information and the fact that i t  is frequently intended for 
patient care, health sciences librarians especially must assess liability 
risks. Rainey (1988) has commented on the liability concerns of 
providing drug information. The liability of librarians in providing 
LATCH (Literature Attached To CHart) service has not yet been 
determined (Babish & Warner, 1983). Gray (1989) concludes that 
“health sciences librarians do face potential liability for the negligent 
provision of information that results in physical injury to others” 
(p. 36). Although this has yet to be tested in court, librarians should 
develop disclaimers as part of their responsibility as information 
professionals (Allen, 1982, p. 43). Librarians and other information 
professionals must consider the need to take out malpractice 
insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
Although some of the circumstances described in this article are 
unique to health sciences librarians, in many cases the ethical concerns 
are the same as those shared by other information professionals. Ethics 
is inextricably linked with professionalism, and with professionalism 
comes “the willingness to assume responsibility for one’s actions” 
(Hauptman, 1979, p. 199). Librarianship may not be a “profession” 
in the sense of medicine or law, but the ethical values that librarians 
hold, whether personal (societal) or professional (stated in a formal 
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code of ethics),go a long way toward the provision of quality unbiased 
information. 
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Ethics Inside and Out: The Case of Guidoriccio 
JOHN SWAN 
ABSTRACT 
THISIS A N  EXAMINATION of problems of oversight and responsibility 
arising from a case in which librarians are implicated at several levels. 
Two art historians, principals in a major controversy in which they 
are challenging the traditional attribution of a great Sienese fresco, 
discovered what they (and others) deemed to be a pattern of censorship 
of their point of view via card catalog indexing in an important 
Florentine research library. This article surveys their attempts to find 
redress and to gain a hearing for their case, and it attempts an analysis 
of the major hurdles they faced in the academic and research world, 
principally the “ethics of collegiality” which presumes against 
complaining outsiders. The implications of both the alleged misdeed 
of librarians and the actual lack of response of librarians are explored. 
Information becomes entangled with ethics through two obvious 
paths-by way of what people do with it, and by way of what they 
do not do with it.  For librarians and others whose trade is information 
itself, this process begins when decisions are made as to how the 
information is to be dispensed in the first place. Thus, it is very 
early in the life of a piece of information that questions of action 
and its consequences gather around it-and for the purposes here 
we are ignoring many large related dilemmas, such as those involved 
in the choices that are made about just what information to generate-
e.g., the morality of choosing to do the research necessary for the 
development of a plastic handgun, to name but one recent 
technological triumph. 
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That there are ethical connections between information and 
action is hardly startling news, but this does not establish any similarly 
obvious ethical dimension for those whose field of operation is the 
connection itself, the passage of information from its generators to 
its users. There is a character in a Flannery O’Connor (1971) story 
whose place in the moral scheme of things could be said to be parallel 
to that of the middle persons: “[she] had no bad qualities of her 
own but she was able to use other people’s in such a constructive 
way that she never felt the lack” (p. 272). Neither the generators 
nor the users, neither the institutions that support us nor the patrons 
of our wares, fall under our ethical purview. As much as we are 
dependent upon and responsive to both, the ends to which they put 
our means do not play a part in the provision of those means. Or 
do they? 
In the case examined here, that question arises in a rather 
specialized context, but its implications are broad and serious, 
especially within the world of research and scholarship. Librarians 
come into the picture first as alleged overt violators of what are 
presumably shared standards of professional ethics (codified and 
otherwise), then as professional colleagues within the academic 
establishment faced with the fallout from this transgression. In both 
phases of this event, which is still unfolding, we have faced multiple 
challenges; it will be argued here that, for reasons intimately related 
to the nature of professional collegiality and our professional identity 
itself, librarians have failed to meet these challenges. 
This inquiry begins with a specific instance of unethical 
behavior-i.e., the apparent suppression of a controversial point of 
view through selective indexing of materials by library officials with 
important connections to the other side of the controversy. The word 
aflparent is important here because this writer has not had the 
opportunity to examine the evidence first hand and is relying heavily 
on extensive correspondence with one of those whose published 
arguments were censored, as well as on the experience reported by 
others who encountered the selective pattern of indexing in the 
research institution. 
It should be made clear that this author does find credible the 
charges leveled by my correspondent and his coauthor. Both have 
waged a long, tenacious, scrupulously documented, and, for the most 
part, thoroughly unrewarded campaign for redress. It is true that 
they have earned support and not a little sympathy from many along 
the way, and that is part of the point of this study. Just as this author 
must admit his own distance from the evidence for the accusation, 
despite the years of documentation arrayed before him, and his own 
impotence in terms of direct action, virtually everyone who has found 
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the evidence compelling has nevertheless found it  easier to express 
sympathy than to find a solution. And further, this is not necessarily 
a failure of will or personal ethics among those who see the problem 
but do nothing directly about it. It is a problem that attaches itself 
with peculiar force to this kind of ethical breach, a problem 
compounded by questions of responsibility, authority, evidence, and 
the very nature of the unethical deed itself. 
The importance of focusing on this instance of suppression lies 
not so much in the particular variety thereof. Outside of states 
con trolled overtly by censoring elites and exclusive ideologies, there 
is little recorded evidence of censorship specifically by indexing 
because it  is usually accomplished much more efficiently long before 
this stage of the processing of materials. But censorship by index 
may be a general problem with broad consequences, unreported 
because i t  is difficult to detect and often practiced by those who 
are unaware that they are, in fact, erecting barriers to information 
in the very process of organizing it (see Intner, 1984). What is more 
significant is the fact that this apparent censorship occurred within 
an academic research environment, and the act and the responses 
to i t  reveal a number of uncomfortable truths about the nature of 
the communal trust that is supposed to be the very foundation of 
scholarship. 
That deed and its background are set forth from the point of 
view of its victims in a paper delivered in 1986 at the Second European 
Conference of the Art Libraries of IFLA-the International Federation 
of Library Associations being one of the organizations to which its 
authors took their case. The elaborate title of the paper (which was 
published in the proceedings of the conference) is effectively a 
summary of the situation as they see it: “ ‘Selective’ Card Cataloging 
(or In-House Screening of Periodical Indexing) of Art History Articles 
in Authors’ Files, and the Potential Effects of this ‘Selectivity’ on 
the Bibliographical Entries Relating to Specific Art Historical 
Problems: A Case Study” (Moran & Mallory, 1986). 
In the world of research and scholarship as well as any other, 
censorship is most likely to occur in a politicized environment. In 
this case, i t  is the politics of a major controversy in the world of 
Italian art, indeed, one which has repeatedly been called “the case 
of the century” (Watson, 1986). This is not the occasion for a 
recounting of this much recounted attribution debate, which is also 
treated elsewhere in this volume (for a convenient overview of the 
early literature thereof, see Wohl [19841 as well as Moran and Mallory 
[1986]; for a recent survey from particular points of view of salient 
portions of the evidence and arguments, see Mallory and Moran’s 
[19861Burlington article, as well as Polzer [19871 and Maginnis [19881). 
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However, knowledge of the essentials of the controversy are necessary 
for an appreciation of the intensity of conflict that led to the 
“selective” indexing and other instances of (at least apparent) 
suppression, such as the exclusion of Moran and Mallory from an 
important conference and their involvement in a letters to the editor 
fracas within the pages of a major art journal. This writer is, of 
course, in no position to take a stand in the original debate itself. 
Nor is that relevant to a brief account of the struggle of Moran and 
Mallory for what they consider to be a fair hearing within the scholarly 
establishment. 
The RILA Editor, Alice Sedgwick Wohl (1984), is eloquent on 
the subject of the work of art that is at the center of all this: 
The fresco known as Guidoriccio da Fogliano at the Siege of Montemassi 
in the great council hall of the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena has long been 
famous both as an artistic masterpiece and as a proud political symbol 
of the Republic. To the Sienese it means what Michelangelo’s David 
means to the Florentines. To art historians it represents a cornerstone 
of the art of S h o n e  Martini and the origin of the equestrian portrait. 
Solitary and powerful, baton in hand like a Roman conqueror, the 
condottiere rides his caparisoned horse along the fresco’s frame, against 
a tawny anddesolate landscape. In the background an undulating palisade 
encloses the scene of the siege ....There is an eerie quality to the scene 
which makes it unforgettable. (p. 10) 
Simone Martini, master of what some scholars call the “Sienese 
proto-Renaissance” and, like Giotto and Duccio, an Art 1 eminence 
and one of the founding fathers of Western painting, was taken to 
be the creator of the Guidoriccio by unquestioned consensus and 
multiple-century tradition until the appearance in 1977 of an article 
by Gordon Moran (1977) challenging that assumption. Basing his 
argument on a range of considerations, from the lack of mention 
of the Guidoriccio in contemporary documentation of payments to 
Martini or early descriptions of either Martini or the Palazzo Pubblico, 
to apparent incongruities and anachronisms in the costume and rank 
of the equestrian. Moran suggested that if there was originally a 
portrait of Guidoriccio by Simone Martini on that wall, it had been 
obliterated when the capitano generale was deposed in 1333 and forced 
to leave town in disgrace. When the redoubtable leader returned to 
rule again fifteen years later, Simone Martini was already dead. Moran 
originally argued that the Sienese likely commissioned a memorial 
portrait of Guidoriccio upon his death in 1352, added to the pre- 
existing Simone Martini fresco of the castle of Montemassi; later, 
taking into account a decade of new evidence, Mallory and Moran 
(1986) suggested that the whole Guidoriccio fresco was probably 
painted much later than the mid-trecento, perhaps even in the 
sixteenth century. 
The act of questioning the authenticity of one of the most famous 
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and revered works of one of the most famous and revered artists 
of the early Renaissance produced a reaction that still seems to be 
growing, over a dozen years and many further developments later. 
The most striking of these developments came as a result of the official 
Sienese response to the Moran heresy. In Siena, as can be imagined, 
the issue has been, and continues to be, far more than a matter of 
scholarly dispute. The mayor of Siena took the reasonable step of 
appointing a committee of experts to examine the Guidoriccio 
carefully and seek a resolution to the new controversy. 
The resultant labor of studying, cleaning, and restoring the fresco 
led to the extremely important discovery and eventual uncovering 
in 1980-81 of a heretofore unknown fourteenth-century fresco directly 
below the Guzdorzcczo. This work, recognized immediately to be an 
outstanding example of trecento painting, depicts a castle and its 
palisade, its gates open perhaps to signify capitulation, with two 
figures standing at the left, both intentionlly defaced with blue 
overpainting, apparently not long after they were painted in the first 
place. 
The civic leaders of Renaissance Siena had a tradition of 
celebrating the city’s conquests of important rival fortifications by 
commissioning their portrayal on the walls of the Palazzo Pubblico. 
Therefore, the identification of the subject matter of the newly 
uncovered fresco has become a controversy intimately connected to 
that involving the Guidoricco, itself traditionally identified as the 
memorialization of the siege and conquest of Montemassi in 1328. 
Indeed, in his detailed defense of the traditional attribution, Polzer 
(1987, p. 67) places great emphasis on the signal importance of 
Guidoriccio’s triumph at Montemassi over the most famous and feared 
of Tuscany’s military foes, Castruccio Castracani, as the reason for 
the fresco’s prime location and its survival without the defacement 
posited by Moran and Mallory. The proper naming of the event 
portrayed on the other fresco, and the various possible alignments 
thereof with recorded commissions of Simone Martini (and others), 
have added a whole new dimension of the similar struggle concerning 
its famous wall companion. 
Throughout the controversy, the Kunsthistorisches Institut in 
nearby Florence has played a number of vital roles. As one of the 
great centers of scholarship and research in the art of the Italian 
Renaissance, it has inevitably served as a major resource for all 
concerned, but the institute’s members have also been more 
particularly involved. Max Seidel, president of its support  
organization and member of its governing Kuratorium, was also a 
member of the special Guidoriccio commission appointed by Siena’s 
(then) Mayor Mauro Barni. Seidel was co-author of the official report 
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of the commission, and he has consistently argued for the traditional 
attribution of the fresco. Members of that supporting organization 
(Verein zur Forderung des Kunsthistorischen Instituts) also gave the 
funds necessary to uncover and restore the newly discovered fresco, 
which Seidel and co-commissioner Lucian0 Bellosi consider to be 
a portrayal of the submission of the town of Giuncarico in 1314 
and painted by Duccio, another founding father. Moran and Mallory 
argue that i t  is, rather, the work of Simone Martini himself, a depiction 
of the surrender of Arcidosso to Guidoriccio done in 1331. (The 
commission had also originally identified the site as Arcidosso, but 
they changed their collective mind-according to Moran [G. Moran 
to G. Ewald, Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florence, personal 
communication, June 18, 19861, this was because they belatedly 
recognized that this position played havoc with the traditional view 
of the man on horseback as being Guidoriccio.) Each of these views 
has the expected implications for the identity of the fresco, of course. 
Seidel and two other institute officials, Irene Hueck and Hans 
Belting, were also members of the organizing committee of a special 
conference devoted to the subject of Simone Martini. This convegno, 
which took place in Siena in March 1985, has a place in this 
complicated tale, because, according to Moran (personal com-
munication, 1986) and backed by considerable documentation, this 
committee excluded Moran and Mallory from the speakers’ program 
twice, at first upon their written request for the opportunity to present 
new evidence disputing the established view of the Guidoriccio, then 
(and more tellingly), after the local government of Siena negotiated 
to have them placed on the program at the last minute, in response 
to the local and even national outcry against their exclusion. (In 
fairness, i t  should be mentioned here that according to the institute, 
and specifically according to B. Doll [to G. Moran, personal 
communication, September 24, 1986, at the behest of Doll and copied 
to twenty others including this author], head of the Division for 
Humanities of the Bundesminister fur Forschung und Technologie 
in Bonn, Seidel had no part in preparing the Simone Martini 
Congress, nor in excluding Moran and Mallory from it-“solely the 
I talian organizers were responsible for preparing and holding this 
congress.” The West German government funds a number of research 
centers in foreign countries, among which is the Kunsthistorisches 
Institut, and thus i t  became Doll’s place to defend the institution 
and its officials against the accusations of censorship.) 
In terms of both scholarly and political issues then, the 
Kunsthistorisches Institut, or at least key figures associated with it, 
has a place in this controversy that goes beyond its central function 
as a vital institutional resource. As an independent scholar and a 
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resident of Florence, Gordon Moran has long made regular use of 
this great library for reasons quite unassociated with the controversy. 
His and Mallory’s accusation of censorship by indexing and the article 
summarizing the case are based on their experience as patrons of 
the library, not on their role in that debate-although for them as 
well as for the members of the institute, this background presses 
rather closely at times. 
As Moran explains, the Kunsthistorisches Institut began indexing 
in the card catalog beyond the level of the monograph in the early 
seventies, producing card sets for articles from periodicals, conference 
proceedings, Festschriften, and other sources. He quotes Head 
Librarian Peter Tigler to the effect that this procedure covers “several 
hundred periodicals” and that “this coverage is far more extensive 
than that of the standard bibliographic tools such as RZLA, Art Index, 
and the Repertoire d’art et d’archeologie” (Moran & Mallory, 1986, 
p. 123). Around 1980, this comprehensive indexing had to be curtailed 
because of a shortage of help. It was replaced by the practice of 
“selective” indexing of periodicals according to their “importance”- 
that is, whether they were “especially rich” in articles on Italian 
art or were otherwise regarded as significant according to the “special 
knowledge or interests” of those responsible for the indexing was 
begun (Moran & Mallory, 1986, p. 124). 
The essence of the Moran/Mallory charge is that, starting in 
1980, this “selective” indexing took on a particular ideological pattern 
that affected the treatment of articles dealing with the Guidoriccio 
affair. The year 1980 was also the time that these articles began 
appearing in larger numbers, reflecting the discovery of the other 
fresco. Before glancing at the evidence behind the charge, i t  is 
appropriate to quote at length from Doll’s (1986) defense of the 
institute, as addressed to Moran, because it  does provide useful 
coverage of the technical processing problems facing its catalogers-
and of the nature of the official response: 
With your indication of the delays in the cataloguing of journals, you, 
quite rightly, pointed to a major emergency impairing the use of these 
journals, which does exist unfortunately. The Kunsthistorisches Institut 
has a library of currently approx. 158,000 volumes, among them 1,082 
journals which must be indexed. The number of visitors is very high 
for a research institution of the size of the Kunsthistorisches Institut. 
Only three scientists and one academically trained librarian are available 
for acquisition, cataloguing, maintaining and safekeeping the books and 
for attending to visitors. If this situation is compared with the proven 
standards existing for art libraries, namely that one librarian should 
be responsible for a maximum of 20,000 books, the acute shortage of 
personnel...becomes clear. This shortage is particularly painfully felt in 
the work-intensive indexing of the journal catalogues; it is the reason 
for the major backlog from 1980 onwards ....Because of the ban-issued 
by the Federal Government for the purpose of consolidating the budget- 
on the recruitment of new staff, it has been impossible so far to remedy 
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this unsatisfactory situation. Yet it is the supreme aim to handle all 
journals as speedily as possible. While this optimum cannot be reached, 
one must make do with makeshift measures, which are in the first place 
determined by internal technical aspects. 
This shortage of staff is therefore the only reason why your essays ...have 
not yet been indexed. Your claim that your publications had been 
deliberately neglected in the indexing of journals is an insinuation which 
is explicitly rejected once again here. Indeed, no member of the Institute 
is concerned in their own research work with the Riccio controversy. 
If this were the case, they would strictly separate their tasks at the Institute 
from their own scientific work .... (pp. 2-3) 
Although they reject much in the official defense here and 
elsewhere and present considerable evidence of evasion and 
misrepresentation, Moran and Mallory do not dispute some salient 
features of the above passage. The financial and staff workload 
difficulties faced by the institute have, in fact, been very large. They 
constitute the essence of the defense offered by the institute-that 
is, by its Director, G. Ewald, and the Head Librarian, Tigler-as 
well as Doll; the response to the charge of censorious selectivity 
has been nothing but categorical denial. An addition to the workload 
defense, also undisputed, is ironically revealing from the point of 
view of librarians who worry about points of access. In response 
to Moran’s accusations, that his and Mallory’s publications were being 
suppressed, the library instituted the practice of collecting Moran’s 
essays “in dailies and other ephemeral organs” and putting them 
in a folder under the title of “Miscellanea Moran,” claiming “this 
folder can be used at any time by any visitor to the library” (Doll, 
1986, p. 3). Since this folder was apparently unconnected by any 
cross reference to Simone Martini or the Guzdoricczo issue, at least 
between 1984 and early 1986, visitors may have had the right to use 
it, but they did not have the knowledge necessary to make use of 
that right. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of concealment by subject heading 
(whether or not i t  was intentional) was demonstrated in the fate of 
the February 1984 issue of News from RILA, the issue containing 
Alice Wohl’s summary of the controversy (quoted earlier), as well 
as her useful bibliography on the subject. When the issue arrived 
in the library, it was put into the “Miscellanea Moran” folder instead 
of being shelved with other issues of the title. This meant that not 
only were interested patrons unable to find it, but even an institute 
librarian failed to retrieve it  when asked by visiting scholar Samuel 
Edgerton (Moran & Mallory, 1986, p. 127). After two years, the issue 
was finally reunited with other copies of the title, although the Wohl 
article therein remained unindexed long after that, and the 
problematic nature of “Miscellanea Moran” continued. It was further 
dramatized by the fact that, until early 1986, none of the twelve articles 
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abstracted in the Wohl piece that disagreed with the traditional 
attribution of the Guidoriccio could be found in the Kunsthistorisches 
Institut’s authors’ catalog card indexing, although many contem- 
poraneous articles that upheld the Simone Martini identification did 
receive prompt indexing. To quote (as do Moran and Mallory) Sheila 
Intner: “Because the function of an index is to bring out ideas and 
materials from a mass of stuff, searchers rely on it and assume that 
an item not found in the index, for whatever reason, is missing ...” 
(Intner, 1984, p. 106. Her specific reference is to printed indexes, but 
it applies to a card index as well). 
Without repeating the sometimes grueling detail of the Moran/ 
Mallory inventory of what articles expressing which points of view 
were indexed when, suffice i t  to say that they provide a thorough 
documentation of the charge that articles of the traditional persuasion 
received the thorough indexing that it was the institute’s policy to 
provide selected titles, while articles challenging that view-even 
when they were from journals that heretofore had been indexed- 
did not. A number of the latter are, of course, by Moran and Mallory 
themselves but several are not. 
The authors offer as evidence the difficulties experienced by other 
patrons of the institute, and Moran later pointed to the evidence 
of an article written in December 1987 by Nicole Squires, a California 
State University student, who went to the Kunsthistorisches Institut 
to study Simone Martini via its “fabulous collection of periodicals.” 
As she tells it, the card catalog yielded some sixty articles on her 
subject but very few after 1983. After considerable struggle learning 
and relearning the library’s systems (her first assumption, naturally, 
was that she was not using them properly), seeking staff help, and 
finally being told that the recent material she sought was not indexed 
because of the earlier-mentioned workload problem, she came to the 
following conclusions: 
Based on the catalogueing (sic)-indexing situation, people from the Kunst 
went against principles of some teaching in library scimce and left out, 
in an inconsistent manner, several crucial articles on Simone Martini 
having to do with Moran’s side of the Guido Riccio controversy, giving 
the excuse that they were understaffed. If this was really true, then why 
were all existing articles written by the opposing side (their side) 
immediately filed in both author and subject indexes! As a result students 
like myself encounter some difficulties in using materials at the Kunst. 
Is such difficulty the case only in this particular situation, and thus 
limited to art history, or do such cases occur elsewhere in academia? 
(Squires, 1987, p. 11) 
Whatever the truth in this particular case, her final question is 
extremely important and one that makes this incident, a small facet 
of a large controversy, relevant to all librarians. 
Once they had uncovered what they perceived to be a pattern 
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of censorship by indexing, Moran and Mallory were not reticent about 
seeking redress, both in person at the institute and by way of 
correspondence with a great many near and distant connections with 
the institute and the art world, the library community, intellectual 
freedom groups, any organization or person who came to their 
attention who might be able to bring pressure to bear, or at least 
shed light upon, their case. Gordon Moran is an indefatigable builder 
of epistolary networks who puts forth his case in long and detailed 
letters, often copied to many other parties. Sometimes he is rewarded 
with silence or even hostility (there is considerable potential for both 
contentiousness and defensiveness in this case, of course), or the kind 
of weary politeness expressed by Doll toward the end of the letter 
quoted earlier: 
If a visitor feels he has been treated unfairly, his criticism is heard, not 
only at the Institute but also in the Ministry. This obligingness ends, 
however, where the effort is disproportionate to the importance of the 
matter. Please consider this statement to be a conclusive answer to your 
numerous questions .... (p. 4) 
However, just as his Guidoriccio position continues to gain ever 
wider notice, Moran has also attracted the sympathetic response of 
many who concern themselves with ethical issues in the worlds of 
scholarship and librarianship. The fact that he pours such energy 
with such effectiveness into letter writing (not word processed, which 
these days is further evidence of an unusually high level of energy) 
is not merely an observation of a personality quirk. It is thoroughly 
germane to this discussion, not only because without the major 
epistolary habit there would be no network and likely no broader 
case, but also because it bespeaks an “outsider’s” style. 
As an observer and (very minor) participant in this matter for 
a number of years, this writer has come to believe that one of the 
obstacles confronting Moran is the fact that he is an outsider who 
has become something of a major player in an insider’s game. This 
is not to deny that “gentlemen scholars” and inspired amateurs have 
contributed mightily to scholarship, certainly in the field of art 
history, or that the professionals have been capable of acknowledging 
this in the past and no  doubt will continue to do so in the future. 
That Gordon Moran is a former stockbroker who has settled 
in Florence to pursue the life of the art historian is, then, only partly 
to the point-and his partner in the struggle, Michael Mallory, is, 
after all, a professional in the field, a bona fide member of the Brooklyn 
College faculty. More relevant is the fact that being an outsider to 
the academic establishment, Moran acts like an outsider; that is, he 
writes long letters expressing and documenting his charge of injustice 
to a wide range of correspondents without regard to the protocols 
attendant upon academic hierarchies and turf. He is courteous, even 
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deferential, but he is also relentless and exhaustive in the support 
of his argument, and in effect he calls upon the wider world to bear 
witness to his cause. All of this is, i t  seems, a considerable strain 
upon the politesse which is everywhere at the center of the academic 
style, both personal and institutional, even when academics are at 
each other’s throats. 
This flagrantly subjective point is insisted upon here because 
this author believes that there is such a thing as an “ethics of 
collegiality” that is at work in this case. It is not unique to academia, 
of course; just as the Greeks tended to regard fellow Greeks as somehow 
more civilized, more fully human, than the barbarians (which meant, 
in a simple and pejorative sense, non-Greek), people have always 
parsed the race into insiders and outsiders. But the world of research, 
scholarship, and higher education depends, at least in theory, upon 
uniquely high standards of mutual trust and openness, combined 
with an intricate, discipline-based meritocracy of knowledge, brains, 
and curriculum vitae. It is in many respects an open-ended democratic 
world in accordance with the dynamics of meritocracy, but once one 
is a member of the collegium, it becomes very natural to divide the 
world into those within and those without. 
Thus, for example, when Serge Lang, the Yale mathematician, 
attacked the candidacy of Samuel Huntington for membership in 
the National Academy of Sciences on the grounds that the influential 
Harvard professor had presented a political view (that South Africa 
was measurably a “satisfied society” before the “early 1960s”) as if 
i t  were objective science, he was perceived as an insider betraying 
the insider’s code. The fact that his campaign to block the membership 
of Huntington has (so far) been successful indicates that that code 
is not monolithic, but the fact that he has to resort to a paid 
advertisement to get his argument and defense of his action into 
print is but one indication of the price paid by one who behaves 
like an outsider. In that advertisement, he quotes from a letter to 
him by Yale’s provost: 
We need to muster all the strength we have to combat the ignorance 
and superstition that prevails without our walls. Our mission as an 
institution for the precious nourishment of ideas and scholars is badly 
bruised when we turn on our own, when we withhold that extra ounce 
of trust and forgiveness. (Lang, 1988, p. 4) 
As this example should make clear, the “ethics of collegiality” 
is a genuine ethics, not just a Mafia, code for scholars who seek 
to hide the misdeeds of their own. The provost, like Doll on behalf 
of the Kunsthistorisches Institut, is not seeking a coverup but urging 
cooperation. That the result is the same as a coverup is only the 
view of those who have taken the position of outsider. There is a 
common presumption shared in one case by the provost and, among 
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others, the Harvard colleagues who rushed to Huntington’s defense, 
and in the indexing case, by officials of the institute and its governing 
ministry. That is, that their colleagues, as honest and proven insiders, 
are being attacked unfairly. The related assumption is, naturally, that 
their assailants are misguided at best, traitors to a higher cause at 
worst. 
The well-known case of the examination of the effects of a proven 
case of laboratory fraud on the scientific literature by Walter Stewart 
and Ned Feder (1987) is very revealing in this regard. Their analysis 
of the 109 papers of Harvard researcher John Darsee (and his forty- 
seven variously attentive co-authors), exposing an extensive pattern 
of errors stemming from Darsee’s original falsifications, was an 
insiders’ attack concluding that “certain lapses from generally 
accepted standards of research may be more frequent than is commonly 
believed” (Stewart & Feder, 1987). This article encountered massive 
resistance even before finally being accepted for publication (in a 
form surrounded by hedging commentary and a negative response), 
and even more hostility thereafter. Many scientists felt that Stewart 
and Feder were letting down the side, overreacting to an unfortunate 
but still uncommon incident; there was derogatory comment about 
their personal careers, and they also encountered difficulties at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), their place of employment 
(Greenberg, 1988). 
It should also be noted that the scientific and scholarly 
community has responded to recent instances of fraud and allegations 
of misconduct with considerable worry and self-examination, 
including the establishment by the NIH of a special office to ferret 
out misconduct (Mervis, 1989). Additionally, the research community’s 
fear of government interference in the laboratory is genuine and well- 
founded (Jaschik, 1989), and all agree that trust and collegiality 
remain essential to the research process. But the fact of fraud and 
dishonest behavior within this collegial, but very pressured, system 
has been established, and the fate of those who point this out is 
still often painful (see also the special section on “whistle-blowing” 
in The Scientist [“Special Section,” 19871). 
The ethics of collegiality is not a universal ironclad code that 
renders all who abide by it capable of concealing what are genuine 
ethical transgressions, but i t  is, at the very least, a strong reference 
point quite independent of issues of guilt or innocence. Denial was 
sufficient defense for the institute librarians (that and at least some 
redress, after more than two years, in the form of some cataloging 
for some of the affected articles). Therefore, absent any independent 
investigation, the issues of evidence as well as turf came to the fore 
very early as part of the problem of seeking redress. Moran 
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approached, among other groups, the American Library Association 
(specifically the Office for Intellectual Freedom, through them the 
Intellectual Freedom Committee, and the Intellectual Freedom 
Round Table [IFRT]), the International Federation of Library 
Associations (where they were given a place on the program of the 
Second European Conference of Art Libraries, if no other official 
support), and the College Art Association. 
Although Moran’s correspondence caused not a little discussion 
in all of these groups, none of them decided that i t  was appropriate 
to take specific action, either because they thought it was not their 
business (especially the American groups), or because of a lack of 
clarity (from a distance, anyway) about what the evidence proved 
and just what they weie to do about it. As is apparent in the Moran/ 
Mallory charges, the “selective card cataloging” pattern is inextricably 
bound up with the larger Guidoriccio controversy, and (again, from 
a distance) this presents the possibility of motives not only for the 
censorship but also for the accusation of the misdeed. In the minds 
of people who may have a responsibility for ethics oversight but 
still do not know exactly what they are supposed to do anyway, this 
presents further hurdles. In the wake of the Stewart/Feder (1987) 
Nature article controversy, a number of scientists, including David 
Baltimore (not himself accused of actual fraud but involved in a 
controversy surrounding published work emanating from his lab), 
argue that significant discrepancies that may to outsiders look like 
fraud were the result of differences of opinion rather than 
misrepresentation. This is always a possibility in cases of heated 
controversy-especially (again) from a distance. For Moran and 
Mallory, Stewart and Feder, the evidence may appear unmistakable, 
but there is a question as to how well some kinds of evidence travel. 
The IFRT Executive Committee did approve a very general 
resolution on “Libraries and the Integrity of Research and 
Scholarship,” inspired in part by the Moran/Mallory experience (“be 
i t  resolved that the membership of the American Library Association 
work within and beyond our profession to further cooperation and 
vigilance in the affirmation of the highest standards of ethics in 
research and in the sharing of knowledge” [Approved January 8, 
19891). This, however, was a very broad statement that did not find 
approval beyond the ALA round table. The cases and the issues that 
engendered i t  have resulted in some discussion about the place of 
librarians in all of this, however. While that is itself small comfort 
to Moran and Mallory or others who seek redress or at least support 
from organizations which are supposed to concern themselves with 
ethics oversight, it may be a sign that librarians are beginning to 
see that their role cannot be limited to that of passive shepherds 
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of documents and data, even if this means addressing some very 
difficult questions surrounding their mediator’s role. 
Librarians have long involved themselves in the exploration of 
both the theory and practice of ethics, including the ethical aspects 
of intellectual freedom. The traditional professional commitment to 
the care and delivery of the information package, rather than to the 
nature of its contents, usually serves as an important limitation upon 
the range of that exploration. Professionals have been nervous, rightly, 
about any claim that they ought to have a share of responsibility 
for the actual quality of the information delivered beyond their 
training in and reliance upon review sources and collection 
development and organization tools. “Vigilance,” the word used in 
the IFRT resolution on ethics quoted earlier, was chosen in an attempt 
to assert the responsibility of librarians to maximize access to the 
best information. However, it conjured up, for some, the old vision 
of the librarian as gatekeeper of the House of Knowledge, censor 
of that which does not meet a particular standard. This is a genuine 
danger that requires its own kind of perpetual vigilance, but i t  does 
not let librarians off the hook. 
Moran and Mallory encountered a situation of a kind that is 
probably as old as libraries and academic politics, but when they 
sought an audience for their case, there was no mechanism in place 
within academia, librarianship, or otherwise adequate to their need- 
adequate, that is, even to give them a forum with the proper authority 
and opportunity to judge the evidence, no matter what the outcome. 
The reasons for this go beyond the specific problem of a lack of 
effective ethics oversight, of course; the controversy, of which the 
indexing issue is a part, is large and messy and getting messier. It 
has even reached into the latest guidebook for Italy-bound tourists, 
where the Guidoriccio is referred to as “attributed” to Simone Martini: 
“In recent years a nasty squabble has broken out among art 
historians,” it says, with a quick summary of the Moran/Mallory 
position (Hoefer & Barrett, 1989, p. 262). The nastiness now includes 
accusations of destruction of evidence in the process of restoration, 
accusations concerning the suppression of a letter to the editor (of 
Burlington Magazine) that was a response to another bitter attack, 
and many other signs of a scholarly war with more than its share 
of excesses. Meanwhile, whether or not there was an original intention 
to suppress their point of view, the co-authors have gained an ever 
wider following and not a few adherents-in part, surely, because 
of the earlier-mentioned “outsider’s” persistence. 
Whatever their ultimate success, however, librarians are still 
confronted with the issues of ethics and ethics oversight that Moran 
and Mallory raised. It may well be that this incident took a shape 
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from the beginning that prevented an effective response by the library 
community; still, it behooves us to examine our place, or lack of 
place, in the process of articulating and enforcing ethical standards 
in academic and research institutions. On the level of individual 
responsibility and practice, there are also important lessons to be 
learned from the frustrations of Moran and Mallory. 
In a thoughtful article on the impact of information technology 
on professional ethics, Lawson Crowe and Susan Anthes (1988) 
addressed what they regard as an increase in this professional 
responsibility: 
The academic librarian as information mediator must acquire deeper 
and broader subject expertise ...and prepare for new information storage 
and retrieval capabilities. In respect to both terhnique and substantive 
content, the mediator must be more directive in relationship to the user. 
The modern academic librarian must be client-oriented rather than 
medium-oriented ....In offering bibliographic services, and by dis-
criminating among materials acquired, the academic librarian may stand 
in the midst of contending interests. It is at this confluence of values 
that ethical conflicts arise. (p. 126) 
The authors are not addressing the kind of conflict examined here, 
and it  could be argued that the responsibilities they describe as new 
should have always been part of the librarian’s code of service, with 
the new technology only providing extra pressure down the paths 
of greater content mastery and stronger patron orientation. Their 
essential argument is very relevant here, however. 
Academic librarians, even impressively pedigreed inhabitants of 
major research institutions, usually find themselves at the fringes 
of the circle of faculty collegiality. In this uncertain position 
(uncertain in most cases even if librarians do have “faculty status”), 
they are particularly vulnerable to the push and pull of the insider- 
outsider condition. Effectiveness and status increase with greater 
faculty recognition and cooperation, but i t  remains important to 
remember that the patrons are outsiders as well as insiders, and 
professional priorities must take both into account. (A common, if 
not directly relevant, example is the widespread practice of granting 
faculty much longer checkout periods than students and then 
charging overdue fines to students but not faculty; there are many 
who do not even regard this as an ethical issue, not to mention an 
unfair practice.) 
If (and only i f )  the Moran/Mallory charges are true, the indexers 
involved arranged their indexing priorities in favor of the insiders 
in the Guidoriccio controversy. Librarians do receive complaints from 
faculty members for acquiring books inimical to views of the 
complainers-a rare occurrence, to be sure (in one of the few personal 
cases, the faculty member was abjectly apologetic some time after 
he realized the implications of what he was doing). Librarians are 
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also sometimes under quite understandable pressure to spend more 
resources and energy in some areas than in others. This is a fact 
of life in every institution that must support a particular curriculum 
rather than the broad world of inquiry, but it becomes an ethical 
trap if i t  means supporting one side of a controversy within a given 
field more than another. 
With the resources of modern information technology at hand, 
a librarian can compensate for virtually any under-represen tation 
of significant points of view in the local collection. But this 
presupposes an awareness that there are other points of view in the 
first place. As the experience of Nicole Squires (1987), described earlier, 
indicates, i t  is not enough to assume that the patron will have that 
awareness. 
The difficult truth is that librarians must be both neutral 
champions of access to all points of view and advocates for the 
important views that are suppressed or unrepresented. This means 
that they must worry about the inside as well as the outside of the 
information package. In most cases the preparation given to become 
effective information providers is narrow and inadequate for these 
challenges. What people do or do not do with the information made 
available may be beyond the ethical purview (in the vast majority 
of cases, anyway), but there is a responsibility for the quality and 
comprehensiveness of the information upon which they do or do 
not act. If the immense fracas that began on an old wall in Siena 
has no other relevance for librarians, i t  at least carries the vital lesson 
that this responsibility does indeed have serious ethical implications. 
More is expected of librarians than they are in the habit of giving. 
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Ethical Considerations in Technology Transfer 
THOMASJ. FROEHLICH 
ABSTRACT 
ISSUES are examined from the perspectives IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
of Kantianism and utilitarianism and in terms of the factors that 
must be considered in moral deliberation-i.e., social responsibility; 
social utility; and individual, professional, and institutional survival. 
In current practice, utilitarianism operates under the guise of 
technology needs assessment. This article advances the argument that 
ethical deliberation in technology transfer is biased toward the 
utilitarian view, that utilitarianism has inherent difficulties in 
projecting the consequences of technology transfer, that utilitarian 
principles are often sabotaged by political or self-serving goals and 
ideologies, and that the perspectives offered by Kant and feminism 
are important aspects in establishing what should be a dialectical 
process for determining which technologies are appropriate and how 
they should be transferred. 
INTRODUCTION 
Wales seems an unusual place for an American to reflect on ethical 
considerations in technology transfer, particularly the transfer of 
information technology, and the role of information professionals 
in the process. Yet i t  is the experience of teaching several summers 
at the International Graduate Summer School in Aberystwyth that 
evoked these reflections. Students, faculty, and professionals from 
as many as forty different countries gathered for this cross-cultural 
educational experience, now under the auspices of the Department 
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of Library and Information Studies of the University College of Wales. 
(Before its merger with the University College of Wales, the school 
was known as the College of Librarianship Wales. The summer 
program has been renamed the International Graduate Information 
Summer School.) The summer school was designed, in part, precisely 
for the purpose of facilitating transfer of information technologies 
from developed countries to less developed countries (LDCs). 
Information technologies are an integral part of successful technology 
transfer and contribute to an LDC’s ability to develop and sustain 
scientific and technological activities. During these summer 
programs, information professionals from various countries 
discovered many shared needs and concerns, but the diversity of needs, 
the plurality of problems, and cultural differences also became 
apparent. This heterogeneity made the issues of technology transfer 
and ethical considerations all the more difficult. 
Transfer of technology touches on such issues as global 
economics, balance of trade deficits, political and social beliefs, 
balances of power, allocation of world resources, and environmental 
issues. Its rise to prominence as a geopolitical issue stems from 
imbalances between advanced or developed countries and under- 
developed or lesser developed countries. Graham (1982) reports that 
northern or developed countries account for 95 percent of all the 
world’s research and development while southern countries, 
representing 70 percent of the world’s population, generate only 4 
percent (p. 45). Technology transfer is important for economic 
development, but much of the available technology is invested with 
proprietary rights so that i t  cannot be freely transferred. 
APPROACHESTO TECHNOLOGY 
There are many ways in which technology can be understood. 
For this article we will distinguish among three levels of technology: 
( 1) technology in  general; (2) technological practices, and 
(3 )  technological packages. In general, a technology can be 
characterized as a group of techniques, either intellectual or 
embodied, orchestrated as a totality for solving a particular problem 
or set of interrelated problems. The technologies with which 
information professionals are familiar can be divided into two kinds: 
( 1 )  “intellectual technologies” (Taylor, 1986) such as classification, 
cataloging, indexing and abstracting, technologies that perform 
“value-added processes in information systems,” and (2) technologies 
as embodied systems of tools or procedures, such as computer systems 
and their use in online public access catalogs. In practice, this 
distinction is difficult to maintain because intellectual technologies, 
manifest in the mental activities of theoreticians or experienced 
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professionals, lead to forms of embodiment-e.g., theories of 
classification lead to systems such as Dewey Decimal, thesauri, 
authority lists, etc. These embodiments, taken up  by professionals, 
may in turn influence perceptions and intellectual organization. 
The intellectual technologies are like Kan t’s schemas, structures 
by which experience is organized and which make experience possible. 
For example, information professionals acquire classification schemes 
through courses, lectures, exercises, and reading; but once the schemes 
are acquired, they become devices through which classifiers and 
catalogers structure their experience of intellectual works, which 
thereby transform their experience of those works. This may not 
always be appropriate. Berman (1981) noted that the 1979 Dewey 
Decimal Classification had inadequate coverage of popular music 
and gay issues and had ambiguous treatment of North American 
Indians. Classification schemes and subject headings tend to reflect 
the biases of the general population. Since the dominant classification 
and subject heading schemes were developed in America, the bias 
they reflect is an American one. These biases may inhibit the easy 
applications of such classifications to local issues in a developing 
country. 
In addition to characterizing the technology associated with 
information work, one should also distinguish, as Pacey (1983) does, 
between technology and technology practices. Technology practices 
are individual or generic applications of technologies in a specific 
context of people and organizations: “technology-practice is thus the 
application of scientific and other knowledge to practical tasks by 
ordered systems that inuolue people and organizations, living things 
and machines” (Pacey’s emphasis, p. 6).Technology practice is geared 
to specific contexts, which en tail cultural and organizational 
constraints. For example, a Dewey Decimal Classification used in 
a special library may be adapted to meet local needs and objectives. 
Recommendations for appropriate classification embodied in the 
Dewey rules may be overridden to suit organizational requirements. 
Thus intellectual technologies lead to forms of embodiment 
(classification schemes) which in turn, through the activities of 
trained or experienced professionals, lead to specific practices (e.g., 
classification of a particular text for a particular information-
seeking environment). But i t  should be a dialectical process: 
problems in particular classifications should lead to reflection on 
the forms of embodiment and the grounding intellectual 
technologies. Unfortunately, there are three reasons why this may 
not occur: (1) practices may pose insoluble problems-e.g., in 
hierarchical classification schemes, i t  is of ten difficult to expand 
the vocabulary, modify the meaning of a term, or describe complex 
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concepts (Meadow, 1967, p. 26); (2)practitioners may not communicate 
difficulties to classification rule makers; and (3)classification schemes 
have historical inertia and tend to be inflexible. 
A technological package, a third approach to technology, can 
be seen as an uprooted technological practice. A given technology 
is developed for a particular cultural and historical environment. 
Upon its success, the developers often attempt to generalize the 
technology by disengaging i t  from its original application. Examples 
include many library automation systems, such as NOTIS, which 
have been “home grown”-that is, built for a particular university 
setting; they then become a technological package marketed to other 
universities and applications. This deracination process lies at the 
core of the notion of a technological package, which has been adapted 
from Crowther’s (1986) characterization of information technologies: 
closely inter-related sets of hardware, software, . . . . human resource 
(and skill) requirements and guidelines, . , . which “work” or “function” 
together in a strictly technical sense (e.g.. reducible to a highly controlled 
laboratory situation), apart from contextual considerations, in order to 
produce or transform a good, service or standard. The technology becomes 
a technological package when it i s  labelled by a policy symbol and 
subjected to a series of technological utility and economic efficiency 
decisions. (p. 1) 
For Crowther, a technological package is the mechanism by which 
technology is transferred and therefore is the unit around which 
assessment occurs. It is an important notion because it  describes actual 
phenomena, and understanding its character helps one to understand 
the complexity, as well as occasional failures, of some transfers. The 
technological package is “a classic case of a technological solution 
looking for a problem to solve” (Rogers & Larsen, 1984, p. 269) without 
regard to the appropriateness of the problem or the context. 
ETHICALFRAMEWORKS 
With these distinctions in mind, two familiar philosophical 
positions can be introduced as frameworks for studying ethical 
considerations-i.e., Kantianism and utilitarianism. These positions 
do not of course exhaust the pluralism that exists in current ethical 
inquiry. Part of the difficulty in discussing applied ethics lies in 
developing some shared standards, difficult enough in the diversity 
of American culture and even more problematic in an intercultural 
context. Yet the positions of Kant and utilitarianism were chosen 
because, according to Kohlberg (1976), they are dominant and 
commonly held across cultures. (Kohlberg has claimed that these two 
positions are stages in a process of moral development that is shared 
across cultures. He argued that there were six definable stages in 
the moral development of persons. The stages were divided into three 
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levels: preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional 
morality. In the latter two levels, the ones characteristic of mature 
morality, each stage reflects the utilitarian and Kantian position 
respectively, but the latter level has a deeper appropriation based 
on a personal commitment to a sense of justice rather than social 
determination [conventional morality is based on shared norms and 
values that sustain groups and societies]. People who progress through 
these levels or positions do not necessarily know their philosophical 
names, originators, or advocates. Nevertheless, if Kohlberg is correct, 
they come to live according to these positions as their ethical 
development matures. Although there are some difficulties and 
challenges to Kohlberg’s position, for the sake of establishing a 
springboard, the focus will be on the utilitarian and Kantian aspects 
of conventional morality [level 21, since they seem to be the guiding 
ethical views of many cases of technology transfer.) Even if people, 
transferrers and transferees alike, do not know their names, they 
practice behavior that can be described in Kantian or utilitarian terms. 
THEKANTIANAPPROACH 
The Kantian position of the “categorical imperative” appears 
to be a rationalization for the golden rule: do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you. One of Kant’s (1959) formulations 
of the categorical imperative is: “Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end 
and never merely as a means” (p. 47). Kant admonishes us to treat 
ourselves and other people as ends worthy of respect and never merely 
as means. 
Kant’s position was formulated as a personal ethic: in fact ethics 
for Kant was anthropocentric, dealing with man’s relation to himself 
or other men. The stakeholders in technology transfer, however, can 
be persons, groups, or institutions of various sorts-i.e., governments, 
corporations, foundations, nonprofit agencies, scientific committees, 
or countries. In this article, institution will be used as a generic 
term to cover these various collectivities. To extend the value of the 
categorical imperative, one must include these institutions as actors, 
because they are entities with some degree of autonomy, with their 
own status and rights. Given the view in the United States that 
corporations have legal status as individual entities, one could 
simultaneously argue, as we for the moment will assume, that any 
institution can be accorded the status of moral agent. Philosophically, 
i t  is not easy to justify this assumption (especially for Kant where 
moral worth is traceable to a rational will), for collectivities, like 
governments and other institutions, exist only in and through 
individuals, and yet i t  is clear that governments and institutions make 
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choices. Their actions and directions represent a will for the 
institution as a whole. In this sense, institutions have an autonomous 
life. Assuming the moral agency of institutions, Kan t’s categorical 
imperative can be restated: treat all institutions not merely as means, 
but at the same time as ends in themselves. Just as an information 
professional, from this Kantian perspective, has no right to regard 
his employing institution as a mere means to his livelihood, 
organizations in both developed and developing countries must avoid 
being mere users of each other. 
With these views in mind, one could argue that Kant’s categorical 
imperative gives rise to three factors for ethical considerations in 
technology transfer: promotion of organization survival, preservation 
of individuality, and presence of goodwill. These can be compared 
to the four factors isolated by Rubin (1991) in a paper on “Ethical 
Issues in Library Personnel Managemen t”-organizational survival, 
individuality, social utility, and social responsibility. (The notion 
of principles implies settled rules of action. But these considerations 
are less rules than constituent elements that contribute to the moral 
deliberation that leads to a choice and/or action, upon an appeal 
to some ethical principles, like fairness or justice. Ethical principles 
imply sets of values or rules that are invoked in the process of weighing 
these diverse factors.) The factor of organizational survival, derived 
from Thompson’s Organizations in Action (1967), originates in the 
view that a fundamental function of an organization is to perpetuate 
itself so that the organization survives and prospers. While Thompson 
derives this consideration by analogy to the moral self-interest of 
individuals found in the work of Locke and Hobbes, it appears to 
be associated with the Kantian notion of the autonomy of the will 
from the version of the categorical imperative quoted earlier: “Act 
so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that 
of another, always as an end and never merely as a means” (emphasis 
added, p. 47). If institutions have moral agency, they also are ends, 
never to be treated merely as means. This implies, as Rubin suggests, 
that those who run or serve institutions have an obligation to make 
the organization as efficient as possible for serving organizational 
ends (otherwise they would be treating organizations as mere means 
in themselves). 
But in the world of information professionals, there is a related 
consideration-survival of the profession. Each profession is also 
never merely a means but an end and must be granted rights of 
survival. One of the origins of ethical conflict is precisely the clash 
between organizational and professional survival: on occasion, 
obligations to the profession may override organizational sur viva1 
or vice versa. For example, if an information professional is asked 
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to pad the account of a client with inappropriate online searches, 
this activity may promote institutional survival but at the expense 
of professional survival. Since this factor applies to organizations 
and professions, it might be better called the principle of institutional 
survival. 
There is another dimension of survival that must be included 
in contemporary ethical discussions, that of planetary survival. The 
advent of technologies with large-scale impacts have changed the 
character of the ethical arena. These changes have led Jonas (1984) 
to create new formulations of Kant’s categorical imperative: “Do not 
compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of 
humanity on earth,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are 
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life” (p. 11). 
Paradoxically, these versions of the imperative move away from Kant’s 
focus on intentional states and move toward the utilitarian mode 
of thinking, as they necessarily focus on the consequences of an action, 
and so these versions will be taken up during the discussion of 
utilitarianism. 
Like the factor of institutional survival, the factors related to 
individuality are founded on the original versions of the categorical 
imperative. People are individuals in an organization and ends in 
themselves. Their individuality must be respected, and Rubin argues 
that they should have as much freedom in the marketplace as 
practicable. Rubin adds: “Restrictions on employee conduct and 
expression require a valid rationale. In other words, the Principle 
of Individuality implies that all rules, regulations and punishments 
should have a clear rationale, i.e., ‘just cause’ ” (p. 8). This principle 
can be applied to organizations as well. Organizations should have 
as much freedom as possible, and restrictions on organizational 
behavior in the marketplace should have “just cause.” For this reason, 
the principle might be better called the principle of autonomy, since 
it  affirms the autonomy of individuals and organizations in pursuing 
their goals subject only to constraints based on just cause (e.g., the 
prevention of environmental pollution). 
Some further clarifications of Kant’s position can be productive 
here. At the center of Kant’s moral philosophy is the notion of a 
good will. A good will is an unqualified good, unlike other kinds 
of goods-for example, wealth, power, or information technologies- 
which can be abused. A good will is a will that acts for the sake 
of duty. When an action is performed because of the belief that i t  
is right, i t  accrues moral worth for the person acting. In Kant’s view, 
it is not because good consequences are achieved that an action is 
good; rather, an action is good when it was attempted because it  
was the right thing to do (e.g., the action of providing agricultural 
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information to a developing country with problems of starvation 
is good despite the fact that a drought destroyed the crops). Somewhat 
problematically, Kant disassociates a good will from inclination. Kant 
believes that an action is hardly moral if we are inclined to do i t  
anyway-e.g., a corporation that gives away computers to universities 
or developing countries because of tax write-offs or obsolescence of 
models is performing actions that have no moral worth even if the 
consequences are good. The  reason, according to Kant, is that, 
although its actions were in accord with moral duty, they were not 
done for the sake of that duty. 
Kant seems to imply that there must be a certain level of 
consciousness in moral action-i.e., one must be aware that what 
one is doing is in accord with one’s duty. This notion seems to run 
contrary to the Aristotelian view that moral worth is related to 
properly acquired moral habits. For example, if a person or institution 
is in the habit of donating obsolescent models of computers to 
charitable causes, such actions are morally praiseworthy because they 
are in accord with good character formation and not because the 
institutions are conscious of their duty. They are the kind of actions 
a good person of good character would perform. One would think 
that Kant would agree, but he seems to insist on a certain level of 
awareness of duty. 
Given that this motivation is the element that supplies moral 
worth, Kant must determine some objective content for the moral 
law. He reasons that you should “act only according to that maxim 
by which you can at the same time will that i t  should become a 
universal law” (p. 39). In this version of the categorical imperative, 
Kant is suggesting that an action is morally acceptable if the doer 
of that action could wish that the principle that guides it become 
a universal law. For example, one could not wish that lying become 
a universal law; if i t  did, communication of fact would become 
impossible since not everyone would make the same assumptions 
on the basis of what they were told. 
Kant does not imply that concrete laws of conduct can be deduced 
directly from the categorical imperative; rather i t  operates as a 
criterion for judging the morality of subjective principles of conduct 
which Kant calls maxims. Suppose that I choose to supply agricultural 
information for use in a poor rural area where there are no  proprietary 
rights on the information or its use. The maxim of this action is: 
I will provide technological and scientific information to needy 
countries or people, where the supply of that information will not 
infringe on  copyright, misuse of employer’s resources (e.g., 
duplicating costs), etc. I ask myself whether I could will that this 
maxim become a universal law, namely that anybody in a position 
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such as mine would do the same, and decide that I can so will it. 
Hence the maxim is morally justified. Interestingly, in terms of this 
example, there may be some who would feel justified in the misuse 
of employer’s resources and/or in the infringement of copyright, for 
example, if they deemed that a higher good would be served, namely, 
the alleviation of famine, disease, or poverty. Kant would have 
difficulty in endorsing such actions as acceptable moral law, precisely 
because he sees justice and universality tied together. For him, it 
is still a matter of stealing, albeit from the rich to the poor, and 
to wish that i t  become a universal law would be to advocate actions 
inconsistent with fundamental notions of morality, namely, justice, 
fairness, and contracts. 
Through the criterion of universalizability, one can determine 
the admissibility of certain maxims into a proper ethical code. So 
the maxim, “steal information from vendors or employers, everyone 
else does,” is inconsistent when universalized-i.e., vendors and 
employers would cease to exist if everyone stole from them. Kant‘s 
position is often called a formalism since it only determines the form 
of the moral law (universalizability) and not its content. 
In the context of technology transfer, whether considering a 
technology, a technology practice, or a technological package, the 
Kantian approach is embodied by those for whom good will is a 
valuable and moral asset, supplying a proper motivation for the 
distribution of scientific and technological information and 
experience for the promotion of economic development. Although 
tangible results are hoped for in the transfer process, their failure 
to occur does not detract from the basic morality of the situation- 
i.e., that individuals and institutions of whatever variety should 
operate with good will and treat each other as ends and not merely 
as means. On the other hand, Kant’s view also accords with one’s 
intuitive feeling that if a technological package is foisted on a 
developing country sheerly on the basis of a profit motive for the 
developer, that action is morally questionable despite beneficial 
results. 
THEUTILITARIANPERSPECTIVE 
John Stuart Mill (1957) explains the utilitarian principle: 
The creed which accFpts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they promote happiness, wrong as they promote thr reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absmce of pain; 
by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. (p. 10) 
The utilitarian position focuses on results or consequences, striving, 
as i t  does, for the maximum amount of happiness for the most number 
of people. Mill’s position is a modified hedonism; he believes that 
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most people seek happiness or pleasure as an end, but he attempts 
to apply this to the entire social setting. The slogan of the utilitarians, 
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” is hrected toward 
both a wide and a just distribution of pleasure and its maximization. 
It is because the distribution was supposed to be both broad 
and just that Mill’s views have had wide impact. One interpretation 
of Mill argues that i t  implies that people should enjoy rights to 
the basic necessities of life-i.e., adequate food, housing, a job, and 
favorable working conditions. In fact, politicians, social activists, 
judges, and decision makers of all varieties have adopted his beliefs 
in the creation of social programs, legislation, and plans for economic 
development. The attempt to bring about the general happiness 
represents their method of implementing utilitarian principles. Smart 
sees behind utilitarianism the “motive of generalized benevolence” 
(in DeMarco, 1986, p. 26), and one can see this motive behind the 
use of technology transfer for economic development and for 
supporting the “modernization cycle,” a process in which developing 
countries undertake technologies to improve the general conditions 
of their societies. 
One may understand the dynamics, benefits, and difficulties of 
utilitarianism by employing an example. Take the case where the 
personnel of an agricultural library in a developing country are 
deciding whether to automate its library system. Such a system would 
supply many benefits-e.g., improved agricultural production 
through the availability of knowledge of crops, techniques for 
enhancing crop culture, and avoiding or inhibiting crop diseases and 
pests; increased income for farmers; and increased prosperity and 
health because of adequate or increased harvests. But not only would 
i t  supply benefits, but also the benefits would be superior-i.e., the 
easy availability of agricultural information, increased speed of access 
to such information, the elimination of much irrelevant information, 
and elimination of the work required to duplicate research results 
of the information. From these benefits, certain deficits must be 
subtracted-i.e., reliance on externally created technologies, depletion 
of financial resources and increased indebtedness to developed 
countries, difficulty in getting skilled human resources to run and 
maintain the operation, increased educational requirements for 
creating such human resources with reliance on developed countries 
or companies for training, increased educational requirements for 
users needed to overcome language and technophobic barriers, higher 
unemployment due to technological replacement of the large numbers 
of personnel typically employed in a manual system, difficulties in 
fostering the need for information on the part of the end-users, 
difficulties in enhancing the literacy standards so that end-users can 
FROEHLICH/CONSIDERATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 285 
use the information, the consequences of misused or misapplied 
technologies (e.g., use of inappropriate pesticides or incorrect 
dosages), the consequences of inappropriate technologies (e.g., use 
of dangerous pesticides), increased “brain drain” by loss of bright 
students who emigrate to developed countries. These benefits and 
deficits must be added up  within individuals and across individuals 
to arrive at a general sum. This sum is to include those consequences 
that are associated not only with the present, but also those associated 
with the immediate and remote future. A long-range ecological 
disaster would ultimately devalue a high level of current general 
happiness. Furthermore, the availability of the information and its 
use for increased agricultural production should not unduly favor 
one segment of the population (e.g., rich landowners) at the expense 
of another (e.g., poor local farmers). For utilitarians and other 
consequentialists, an action is moral if i t  promotes the long-range 
general happiness for the most people and/or if it inhibits the general 
amount of displeasure. 
This example illustrates a number of critical features of 
utilitarianism. These include: (1) a distinction among pleasures in 
terms of quality; (2) the additive nature of benefits and deficits; (3) that 
there is a temporal factor that must be considered in calculating the 
general happiness; (4)that the general happiness is a good to every 
individual; and ( 5 )  that there should be a just distribution of the 
benefits. Let us move on to a delineation of the problems associated 
with such a view. 
Not all forms of utilitarianism (e.g., the theories of Bentham) 
have argued for qualitative distinctions among pleasures, but it was 
a view that Mill (1957) supported and demonstrated in his famous 
assertion that it “is better to be a human being dissatisfied than 
a pig satisfied” (p.14). In certain areas it seems to be justified: increased 
agricultural production due to increased knowledge and experience 
is superior to local agricultural production bound to sheer “grunt 
work” because of inappropriate technologies (e.g., failure to rotate 
crops). In other contexts, it can be hazardous to associate labels of 
inferiority or superiority with physical or mental pleasures (e.g., is 
sex inferior to book reading?), because these pleasures are variously 
good at diverse times and are not a matter of inferiority or superiority. 
Inferiority as a label is often employed only to indicate abuse or 
fixation on certain kinds of pleasure, typically physical. 
Not all “grunt work” farming may be bad. Given some good 
information about appropriate techniques, such production may be 
environmentally safer and instill large amounts of self-esteem for 
the farmers. Part of the problem for Mill is that he wants to make 
qualitative distinctions based on pleasure. If one makes qualitative 
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distinctions among pleasures, it is not on the basis of some difference 
in pleasure that these are made but according to other values. The 
superiority of informed agricultural production versus grunt work 
production is not simply a matter of pleasure (i t  is true that less 
physical effort may be involved and there may be increased 
production, but these are quantitative measures) but of other values- 
i.e., freedom from ignorance, increased knowledge, better control of 
and relationship to nature, more leisure time. 
Mill attempts to establish these differences in quality on the basis 
of a competent judge. He argues that if one of two pleasures is preferred 
by people who are competently acquainted with both, “even though 
knowing it  to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and 
[who] would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure,” 
the preferred pleasure is superior in quality (p. 12). Mill’s description 
has to do with weighing quantitative and qualitative pleasures within 
the individual, but our example generalizes to social dimensions. 
Determining and weighing qualitative and quantitative pleasures in 
the aggregate has always been a difficult problem, especially in matters 
bearing upon the public sector. In matters of the public interest, 
who are to be regarded as the competent judges: politicians, scientists, 
or pollsters (reflecting a consensus of the general population)? In 
matters of technology transfer it is more difficult to decide since the 
experts presumably must be competent to assess a technology from 
the viewpoints of both the donor and receiving cultures. The problem 
is aggravated if the technology is newly applied, because there is 
little knowledge of the potential or actual consequences. Even the 
methods of technology assessments are geared to the donor culture, 
and they may be inappropriate for the receiving culture. If the experts 
are attached to the donor culture, they may have a serious lack of 
understanding of the receiving culture-i.e., its needs and traditions. 
If they are in the receiving culture, they may not be able to fully 
assess the effects of the technology in itself and more so in its 
application to their own culture. 
As an alternative judge, one might resort to appealing to a 
consensus by major players or the public in a sort of “participatory 
technology”-e.g., if the public is given sufficient informaion, it will 
come to a consensus about what technology it will need or reject. 
Brooks (1973) indicates the problems with this view: 
This seems an unrealistic hope. What is more likely to happen with 
greater participation, as traditionally visualized, is that any adversely 
affected group or interest can exercise a veto power over a technological 
enterprise, almost regardless of other affected interests or values. 
Unfortunately, all policy, including that relative to technology, requires 
a measure of both consistency and continuity among objectives, which 
is difficult to reconcile with participatory democracy in the decision 
process. (p. 255) 
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Nonetheless, this is precisely the strategy recommended by Noar (1982) 
with respect to the social responsibility of multinational corporations 
to operate in a “socially desirable manner.” What is socially desirable 
is to be determined on the basis of whether activities will be seen 
to bring about welfare improvements in the countries in which the 
companies exist. “Periodic public opinion polls, or more informal 
methods in the less developed countries, are seen to provide the 
necessary inputs for the overall corporate guidelines for action, which 
in turn will influence strategic corporate decisions” (p. 219). To 
reiterate Brooks, this seems naive, since it is not clear that those 
polled could really understand or predict the consequences or 
nonconsequences of a corporate course of action. 
Implied in the discussion so far is that pleasures (whether 
qualitative or quantitative) are additive in some way, and that these 
pleasures and pains can be computed into a sort of aggregate 
happiness. But this calculus of pleasures must be examined. In some 
instances, two pleasures can enhance the individual pleasures. Using 
the example of the agricultural library, there would be greater 
happiness if both the citations were available online and the source 
documents were immediately available than if there were source 
documents alone (with few or faulty access points in a manual system) 
or online references alone, with months needed to obtain the source 
documents, if they were at all available. In other instances, two 
pleasures may be in conflict, as, for example, trying to promote full 
employment while simultaneously trying to automate the agricultural 
library in a country with a large population and little local 
technological resources or expertise. On other occasions, a pleasure 
may even be enhanced with the addition of a pain, as when the 
successful implementation of an automated system is enhanced by 
the number and degree of difficulties overcome, such as low 
availability of capital, language barriers, unstable governments, low 
prestige of information professionals, lack of available trained 
personnel, and poor existing information infrastructures (Eres, 1981, 
p. 99). In simple comparisons, one often can make a judgment, but 
when one combines all these factors, i t  is difficult to estimate overall 
results. For example, in the plans to automate the agricultural library, 
one would have to take into account the unhappiness of all those 
who remained unemployed and their offspring-i.e., the unhappiness 
of the government in reduced tax revenues because of reduced 
employment; all the happiness of the patrons due to the quick easy 
efficient access to the materials of the library; their unhappiness when 
the equipment breaks down; and the unhappiness caused by reliance 
on external suppliers and the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and 
repairing the equipment. 
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There is also a temporal element in the computation, since the 
consequences to be considered are not simply the current ones but 
those in the future as well. At the extreme, one must take into account 
the effects of a technology transfer on the survival and quality of 
life on planet earth in the distant future. As noted earlier, Jonas 
(1984) believes that Kant’s ethics are inadequate to deal with 
contemporary situations. Previously, man’s actions had little effect 
on the self-sustaining character of nature or on the ability of the 
planet to sustain life. Now actions undertaken by whatever individual 
or institution, be i t  corporation, government, or social agency, can 
have grave consequences for life on the planet. In the new ethics, 
increased knowledge is vital to proper moral decision making 
especially where actions involve or promote these serious conse- 
quences. Hence, Jonas (1984) reformulates Kan t’s imperative: “Act 
so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence 
of genuine human life”; or “Act so that the effects of your action 
are not destructive of the future possibility of such life” (p. 11). 
Although these formulations remind us to avoid ecological disaster, 
they make two shifts from the original Kantian perspective. First, 
they heighten the role of knowledge. For Kant, the knowledge required 
for ethical decision making was not that of a scientist or expert, 
but “of a kind readily available to a man of good will” (p. 5 ) ,  a 
man of common sense. The impact of one’s actions did not have 
consequences except for the foreseeable future. Current moral action 
requires “predictive knowledge,” but paradoxically, as Jonas points 
out, such knowledge is unavailable since man lacks experience in 
the long-range effects of certain actions upon the life of the planet. 
So a dilemma appears: on the one hand, the need for knowledge 
of consequences as a prerequisite for performing utilitarian 
calculation, and on the other, the inadequacy of predictive knowledge. 
This is especially perplexing for developing countries for two reasons: 
(1) they are more vulnerable to a lack of knowledge of consequences 
(both in terms of the technology and of its application to their 
environment); and (2) technologies, such as the use of certain 
pesticides that are no longer tolerated in developed countries, are 
of ten foisted on them by unscrupulous businessmen. Even though 
these technologies may be recognized as harmful, they are often 
tolerated because they are cheap and because they offset other large- 
scale problems such as severe shortages in food supply. 
Thus the utilitarian computation of the consequences of 
technology transfer is complicated by many additive and temporal 
factors. When a decision maker opts for the importation of a 
technology such as computer hardware and software for automation, 
he must consider the current and future benefits of all affected 
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persons-e.g., the benefits to be derived from the avoidance of hunger, 
poverty, disease, and ignorance; economic growth and development; 
stimulation of research and productivity; and increased stature in 
the international community. From this aggregate he must subtract 
the cost of the technology and the resultant dependency i t  fosters; 
those adverse consequences resulting from misapplied technology as 
in the improper use of pesticides; environmental costs including the 
depletion of natural resources, pollution, and long-range (and of ten 
unknown) adverse consequences including those that may affect life 
on the planet; costs of science policy development and imple-
mentation; costs of the failure of anticipated results; and the erosion 
of cultural identity. If the moral quality of a choice for a transfer 
of technology depends on its consequences (as the teleological 
dimension of utilitarianism suggests), there will be a long wait to 
determine the verdict of such a choice. 
Furthermore, there is an uneasy relationship between the 
individual’s happiness and general happiness in utilitarianism. Mill 
suggests that since each person’s happiness is a good to that person, 
the general happiness is a good to everybody. Taken at face value, 
this is the fallacy of division, arguing that a property associated with 
the whole must be associated with the parts. One could imagine 
that with our agricultural library, some individuals may very well 
be unhappy, despite an increase in the general well-being of the 
society. Farmers who were excluded from use of the library because 
of economic, educational, or other barriers, and thus excluded from 
implementing the information contained therein through appro- 
priate technologies, would discover the falling value of their current 
production efforts, making them unable to earn a living and sustain 
a family. On a positive side, economic growth in a country as a 
general good does tend to facilitate economic growth throughout 
a society. But such growth may disproportionately favor some 
constituents at the expense of others. 
This suggests another problem: utilitarianism aims for a just 
distribution of those goods. Given the greatest happiness principle, 
a corresponding principle of justice to which utilitarians should 
appeal is that the allocation of resources should be such that there 
will be the most happiness for the most number of people. In the 
case of a developing country, funding decisions for technology 
transfers would address the more fundamental problems of a society- 
i.e., poverty, starvation, disease. Funds might go to a medical facility 
first before they would go to the agricutlural library. Or would they? 
Which are the more fundamental problems? Would a best-
maximization principle imply a single obvious, well-defined course 
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of action or set of priorities, when there are conflicting goods or 
conflicting competing avenues for combating sundry evils? 
For example, in the agricultural library, conflicts are bound to 
arise between organizational demands and social responsibilities. As 
noted earlier, Rubin (1990) has suggested difficulties in balancing 
the factors of social responsibility, social utility, and institutional 
survival (p. 6).In the context of library personnel management, factors 
related to social utility are concerned with promoting the greater 
good of society within the context of the organization’s goals. 
Personnel managers must maximize resources to promote the public 
good. For the agricultural library, the budget would have to be 
allocated so that i t  would best fulfill its mission-i.e., to provide 
agricultural information to those sectors of the society most in need 
of it. In this manner, i t  would fulfill both the goals of social utility 
and institutional survival. 
But social responsibility is concerned with advancing the larger 
goals of a developing country. In this respect, the library may be 
inclined to hire more staff than it  needs (to enhance national full 
employment demands) and to hire less qualified but native citizens 
(to inhibit economic dependence on external countries); i t  may 
concern itself more closely with the problems of the impoverished 
and ignorant through such things as literacy and outreach programs 
(as opposed to serving the needs of the wealthy and privileged); may 
acquiesce in cutting budgets (so that critical problems in other areas 
of the economy may be addressed); may defer automation (to increase 
employment and to avoid dependence on external technologies). 
These choices would aim for a harmonious society in which all or 
most people would enjoy basic rights to food, shelter, clothing, 
education, etc. 
Such a concern for social responsibility, however, would often 
stand in tension with institutional survival since losses entailed by 
actions promoting social responsibility would infringe on a library’s 
economic well-being. Promotion of organizational survival fosters 
an organization that is efficient and economical. The agricultural 
library fulfills its goals by minimizing staff requirements, by hiring 
only the best-educated and most highly skilled workers, by purchasing 
only the most reliable technology, and so on. In this respect, the 
unhappiness of some individuals (e.g., those who fail to gain 
employment or other benefits from the system) would be overriden 
in favor of the greater social good. In addition, poor personnel 
practices would also deflate the profession’s standing, a matter of 
special concern in developing countries where the value and prestige 
of trained professionals is not well established. Thus professional 
survival would also be threatened. And the promotion of the library’s 
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social utility function-to provide agricultural information-may 
also be impaired by expending resources on programs or actions 
promoting social responsibility. The choice of a technology, including 
information technology, is bound to many competing demands and 
to many uncertain results. Yet the utilitarian calculus demands- 
whatever the choices-a projection of results. 
REINTERPRETING TERMSMILLIN CONTEMPORARY 
Such choices based on calculations of the general happiness have 
been undertaken. The apparatus of utilitarianism has taken on several 
guises in contemporary life. In the context of technology transfer, 
it is actualized under the rubric of technology needs assessment, a 
preliminary analysis of an LDC’s needs and capabilities, so that 
appropriate technologies can be imported for economic development, 
and a trajectory for successful technology transfer may be established. 
Hetman (1973) reformulates the utilitarian principle in contemporary 
economic terms: “a mass society devoted to maximizing economic 
growth and the average expectancy of material well-being” (p. 258), 
accomplished by a technology that “has to be put at the service of 
the economy” (p. 257). Such technology incorporation is part of the 
“modernization cycle” for developing countries so that they can 
effectively deal with their local problems and can learn to compete 
in the world market or to participate in the “New International 
Economic Order.” Hetman’s assessment entails three parts: 
technological utility, social relevance, and political acceptability. 
With respect to the first part, a reason for introducing a technology 
is to gain some sizable advantage with respect to existing technologies. 
In order to determine this, the available technologies and their 
variants must be explored as a set of options. With respect to the 
second issue, each option must be subjected to a test of social relevance 
that includes assessment of direct economic costs and benefits and 
all other identifiable effects and impacts (on the environment, society, 
individuals, and values). Following an assessment of social relevance 
with each option, political acceptability must be determined-e.g., 
it might be the case that the preferred options, though socially relevant 
or technologically useful, may not be politically acceptable. This 
acceptability : 
must be ascertained through a multi-constituency procedure where 
impacts on affected parties are examined and evaluated in terms 
commensurate with those expressing overall social relevance. Depending 
on the importance given to values of various social and political groups, 
several socio-political alternatives can be formulated. The final step is 
the choice of an acceptable alternative which appears most suitable in 
a given socio-political context. (Hetman, 1973, pp. 268-69) 
In terms of information technologies, this process is further 
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complicated because traditional cost benefit analysis may not apply 
to the ultimate product of such technologies-i.e., information or 
knowledge. Even though one hears of the “economics of in-
formation,” the phrase is misleading since traditional economics, 
based on supply and demand, cannot be readily applied to 
information. As Eres (1981) notes: “Knowledge is cumulative and 
generally unquan tifiable. The process of acquiring knowledge is 
complex. An article read today might trigger research in 20 years” 
(p. 98). One cannot predict the long-range effects of the acquisition 
of information. Although there is a commodity sense to information, 
it is derived from the containers of information-i.e., a specific 
physical unit such as a document, book, microfiche, online citation, 
or text. But information is not properly quantifiable, and one could 
argue that the commodity sense is incidental to the real meaning 
of the term. Information, as Fox (1982) points out, is not a count 
noun but is related to the “propositional content” of a text or texts, 
what the texts affirm or deny. If information is a unit in this sense, 
i t  is elusive since any unitization occurs ultimately through the 
meaning that the information creates in the information seeker’s 
mind, where different parts, sources, and elements of texts are bound. 
For example, an information seeker’s understanding of technology 
may have been acquired through a variety of texts, references, and 
sources, and the unit of comprehension must be traced back to all 
these sources. Even when we associate information with a particular 
text or journal, one cannot readily determine the effects of its absence 
from a collection (Kent, 1974, p. 303). How can we estimate how 
the absence of a text or the absence of online or on -dm searching 
prolonged or wasted the work of other researchers? Although we 
do know that such absences have important effects, calculating the 
consequences of their absence is close to impossible. Brooks (1973) 
claims the same is true of technology: “The problems of assessing 
the absence of a technology can be much more difficult than assessing 
any particular proposed technology” (p. 249). 
Setting apart for the moment the difficulties of quantitatively 
assessing the consequences of information or information 
technologies, the iterative process suggested by Hetman earlier is only 
to determine whether to undertake a certain technology, but utilitarian 
principles demand some computation through the whole process, 
including actual consequences. Unfortunately, a technology chosen 
for transfer is not necessarily created, implemented, maintained, or 
used in harmony with the objectives for which it was originally 
assessed. And the secondary effects may have more impact than the 
original direct intended effects. Dede (1981) asserts: 
Research in  the field of technology assessment has shown that the 
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unintended, second order effects of a technological innovation on society 
are frequently more influential, long-term than its direct and deliberate 
effects. For example, in many crowded areas one can travel by car no 
faster than by horse-the greater speed of the automobile has been lost 
through congestion-but automotive pollution and petroleum 
availability remain as major societal concerns. (p. 204) 
According to Crowther (1986), technology transfer is constructive 
when the following conditions are supported: the capacity to 
determine a country’s major socioeconomic problems and to translate 
them into a coherent set of technological requirements; the 
marshaling of the population to innovate, implement, and deal with 
the effects of the innovation; simplified presentation and ample 
diffusion of information regarding the technological options; an 
analysis of hardware and software requirements and costing of these 
items; and an awareness of the ideological or social value content 
to technologies and technical decisions (p. 2). Unfortunately, 
Crowther’s experience with information services in Latin American 
countries indicates that these conditions are countervailed, and the 
information technologies adopted by the services “enhances the 
personal value and not necessarily the national development value 
of the information” (p. 3). 
Not only are intended consequences often sabotaged, the long- 
range general happiness in the form of basic developmental needs 
is sacrificed for immediate goods. For example, Akin M. Makinde 
(in Murphy et al., 1986), explains the imbalance of happiness caused 
by the oil found in Nigeria: 
As long as the oil revenues lasted, Nigerians lavished their foreign 
exchange on innovations that were completely unrelated to their basic 
developmental needs. In fact, agriculture, the major source of foreign 
exchange, was abandoned as the population gravitated to big cities to 
enjoy the products of technology....The desire to enjoy foreign 
technological products has led to a wide gulf between the rich and the 
poor, with contractors of technological products and government officials 
becoming millionaires overnight. In fact, it is now estimated that a few 
individuals in Nigeria have more money than the national treasury! (pp. 
182-83) 
The considerations that we have looked at so far are concerned 
with technological practices and consequences and with technology 
transfers in the form of technological packages, inappropriately 
uprooted, and applied or implemented practices. But leaving the 
discussion at this point would seem to imply that the problem lies 
only in the practice or in the package or in its implementation but 
not in the technology itself or in the marketplace of the available 
technologies. 
Consider that there is an information problem in an LDC looking 
for a technological solution. Given this kind of problem, there is 
a belief in a free marketplace of available information technologies, 
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similar to the notion of the free marketplace of ideas. There exists 
a marketplace of goods and services of all available information 
technologies. From this marketplace any developing country can 
freely choose any technology in terms of the problem under 
consideration. Given that the technologies adequately address the 
needs or problems of the developing country, these technologies are 
supposedly of equal value. But just as in the free marketplace of 
ideas, one cannot assume that competition has pruned the market 
to the best or the most appropriate: some technologies may dominate, 
occlude, or exclude more efficient ones. One merely has to think 
of the domination of IBM in setting standards for the computer 
market, especially in the personal computer market, even in the face 
of its confused strategies and some poorly conceived products. In 
information technologies, Library of Congress and Dewey classi- 
fications have commanded the classification market, and the 
commercial bibliographic retrieval systems have established Boolean, 
deductive systems as the standard. In cataloging, OCLC has 
dominated the market, and although it  has not captured the market, 
i t  sets standards with which other catalogers must contend. 
There are many reasons for this uneven marketplace-e.g., 
historical events, economics, and consequences of past choices. Given 
the need for economies of scale, the range of economically feasible 
designs for a technology is limited. With respect to the use of 
information technology in an educational setting, Dede (1981) 
remarks: “In brief the educational quality of the device (or 
instructional unit) and the profit margin of the manufacturer will 
be inversely related” (p.206).Furthermore, he asserts: “Market forces, 
if the sole criterion ...,will dictate that the educational hardware and 
software produced be designed for the needs of the largest and richest 
body of consumers: the middle and upper class majority culture” 
(p. 211). Given the availability of such software and hardware, i t  
is not hard to understand the emergence of technological packages 
(e.g., computer hardware and software) that are then foisted into 
inappropriate settings or used for inappropriate problems. 
And it  is easy to foresee the motives of information technology 
salespersons in their assessing and addressing the needs of developing 
countries. If one were to adopt a more cynical attitude, one could 
argue that these motives are suspect. Mowshowitz (1984) calls 
computer literacy a “euphemism for consumer training. It should 
take only a moment’s reflection to realize who stands to gain the 
most by promoting computer literacy. Is it the free choice of a neutral 
technology that is bringing computers into the schools?” In view 
of the developing countries’ drive to enter the modernization cycle, 
can one really speak of the free choice of neutral, equally available 
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technologies? That is to say, not only are the available technologies 
unequal, the prevailing belief that technologies are neutral is 
mistaken (Mowshowitz, 1984; Froehlich, 1990). Every technology is 
undertaken with a technological practice in mind and is bound to 
a set of values for which it was undertaken. Technological packaging 
attempts to hide these value-laden roots, but proper needs assessment 
must uncover these values to ensure their appropriateness and utility 
for the problems to be solved. 
Crow ther (1988) remarks that technological development opposes 
the modernization cycle, since the cycle focuses on the technology 
rather than the context and purpose for its use: 
The modernization cycle is inherently contradictory to technological 
development. It is the proper function of the technology itself rather 
than human or natural environmental stress, that is monitored and 
corrected; technology assessment in this cycle explicitly emphasizes 
technological utility and economic efficiency rather than social relevance 
or  political consequences, and commercial criteria override the 
consideration of basic needs. (p. 8) 
The choices from the marketplace are uneven and so put constraints 
on the fulfilling of objectives. And decision makers, in facing the 
available choices, are not necessarily guided by utilitarian principles 
and needs assessment. 
In the context of technology transfer, there are necessary unhappy 
choices-e.g., when budgets and resources are limited, some members 
will be serviced before others. Mechanisms to develop and facilitate 
agricultural or medical information transfer may be given higher 
priority than educational information or vice versa. As noted earlier, 
the content of the greater good or the maximized happiness or 
minimized displeasure is not achieved through utilitarian principles 
or through an abstract notion of justice, but by setting priorities 
and solving problems in turn. Taylor (1985), in an essay on “The 
Diversity of Goods,” suggests that this is precisely an area where 
utilitarianism founders-that i t  assumes homogeneity of goods where 
actually only conflicting heterogeneity exists (p. 244). Each 
stakeholder comes to the deliberation process of determining the 
greater good with different traditions and different priorities. Such 
differences are of ten amplified by the differences between developed 
countries and LDCs and within LDCs by competing segments of 
the society with diverse cultural backgrounds. Thus there is a diversity 
of competing goods (not clear goods opposing clear evils) or, more 
often, a diversity of competing evils (which area of the economy 
to address first-poverty, ignorance, disease?) for which utilitarianism 
supplies no governing principles for choices. Although it  can be 
agreed that there is a greater good or a greater happiness, what the 
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greater good is and how it  should be actualized is fraught with difficult 
choices that are ultimately political. According to Brooks (1973): 
Although the consequences of various technological choices may be 
clarified by analysis, there is no objective or scientific basis on which 
final choices can be made. The choices themselves are political, depending 
on a complex interplay or bargaining process among conflicting 
economic, political and ideological interests and values. The chips in 
this bargaining game involve not only immediate choices at issue, but 
also unrelated perceptions and interests. For example, many people who 
opposed supersonic transport in the United States did so because it was 
a convenient symbol for uncontrolled technology, rather than because 
of its specific environmental impact or economic viability. (p. 251) 
Similarly, in addition to such good reasons for technology transfer 
as increasing the general welfare, there may be a series of reasons 
based on less desirable motives-e.g., prestige value of owning 
computer technology, centralization of power at the expense of 
democratic values, and vested interests. In the case of information 
technologies in particular, Katz (1988) sees politics as the driver of 
the diffusion of such technologies (pp. 47-78). 
The ideals of utilitarianism-i.e., its “generalized benevolence”- 
tend to be vulnerable to corruption because of the number and variety 
of stakeholders in the decision-making and implementation process 
and their diverse interpretations of what the general happiness is 
and how to best realize it, interpretations often colored by simple 
self-serving interests. Again the problematic relation of individual 
and collective happiness and the importance of motivations based 
on good will is seen here. The ethical can be confounded or clarified 
by the political, but the former seems to be more often the case since 
stakeholders, whether experts or members of a participatory 
technology, have such diverse perceptions and motivations. 
In sum, if we look at the application of utilitarian principles 
to issues of technology transfer in developing countries, we find that 
technology needs assessment is confounded on many fron ts-e.g., 
in lack of predictive knowledge for determining a set of effects; in 
difficulties in ensuring that the intended effects are achieved; in 
establishing priorities on reasonable grounds (either by experts or 
participants); in balancing competing demands of various factors or 
from differing interpretations of the greatest good and how it  may 
be achieved; in creating a fair distribution of goods; in uncovering 
the implicit values of technologies and technological packages; and 
in the constraints of available technologies. 
DIALECTIC THEMESOF THE KANTIANAND UTILITARIAN 
The difficulties surrounding the actualization of utilitarian 
principles, and the confusion surrounding the determination of 
results, do not invalidate utilitarianism as a moral perspective or 
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obviate the need for some mechanism of needs assessment (however 
flawed). It only underscores the difficulty of making choices among 
conflicting or competing goods and evils, ensuring intended effects, 
and making overall assessments. Attempts to define moral choices 
pale in the face of poverty, starvation, disease, and ignorance: how 
can citizens of an LDC hope to enjoy an ethical life if their basic 
needs are severely compromised? The Mother Theresas and social 
activists of the world have long recognized the fundamental necessity 
of providing for basic needs. 
Part of the problem of contemporary culture, as suggested by 
Jonas (1984), is that we are forced to endorse the utilitarian view, 
and the calculus of happiness takes the upper hand. Ellul (1980) 
asserts that technological morality has two characteristics: “( 1) it is 
behavioral (in other words, only correct practice, not intentions nor 
motivations, counts); and (2) i t  rules out the problematics of 
traditional morality (the morality of ambiguity is unacceptable in 
a technological world)” (p. 244). For Ellul, all moral evaluation, 
including that required in technology transfer, is forced into the 
utilitarian framework. Utilitarianism is, of course, not wrong per 
se, but its domination as a sole moral perspective and its sacrifice 
of the ethical to the political is problematic. It offends the intuitive 
notion that morality should be related to good intentions and good 
will. 
One could argue the other side of the case as well: proper 
motivation and good will are not the only basis for moral evaluation. 
Good motivations that fail to produce beneficial results will not serve 
the severe problems that confront LDCs. Although the calculus of 
utilitarianism or needs assessment is difficult to perform, so too are 
Kant’s motives elusive: proper motivation and good will can be faked, 
they are not readily discernible, and our perceptions may be unreliable. 
This invisibility of real motives is probably the source, at least in 
part, of the ambiguity of “traditional morality,” the ground of its 
unacceptability to “technological morality.” Motives are neither 
verifiable nor quantifiable. Furthermore, technology transfer that 
promotes a genuine good cannot be morally dumissed because the 
motivation is not pure. The point is that each perspective offers a 
partial truth, and both perspectives can be engaged as two poles 
of a dialectical clarification process that can be used to evaluate the 
moral dimensions of technology transfer. 
This article has examined only two ethical perspectives based, 
in part, on the work of Kohlberg (1976); there are other perspectives 
and other variations of Kant’s and Mill’s views that are not represented 
here. In addition, one must acknowledge that Kohlberg’s work has 
been criticized, and if the dialectical reasoning that we are advocating 
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is based on problematic research, one should recognize these 
difficulties and the alternatives they raise. An alternative perspective 
is offered by Gilligan (1982). She suggests that the moral development 
of women is different from that of men. In her view, Kant and Mill 
advocate an “ethic of rights,” Karit in terms of the rights and 
autonomy of moral agencies, and utilitarianism in terms of a complex 
dialectic balancing of the rights of all parties in a transfer process. 
Women, in Gilligan’s view, are more concerned with preserving 
human relationships and hence are advocates of an “ethic of care” 
or an “ethic of responsibility.” Those attached to an ethic of rights 
are concerned with the abstract rules of justice (whether Kantian 
or utilitarian), notions of social contract, and the rights of moral 
agents, whether individual or institutional (Held, 1988, p. 12). A 
feminist approach calls for a reasoning that is more narrative and 
contextual, noncontractual, and focused on others, so that caring 
relationships become the basis for ethical behavior. Gilligan’s (1987, 
p. 25) work indicates that both such methods of moral reasoning 
occur among men and women, that reasoning in the manner of an 
ethic of care occurs more frequently in women (and less frequently 
in men), and that, among men and women who are socially similar, 
there are fewer differences. What accounts for these differences is 
unclear, but Gilligan and others have argued that it is tied to differing 
ego development in men and women. For men, masculine ego 
development is based on individuation and separation from the 
mother; for women, feminine ego development is based on attachment 
(Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982). Most feminists do not wish to 
propose that a different basis for morality be constructed on these 
observations. They are only concerned that the feminist view not 
be discredited, that any male gender bias not be perpetuated in moral 
theory, that concerns traditionally characteristic of women (e.g., 
concern for children) not be dismissed from moral reflection, and 
that the feminist view be integrated into a more comprehensive moral 
theory (Held, 1988, p. 13). 
If one grants the legitimacy of this critique, does it significantly 
change the dialectical perspective proposed earlier for matters of 
technology transfer? It is not clear that the feminist perspective 
prescribes any different set of moral principles; what it may call for 
is a different approach to problems of technology transfer, a different 
weighing of factors and elements (derived from context), and a 
recognition of the legitimacy of certain topics that have been omitted 
from many discussions of ethical theory-e.g., care for each and every 
country and care for those as yet unable to frame their needs. 
If one integrates the feminist viewpoint, one must balance an 
ethic of rights with an ethic of care. In the ethic of rights, one must 
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balance competing claims and rights of stakeholders in a complex 
dialectical process, weighing contrasting factors and the competing 
claims of individuals and institutions, recognizing the factors of social 
utility and social responsibility, and respecting the autonomy of 
individuals and institutions, including organizations and countries. 
On the other side, an ethic of care underscores a common history 
and a sense of an advancing smallness of the planet. Paradoxically, 
i t  may accentuate certain features of both Kant and Mill. It extends 
the Kantian motive of good will beyond the rights and autonomy 
of individuals to care for the human family and planet as such, and 
to the unconditional acceptance of the rights of all persons and 
institutions. It also extends the utilitarian emphasis on generalized 
benevolence to a sense that the whole planet and the human family 
is a system of interconnected parts so that any exploitation of 
individuals, groups, societies, or countries will have an impact on 
the whole and return to haunt both the exploiters and the exploited. 
It does not change the nature of the problems of technology transfer 
nor the nature of principles to which one might appeal (e.g., fairness 
to all parties); i t  only changes the perspective from one of separation 
(balancing rights and principles) to one of connection and 
contextualization. An ethic of care could not be blind to specific 
individuals and context, and therefore i t  would advocate a view of 
fairness in contrast to that suggested by Rawls’s (1957) technique 
of a “veil of ignorance.” In his method, stakeholders could decide 
on the fairest allocation of resources or rights i f  each of the 
stakeholders would assume, for the duration of the decision-making 
process, that none of them could know what their post-decision status 
was to be until after the decision was reached and a course of action 
was implemented. For example, in the case of the agricultural library 
and its decision to automate, the stakeholders would assume that 
they would make choices not knowing whether, after the choice was 
made and implemented, they were the minister of agriculture from 
the developed country, the head librarian, the vendor from the 
developed country, a wealthy farmer, an illiterate farmer, a user, a 
consumer, or a staff member. In this way, Rawls thinks that 
stakeholders would be more inclined to make rulings that were fairer 
to each party since each stakeholder, under the veil of ignorance, 
would not know where he or she would be at the end of the process. 
But the feminist position would argue that the veil of ignorance 
may be itself a problem because the context cannot be ignored, and 
a genuine fairness may acknowledge differences among the specific 
stakeholders. For example, fairness may mean that one ignore the 
demands of the wealthy farmers (perhaps even penalizing those who 
previously abused the available systems) or the administrators and 
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heed more fully the demands of those who suffered more past 
inequities (illiterate farmers, those members who have the most 
barriers to technology usage). In general, feminists do not demand 
that this perspective dominate, only that this voice be respected in 
the deliberation process. 
Even if Kohlberg’s theory is incomplete and feminism adds new 
principles (and not just perspectives), one can still regard moral 
deliberation in technology transfer as enhanced through a dialectical 
process in which the coexisting poles of Kantianism, and util- 
itarianism, “masculinism” (if that is how one may characterize the 
history of philosophy, as having been dominated by male thinkers), 
and feminism are used for framing ethical issues and coming to closure 
on them. 
In conclusion, issues in technology transfer are not simple, and, 
although ethical considerations may amplify their complexity, such 
considerations are essential for evaluating the appropriateness and 
consequences of certain technologies and their transfer, since they 
can clarify issues and raise important challenges. There is an implicit 
ideology bound to the information age, an ideology that is self serving 
and full of dubious values and that may work against the quality 
of life in LDCs and on the planet. Part of this ideology is the belief 
that all problems can be solved through some form of technology, 
that technologies are morally neutral, and that technology is an 
unqualified good. One of the functions of ethics is to critique this 
prevailing ideology. Dahlgren (in Slack, 1987, p. 27) calls for a 
conscious ideology to counter this tacit yet dominant ideology. Ellul 
(1980) observes that one option is the practice of an ethic of nonpower 
as a resistance to the domination of technology in our culture. This 
option, infrequently recognized, but of ten necessary, states that 
appropriate technology may mean the absence or the minimization 
of technology, the refusal to implement technology or the 
simplification of technology, even those information technologies 
that at first blush may seem to solve a myriad of problems. Could 
it be suggested, as Dosa (1985) does, that many authors “overestimate 
the role of information technology and present it as a panacea to 
all project-related problems . . .” (p. 146) in providing technical 
assistance for development? Sometimes appropriate technology may 
mean engaging one’s own resources and simplifying and refusing 
high-tech solutions to problems. Only by doing so might we inhibit 
the spread of ill effects of technology to LDCs and preserve a viable 
planet for all countries, both developed and developing. 
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Ethical Considerations in Represen tation 
Or, Did Dui Do It? 
NORMAND. STEVENS 
ABSTRACT 
THESEVERAL ROLES THAT contemporary American librarians may 
play in cooperative organizations and library associations of ten places 
them in situations in which their principal employer stands to gain, 
or lose, from actions they may take in their role in such organizations 
or associations. An examination of the potential conflicts that may 
arise from such roles suggests the need for those involved to give 
careful attention to appropriate ethical considerations even though 
there may be no question of direct personal benefit. After a general 
description of the extent and nature of the multiple roles that 
librarians now play, the ethical questions that arise from such 
situations, and a detailed examination of several actual cases, a few 
general suggestions for at least minimizing the appearance of conflict 
are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
In contemporary American society, there is an increasing 
awareness of ethical issues-unquestionably heightened by various 
recent national political scandals-and the extent to which those 
issues require careful thought among all professionals, even 
librarians. Although the American Library Association (ALA) 
promulgated in 1981a revised Code of Ethics to which all professional 
librarians are supposed to subscribe, librarians are not immune to 
the temptations that beset them when faced with a situation in which 
professional employment may open the way, directly or indirectly, 
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to personal gain. Until recently, i t  appeared as though, in most cases, 
there was little cause for concern, perhaps in large part because 
librarians as a class are honest, primarily because library budgets 
were comparatively small, and libraries were not a part of the general 
commercial fabric of society. Various factors, including relative 
prosperity and the widespread application of technology by libraries, 
have changed that and increased librarians’ vulnerability. 
From time to time, and with what appears to be some noticeable 
increase in frequency, situations arise in which librarians are clearly 
guilty of using their professional position for private gain. Such 
situations, which of ten involve some kind of embezzlement, inevitably 
attract considerable professional and public attention since they 
appear to be, and are, so clearly out of character. In these cases, the 
dividing line is clear cut, violations are easily identified, and sanctions 
are readily applied. Still, either because of our essential professional 
honesty or simply limited opportunities, such conflicts of interest 
are a rarity among librarians. 
There is an increasingly more common situation that often 
ultimately presents librarians with a very real potential conflict of 
interest in a professional, if not a personal, sense. That situation 
raises substantial questions about loyalty, conflicting institutional 
and organizational interests, and how those involved can act in a 
professional manner to adequately protect the rights of all parties. 
This is not a recent development-although here again the 
application of technology by libraries has helped dramatize the 
situation-but one that has existed, for the most part largely 
unnoticed, for many years. 
Most librarians are employed and paid by a particular institution 
that assumes, and may even spell out in employment contracts or 
other official documents, that the librarian’s principal responsibilities 
are to represent the best interests of the institution at all times, to 
see that the needs of the institution and its library are met, and 
to make sure that the library receives the goods and services it requires 
to operate effectively under the most favorable conditions. As a body 
of professionals with a strong commitment to cooperation as a 
primary means of achieving the goals of individual libraries and 
librarianship as a whole, librarians have consciously created a wide 
variety of formal associations, organizations, programs, and other 
activities that are designed to enhance library service. The growth, 
development, and proper functioning of those cooperative efforts is 
largely based on the premise that the governance and direction, and 
sometimes even the management, of those efforts is best controlled 
by librarians from the participating institutions. That approach has 
been adopted both as a cost-effective method of operation and as 
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a means of ensuring that the control and direction of such efforts 
will remain in the hands of those who understand the importance 
of cooperative activities and, significantly, those whose libraries stand 
to gain the most from such efforts. 
A substantial number of American librarians now serve on the 
governing bodies and/or commit tees of regional, state, multistate, 
and national network organizations. They also serve on the governing 
bodies and/or committees of regional, state, multistate, and national 
professional associations that often play a direct role in the planning 
and development of cooperative activities. They may also serve on 
committees or review panels that assist state library agencies or federal 
agencies in the awarding of substantial grants for a wide variety 
of library programs. There are relatively few librarians involved in 
the administration and management of libraries in the United States 
who do not, in some fashion or another, also play a broader role 
in the profession and, especially, in cooperative activities that are 
directly linked to their own success or failure as well as to the growth 
and development of the library in which they work. 
Most of those librarians-even if asked-undoubtedly would not 
think that their participation in such activities, especially if that 
participation is clearly on behalf of their own institution, raises any 
ethical questions for two reasons. First is the fact that in almost 
every case there is no question of personal gain. Second is the fact 
that in almost every case there appears, on the surface, to be no 
conflict between the goals and objectives of their own institution 
and those of the activity, association, organization, or program in 
which they are participating on behalf of their institution. Indeed 
most such participation is clearly intended to help facilitate the 
development of programs and/or access to services that will benefit 
the individual’s institution. Both of these reasons require careful 
analysis. 
In most cases, there is, in fact, no question of any direct personal 
payment to the individual librarian, but there may often be perquisites 
such as the payment of travel expenses; time due to the parent 
institution may be directed to a cooperative effort; there is always 
prestige to be gained; consulting opportunities may present 
themselves; and participation in cooperative efforts may lead to new 
job opportunities including, in many cases, ones with an association 
or organization. Increasingly, as for example in the case of the OCLC 
Board of Trustees, individuals may receive direct payment for their 
service to a cooperative body. 
It is by no means always clear that the goals and objectives of 
the individual library and those of a cooperative association or 
organization are identical. In another context, the National Collegiate 
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Athletic Association (NCAA) has certainly demonstrated that. Each 
has its own mission. Each seeks to strengthen itself. It may not always 
be appropriate to use the time and resources of an institution to 
support an individual librarian’s work on behalf of a larger 
cooperative effort. Even when goals and objectives may be identical, 
and even when a librarian’s primary employer may fully support 
a librarian’s participation in such an effort, there remains the distinct 
possibility that such participation will allow him or her to help 
direct the goals and programs of the cooperative effort to meet the 
needs and interests of his or her own library. 
Simple answers no longer suffice in these complex situations 
especially at a time when there is an increased emphasis on 
accountability and ethics in all parts of contemporary society. Actions 
and decisions that, a t  first glance, may seem simple and 
straightforward are too of ten fraught with difficulty. A substantial 
number of situations arising from the common practice among 
librarians of assuming multiple professional roles present substantial 
ethical questions that require careful attention. We can no longer 
simply assume-if we ever could-that librarians are all professionals 
of good will whose actions are automatically honest and above board. 
Even if we as individuals assume or know that they are, others may 
question their integrity. Librarians are, at the very least, obligated 
to make every effort to minimize situations that appear to allow them 
to take advantage of their own institution to work for other bodies, 
allow their own institution directly or indirectly to benefit from the 
work for such bodies, or-in rare cases-place them in the position 
of appearing to support the goals and objectives of other bodies that 
may not be in the best interest of their own institution. 
DID DUI D o  IT? 
These are by no means new issues for librarians. They are ones 
that have existed since at least 1876. The subtitle of this essay-Did 
Dui Do It?-is not entirely facetious. It is meant to suggest that just 
as Melvil Dewey can be credited with many of the positive aspects 
of the growth of librarianship in the United States in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he also can be credited with 
having been among the first to find himself in the kind of situations 
in which diverse institutional and professional-and sometimes even 
personal-loyalties may create substantial conflicts of interest for 
librarians. Throughout his professional career, Dewey played many 
roles simultaneously. While employed primarily as secretary of the 
American Library Association, he continued, of course, to develop 
and market the Dewey Decimal Classification to libraries as a private 
enterprise. He developed, as an outgrowth of the Supplies Committee 
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of the American Library Association, the Library Bureau as an 
independent commercial firm producing and selling equipment and 
supplies to libraries. While librarian at Columbia University, he 
established and operated-apparently without official sanction and 
with the admission of women students under circumstances that 
ultimately brought him into direct conflict with the Board of Trustees 
of Columbia University-the School of Library Economy. He 
presumably saw that school as meeting a broad professional need 
that he assumed was in the best interests of librarianship even though 
it was not necessarily in accord with what the trustees saw as the 
best interests of Columbia University. Ultimately Dewey was forced 
out of an active career in librarianship because of his leading role 
in the Lake Placid Club which dscriminated in its membership. 
There is little evidence to suggest that Dewey ever considered any 
of those situations to raise ethical questions that he, or others, needed 
to be concerned about. Dewey’s lasting legacy to librarianship in 
this regard may be his lack of concern about such issues. That lack 
of concern is no longer appropriate. As addtional examples will 
make clear, librarians need to pay serious attention to developing 
appropriate standards of behavior in situations that arise when they 
undertake multiple roles. 
CASESTUDIES 
In order to clarify the extent to which what may appear to be 
innocuous situations are, in fact, fraught with potential danger, it 
is important to examine in detail a number of typical cases that 
demonstrate, in both particular and general terms, the issues that 
one faces when he or she engages in an expanded professional role. 
It is important to demonstrate that these are indeed real day-to-day 
occurrences and not simply hypothetical situations. The discussion 
of these cases is intended only to illustrate the situations that 
frequently do arise and the questions that may be raised. It is not 
intended to suggest, in any fashion, that individual librarians- 
including this author-have not thought about the ethical 
implications of their actions, have in any way acted improperly, have 
acted for personal gain, or have acted solely in the best interests, 
or at times to the detriment, of their home institution. The discussion 
is intended only to be illustrative of situations that do occur with 
increasing regularity. It is by no means exhaustive. It should alert 
all librarians to the real necessity of examining carefully their 
behavior, and that of others, in situations in which they play multiple 
roles. It should alert librarians in particular to the need to act with 
due consideration not only for known motives and the reality of a 
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situation, but also for how others may regard those motives and the 
appearances of a situation. 
A COPYRIGHTCASE 
Frequently, as the first example demonstrates, librarians may have 
several different roles that create special challenges for them. In the 
mid-l980s, at a time when Nancy Marshall was an associate director 
at the University of Wisconsin at Madison Library, she was also chair 
of the American Library Association’s Copyright Committee and a 
member of the OCLC Board of Trustees. As a library administrator 
and chair of ALAs Copyright Committee, Marshall presumably had 
a primary interest-since those two institutions shared common goals 
in this respect-in the maintenance of an interpretation of the Federal 
Copyright Law that allowed for the broadest possible latitude in 
the application of the fair use doctrine, always allowing, of course, 
for the fact that both of those institutions are publishers and, as 
publishers, might have interests to protect that would argue against, 
in some respects, a liberal interpretation of the fair use doctrine. 
More significant is the fact that, at that time, OCLC was seeking 
to copyright its bibliographic database in an action that brought 
widespread protest from many OCLC members and many library 
associations and organizations. It was widely felt that the question 
of ownership of the bibliographic records in the OCLC database 
was by no means clear and that OCLC’s attempt to secure copyright 
in its name was not in the best interests of its members either as 
individual libraries or as members of a multistate network. As a 
member of the OCLC Board of Trustees, Marshall was publicly 
supporting that action-although presumably she might have been 
speaking against i t  in board meetings-and at a time when she was 
charged as chair of ALAs Copyright Committee with relaying 
information to the Legislation Committee “on the various aspects 
of the copyright law that are unsettled or on which there is a general 
lack of understanding among librarians.” She was also doing so when, 
for example, the attorney general of Wisconsin was actively arguing 
against OCLC’s proposed action. In that situation, Marshall was 
presumably faced with a complex problem in respect to reconciling 
her understanding and interpretation of the Federal Copyright Law 
with the differing interests and positions of the University of 
Wisconsin, the American Library Association, and OCLC as she 
simultaneously served and represented those three institutions. 
OCLC 
Since its founding in the late 1960s, OCLC has either created 
or contributed to a considerable number of complex situations, such 
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as that encountered by Marshall, in which librarians involved in 
its governance have been faced with difficult ethical decisions as they 
sought to meet the needs of OCLC while simultaneously representing 
the best interests of their libraries. Begun as a conscious effort to 
build a cooperative program that would offer a full range of automated 
services to libraries in Ohio, and supported financially primarily 
by its member libraries in Ohio with added support from the state, 
OCLC soon found itself with a highly successful cataloging system 
built around a shared bibliographic database to which libraries outside 
of Ohio wished to gain access. That left the Ohio membership, and 
in particular the original board of trustees, with a decision as to 
whether to adhere to their original plan of developing additional 
services built around that database for the Ohio members or to 
aggressively market its successful product to libraries outside Ohio. 
To what extent that issue was ever discussed in ethical terms is not 
clear, but i t  seems evident that even at that point, and certainly in 
hindsight, there was a discrepancy between what might have been 
in the best interests of the member libraries, and their investment 
and ongoing support of OCLC, and the best interests of OCLC as 
an independent organization. It could not have been an easy decision 
involving, as i t  must have, a myriad of financial, operational, legal, 
and systems considerations. That the final decision was in the best 
interest of OCLC is evident from its growth and development since 
that time. That the final decision may not have been in the best 
interests of the member libraries is evident from the current effort 
by academic libraries in Ohio to once again form a cooperative 
organization to develop a full-scale integrated library system for its 
members. That action clearly replicates the early goals of OCLC and 
suggests that the Ohio members of OCLC might have been better 
served had the earlier decision been to maintain OCLC as an Ohio 
based system. Whose interests did the then OCLC Board of Trustees 
and Ohio member libraries serve in making that decision? 
The rapid growth and development of OCLC in the early 1970s 
placed heavy demands on the time of those librarians in Ohio who 
served on that board of trustees. That presumably placed them in 
a position, to one degree or another, that might have raised questions 
about their use of institutional time on behalf of OCLC, especially 
as its focus shifted to the development of a national program, and 
whether that use of their time was in the best interests of their own 
institutions. At OCLC and subsequently at other multistate networks, 
several members of the board of trustees went on to accept full-time 
positions with OCLC for which they were qualified primarily on 
the basis of the expertise that they had developed as members of 
the board and on the time and effort that they had volunteered to 
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OCLC. Such job movement represents, in general terms, the kind 
of “revolving door” situation that now raises serious ethical questions 
when an  individual moves from a governmental position to 
employment with a private firm with which he or she had previously 
been dealing. It should perhaps raise the same kinds of questions 
for librarians. 
NETWORKACTIVITIES 
The rapid development of networks in the early 1970s placed 
many librarians in the position of direct participation in the decision- 
making processes for those networks with relatively little experience 
and/or training in such matters. That was especially true in  regard 
to decisions involving the marketing of OCLC services and the pricing 
of those and other network services. As they sought to balance the 
welfare of their own institution with the welfare of a multistate 
network as a whole, as well as with the welfare of all of its existing 
and/or potential members, those involved in network governance 
had to deal with complex issues with little guidance. As a member 
(1969-1979) and officer (vice chairman 1972-1973, chairman 1973-1975, 
controller 1977-1978, and president 1978-1979) of the NELINET 
Executive Committee and later the NELINET Board of Trustees, this 
author can, in this case, offer comments and observations based on 
direct active participation in the process. There were at least three 
major issues, typical of the issues faced by other networks at the 
same time, on which choices had to be made by those making the 
decisions that, at least in retrospect, raised serious ethical questions. 
I cannot recall that the NELINET Board ever specifically addressed 
the ethical implications of those situations, but, in each case, we 
certainly agonized over questions of equity throughout the process. 
In each instance the underlying question, as seen in retrospect, was 
whether we were acting in the best interest of our institutions or 
of the network as a whole. In each case i t  was evident at the time, 
and continues to be evident, that the individual librarians involved 
in the decision-making process at NELINET were motivated, for 
better or for worse, to act in the best interests of the network as 
a whole, and of all of its members, largely on the assumption that 
the long-term growth and development of NELINET was ultimately 
in the best interests of their institutions. That was often done without 
regard for, and frequently in direct conflict with, what would have 
clearly been in the best short-term interests of theii- institutions. 
The first such issue at NELINET dealt with the possible recovery 
of the initial financial investment that the founding members of the 
network had made in establishing the organization. The possibility 
of recovering some of that investment by a charge-back to new 
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members was discussed but ultimately, as true in most other networks 
faced with this issue, the decision was made not to attempt to recover 
those costs despite the fact that to do so might have been of direct 
financial benefit to the libraries of those making the decision. 
A second such issue at NELINET, and also in other networks, 
dealt with the apportionment of telecommunications costs and, in 
particular, whether or not telecommunications charges should be 
established with or without regard to the geographic location of the 
participating libraries. For individual libraries centrally located in 
respect to the network site, a decision to base telecommunication 
charges in direct relationship to geographic location would have been 
to their economic advantage; for libraries less favorably located, that 
same decision would have resulted in substantially higher charges 
that might have even prohibited them from participating in the 
network. Largely for reasons having to do with the felt need to 
promote the widest possible membership in the network from within 
all of New England, NELINET, like most other networks, elected 
to make telecommunications charges distance independent. Several 
librarians whose institutions stood to benefit, and in some cases 
substantially, from a different decision readily supported that action. 
Far more complex, both because in most cases i t  had less direct 
influence on the growth and development of the network and because 
there were numerous possible gradations in the scale of charges, were 
the decisions-plural because as network charges were reviewed 
annually, this factor was examined carefully several times-as to how 
to apportion costs, including telecommunications, among libraries 
on the basis of size. Charging member libraries, for example, for 
telecommunications on a per terminal or a per institution basis was 
one option that was frequently reviewed. The decisions in this area, 
at least within NELINET, should have raised serious ethical questions 
perhaps largely because of the way in which they were most typically 
addressed. As the NELINET Executive Committee struggled with 
this issue, the process began with the development of the total 
operating budget required to support NELINET’s programs and 
services for the coming fiscal year. That, in turn, led to a discussion 
of how best to apportion charges to produce the level of income 
needed to support the requisite budget. Most often the NELINET 
staff produced several detailed algorithms describing how charges 
might be assessed on the basis of various factors always including, 
in particular, the size of the participating libraries. There was always 
a serious effort to arrive at a balanced decision that would, in general, 
allow the network to accommodate and support membership by 
smaller libraries. Unlike the distance-related telecommunications 
issue, it  was never an outright yes or no  decision. It was always 
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a question of fine tuning to arrive at an appropriate point on a 
continuum that would balance the needs of smaller and larger 
libraries. In that respect, the members of the executive committee 
were faced with a continuing ethical challenge as they sought to 
arrive at a decision that directly affected their budgets and the needs 
and interests of their institutions as well as the budget and the needs 
and interests of NELINET 
The underlying concept of encompassing the needs of the 
individual library within the needs of the larger organization-on 
the grounds that the long-term growth of the larger institution is 
always in the best interests of the individual library-is how network 
decisions may have most often been rationalized, but whether or not, 
in fact, that principle has guided individual votes and particular 
decisions is by no means certain. The possibility of votes and decisions 
being arrived at primarily on the basis of self-interest always exists. 
The issue of network governance rapidly became extremely 
complicated in the late 1970s as more and more network organizations 
came into existence and as OCLC changed its governance structure. 
In that process, many participating librarians found themselves 
involved in a multitude of roles that made i t  difficult, if not impossible, 
to keep a sense of balance or proportion. It soon became possible 
for an individual librarian, who began with and maintained a basic 
responsibility for the effective oversight of his or her own libraries’ 
finances and operations, to serve simultaneously on the board of a 
multistate network, the OCLC Users Council (on which this author 
served from 1978-1981), and/or the OCLC Board of Trustees and, 
indeed, to be an officer in two or more of those network organizations 
at the same time. The somewhat later development, in the early 198Os, 
of a variety of smaller regional shared automated systems within 
individual states, almost all of which have also typically developed 
a shared governance structure of some kind, has only served to expand 
such opportunities. 
The most difficult issues regularly faced by individual librarians 
in such situations, whether or not they fully recognize the ethical 
implications involved in the decision-making process, have to do 
not with the immediate question at hand but with the broader 
question of which set of interests they represent in their involvement 
in the decision-making process in various organizations. Neither the 
assumption that there is a common set of goals and objectives-witness 
the questions involved in the effort to copyright the OCLC database- 
nor the assumption that the goals of the “higher” level organization 
always take precedence-witness the fact that an institution 
employing an individual librarian generally does so with the explicit 
understanding that the person’s primary responsibility is to represent 
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the needs of that institution-are adequate guides to action. Each 
issue is likely to be somewhat different, especially in respect to the 
convergence or identity of interests, and each individual is likely to 
respond in a somewhat different way. 
HARDCASES 
As complex as the issues of representation in network governance 
may be, they are by no means the most difficult ethical situations 
that have arisen from the growth and development of networks in 
the past two decades. They are, at least, issues in which it is presumed 
that individuals have acted in the best interest of one or more of 
the parties that they represent. At worst they involve issues in which 
it might be suggested that an individual had sought to influence 
a network decision to the direct economic benefit of his or her library 
to the detriment of other participating libraries. The development 
of networks, however, has also created situations in which it is possible 
for individuals to use a network’s services to the advantage of his 
or her library without disadvantaging other members or the network 
as a whole-and indeed perhaps even substantially benefiting them- 
but in ways that raise serious ethical questions. 
The recent case, which attracted widespread national attention 
for its ethical implications, in which individuals in the Department 
of Defense (DoD) used the Pentagon library’s membership in 
FEDLINK to expedite nonlibrary related consulting contracts, in 
apparent violation of DoD’s procurement regulations, is the most 
noteworthy example. A considerable portion of FEDLINK’s budget, 
including overhead costs that supported the overall operation of the 
network and reduced the costs to other participating libraries, came 
from such contracts. That inappropriate use of a library network, 
despite the fact that i t  benefitted the network and its members, 
represented a kind of obvious unethical behavior that was quickly 
stopped by the Librarian of Congress when he was made aware of 
it. This is perhaps the only clear cut case of unethical library network 
organizational behavior that has yet come to light. 
But what of another far more common example, which has 
become a standard practice in many networks and that benefits both 
the network and its member libraries? In the initial development 
of financial policies in most of the OCLC affiliated networks, a 
decision was made, primarily for operational reasons, to offer 
participating libraries the opportunity to pay for OCLC and other 
services on an annual-in-advance basis with an appropriate discount 
for prepayment. Those pricing policies generally have remained in 
effect even though OCLC’s pricing policies have made i t  just as 
economical for a network to pay OCLC on a monthly-after-the-fact 
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basis. By offering a discounted price for these services, payment for 
which may represent a substantial portion of a library’s operational 
budget, the networks have become, in effect, bankers. This policy 
decision has allowed individual libraries to augment their budget 
in a way that is not available to it within its own institution by 
depositing funds in a network account where these funds can earn 
interest for the network before being expended for OCLC or other 
external services. The library then shares in that interest income both 
through reduced costs and through the ability of the network to 
develop a reserve fund that may be used to generate additional income 
that in turn may keep price increases down, support network growth 
and development, or fund the establishment of new services. That 
appears to be a reasonable network policy decision and a sensible 
library operational decision that benefits both parties. Since most 
libraries are a part of another institution and do not have direct 
control over their own funds, that policy decision-especially to the 
extent that individual librarians may be involved in the establishment 
or application of that policy at the network level-and its application 
within an individual library raises serious ethical considerations. If 
reviewed carefully by auditors and/or other institutional officials, 
that approach to the funding of networks and the payment for network 
services might well be called into question. Investment policies are 
typically handled at the institutional level, or, in the case of many 
publicly supported institutions, at a governmental level. An 
individual library is not generally free to take funds allocated to i t  
for operational purposes and place these funds in a bank account 
to earn interest for the library-not the institution-during the year. 
By utilizing the network’s payment-in-advance policy, which it may 
have helped establish, the library is gaining an economic advantage 
in what may be a questionable fashion at the expense of its own 
institution or of the governmental body that provides the institution’s 
financial resources. This is now a commonly accepted practice that 
appears to be a perfectly reasonable way for a library, in accordance 
with its internal goals and objectives, to make the most effective 
use of its resources. It may well be a questionable practice when 
viewed from the broader perspective of institutional policies, 
procedures, and goals. It certainly raises serious ethical questions 
in respect to the extent to which individual librarians involved in 
the development and application of network policies may be able 
to manipulate those policies to their advan tage-and to the advantage 
of the network and other member libraries-at the expense of their 
own institution or the governmental body that supports it. 
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THECONNLINETCOUNCIL 
A story in The Chronicle of Philanthropy (January 10, 1989, 
pp. 11-12) reported on the conflict of interest issues raised by the 
relatively common practice of allowing the staff and board members 
of a foundation awarding grants to serve on the boards of nonprofit 
organizations that may be seeking grants from that foundation. The 
issues raised are serious and substantial. While the particular issues 
may not be directly applicable to libraries, there are certainly a number 
of analogous instances in librarianship that raise similar questions. 
There are many situations in which librarians, representing 
individual institutions, serve on a policy-making body, and/or a grant- 
awarding body, that places them in a position to influence the 
development of policies and/or the awarding of grants-even if they 
may abstain from voting when the issue directly involves their own 
library-that directly or indirectly benefit their own library. 
The work of the Connlinet Council, established by the 
Connecticut State Library Board in the mid-1980s pursuant to state 
law, is an example of how complex these matters can become and 
of the serious ethical issues that may develop. The Connlinet Council 
was responsible for the development of policies and plans relating 
to the establishment of automated library services in Connecticut, 
the drafting and preliminary approval of regulations governing the 
awarding of state automation grants, and the review of applications 
for those grants in order to make recommendations to the State Library 
Board. As a member (1984-1988) and officer (chairman 1985-1988) of 
the Connlinet Council, this author once again had first hand 
experience in working through what turned out to be a series of 
issues in which the council faced ethical considerations. In contrast 
to the earlier experience in NELINET where ethical considerations 
largely remained in the background and were seldom raised directly, 
the Connlinet Council frequently discussed ethical considerations 
directly and at some length. Policy statements governing potential 
conflict of interest situations not covered by state law were drafted 
and, although ultimately never fully adopted, served as the basis for 
individual actions particularly in respect to participation in the 
discussion and review of grant applications. 
By the time the Connlinet Council was established, libraries in 
Connecticut had already had considerable experience with a wide 
range of automated programs and services. In addition to substantial 
participation in NELINET and OCLC, there were five well- 
established shared automated systems in operation and extensive 
independent use of various kinds of library automation. The passage 
of the state law authorizing automation grants and the establishment 
of the Connlinet Council was the direct result of extensive work 
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involving a variety of individuals and libraries, including the 
Connecticut State Library, over a period of years. Appointments to 
the Connlinet Council were, as one might have expected, made with 
careful attention to the deliberate inclusion of individuals with 
considerable experience in the application of automation to library 
services in the state with a particular emphasis on those who had 
been involved in shared systems and other cooperative programs. 
From the start, the majority of members of the Connlinet Council 
were individuals who had at least dual, frequently triple, and 
sometimes quadruple interests in the outcome of the council’s work. 
Individual librarians, for example, most typically represented libraries 
that actively participated in one of six Cooperating Library Service 
Units (CLSUs) as well as in one of the five shared automated systems. 
In addition, staff members of one or more of the CLSUs and/or shared 
automated systems served on the Connlinet Council throughout its 
existence. At all times, the membership of the Connlinet Council 
consisted predominantly of individuals who had a direct institutional 
and/or organizational interest in the growth and development of 
automation in Connecticut not only from the perspective of the 
information welfare of the citizens of the state as a whole-a fact 
that was never questioned-but from the perspective of their 
individual libraries as well as various cooperative associations and 
organizations. 
In the initial formulation of policy by Connlinet, for example, 
a decision was made-based primarily on the language of the 
authorizing legislation that was a direct outgrowth of earlier library 
planning efforts-to concentrate on support for automated programs 
and services of a cooperative nature and to exclude, or minimize, 
support for stand-alone automated systems in individual libraries. 
That policy decision effectively precluded support to several large 
public libraries in Connecticut that had stand-alone systems and that 
were not represented on the council. That decision, which was 
formally accepted by thr State Library Board, governed the work 
of the Connlinet Council. It was presumably in the best long-term 
interests of the citizens of Connecticut and of the state government 
in respect to the sharing of library resources. It was also clearly in 
the best interests of those libraries and organizations whose 
representatives constituted most of the Connlinet Council. 
Over several years, as the Connlinet Council reviewed and 
recommended substantial automation grants, the grant review process 
itself presented interesting dilemmas for virtually every member of 
the council at one time or another. The simple question, for example, 
of what information it  was, or was not, appropriate for members 
of the council whose institutions were applying for a grant to share 
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with other members in the discussion of grant applications-a 
discussion that always took place, as required under Connecticut’s 
Freedom of Information Act, in an announced public meeting, 
although others seldom attended those meetings-was frequently a 
matter of concern especially if the application was not clear or some 
adjustment in the amount of awards was called for. 
Abstention from voting on grant applications was, of course, 
the accepted practice when it involved a member’s own library or 
organization or any library that participated in a member’s 
organization. In addition, librarians representing libraries served by 
a shared system typically abstained from voting on any grant 
application that involved the shared system, including the funding 
of new members, since their library might gain some direct or indirect 
benefit from the awarding of a grant. There were few grant 
applications in which there were not several abstentions; in fact, the 
broad application of potential conflict of interest rules might have 
required, in some cases, a majority of the members to abstain. The 
process called only for the Connlinet Council to review grant 
applications and to make recommendations to the State Library Board 
(whose membership was always less directly involved in library 
programs), which had ultimate responsibility for awarding the grants. 
The State Library Board never questioned the council’s recom- 
mendations, and there were no formal appeals to the State Library 
Board involving any of those recommendations. 
Throughout the course of its work, the Connlinet Council 
regularly and frequently discussed various ethical questions especially 
as they involved potential conflicts of interest raised by the application 
of its policies and procedures. All of its members made a serious 
and conscientious effort to be guided primarily by the overall needs 
and interests of sound statewide automation planning. Yet, because 
of the intricate existing pattern of library automation and network 
services in Connecticut, it was virtually impossible to ascertain the 
extent to which any individual involved in the Connlinet Council 
could easily determine whom he or she might have represented at 
a particular point in time or on a particular issue. Nor was it possible 
to determine the extent to which the goals of a particular policy 
or program were truly shared goals of broad benefit to all libraries 
and all citizens as against the extent to which they were more limited 
goals of benefit only to a particular library, network, shared system, 
or other segment of the library community. Today, only a few years 
later, it would be even more difficult to develop policies and plans 
for broad-based shared network services in Connecticut without the 
active involvement of a wide spectrum of individuals who already 
have one or more sets of vested interests. 
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Suggestions 
The general description of some of the ethical issues generated 
by the multiple roles that so many librarians assume as they represent 
their libraries in cooperative activities, along with the specific 
examples presented earlier, serves to illustrate the complex situations 
that we face. That description and those examples should help 
heighten awareness among librarians of the extent to which the 
multiple roles that we all so frequently now play do raise serious 
ethical challenges. As is so often the case, an awareness of those 
issues, and a willingness to take them into account in our actions, 
is an important first step. There may, indeed, be relatively few 
additional specific steps that librarians can take to make certain that 
they act in an ethical fashion when confronted with situations in 
which the various roles that they assume raise questions of potential 
conflicts of interest. 
There are, however, a few suggestions based on or derived in 
large measure from the examples cited earlier, that can be offered. 
Together these suggestions may form the beginnings of a code of 
practices to augment ALA's Code of Ethics, which fails to address 
these issues. It also seems clear that the ALA Council's Committee 
on Professional Ethics should be encouraged to develop a revision 
of that code that speaks directly to the ethical considerations raised 
when librarians serve on representative bodies. It also seems 
reasonable to suggest that individual networks, shared systems, and 
other cooperative activities, committees, and organizations should 
develop their own formal statements of ethical behavior to describe 
their expectations of the way in which representatives from member 
libraries should conduct themselves. 
The primary responsibility for these matters continues to reside, 
as i t  always has, with the individual librarian. As professionals, it 
is up to us to abide by high standards of behavior and to avoid 
situations and/or actions in which personal integrity may be called 
into question. 
Librarians should accept, as a general principle, the idea that 
our primary loyalty and obligation is to the library or institution 
by which we are employed. Librarians should comply fully with the 
policies and regulations of the library and institution especially in 
respect to those governing such matters as the use of time or payment 
for external services. We should assist in the development of, 
understand, and accept the mission statements of the library and 
institution and their goals and objectives. In serving on other bodies, 
librarians should recognize that we are doing so as a representative 
of our own library and institution and should make every effort to 
be certain that there is no conflict between the mission and the goals 
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and objectives of that body and those of our library or institution. 
The decision to serve in some capacity with an external organization 
or association should be reached only after there is a clear 
understanding that such service is in harmony, and not in conflict, 
with our primary employment and assignment. Where there is an 
obvious conflict, we should not serve or at least be prepared to explain 
to all concerned, the nature of any potential conflict of interest. In 
some cases it may be desirable to review the possible conflict 
beforehand with an immediate supervisor. 
Clearly librarians should abstain from voting, or otherwise taking 
any direct action, on any matter before an association or organization 
on which they serve when it is evident that either they or the library 
or institution for which they work may benefit, directly or indirectly, 
from that vote or other action. Librarians should, in every case, be 
careful, at the very least, to make certain that all involved are fully 
aware of the various groups and interests that they may represent. 
The generally accepted principle of making a decision that serves 
the greater good or the “higher” organization, which is especially 
prevalent in cooperative associations and organizations, needs to be 
carefully thought through. Potential conflict between the needs of 
a cooperative body and the needs of its members’ libraries should 
be identified and discussed thoroughly to determine appropriate 
courses of action. Librarians should be careful not to use their role 
in an external association or organization to help shape policies or 
procedures that can be seen as enabling themselves or others to 
somehow circumvent established institutional policies and procedures 
to the benefit of their library. Nor should they use their role in such 
a group to shape policies and procedures that can be seen as providing 
direct or indirect benefit to them or to their library. We should, again, 
be certain that all involved know and understand how a decision 
in which we are participating may affect the library. 
Since the issues are so complex, and since there is a lack of clear 
guidelines to govern current practices, it is, above all, the free and 
frank discussion of these issues that is critical. All who are involved 
must understand these issues and act thoughtfully and responsibly 
in offering guidance and direction to themselves and others. That 
we have come a long way toward a better understanding of these 
issues is amply demonstrated by the sharp contrast in the work of 
the NELINET Board in the 1970s and the Connlinet Council in the 
1980s. Although both faced what were, in fact, serious ethical 
considerations as they dealt with important policy decisions, there 
was little or no direct discussion of those considerations in NELINET, 
but there was lengthy and protracted discussion in Connlinet. We 
still have, however, a long way to go especially in more clearly 
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articulating the issues and in developing formal statements to guide 
our behavior rather than continuing to rely on individual librarians 
to exercise sound judgment. 
“Which Hat Are You Wearing Today?” 
Ethical Challenges in Dual Employment 
SUSANN. B J ~ R N E R  
ABSTRACT 
SUBSTANTIALNUMBERS OF LIBRARIANS today are taking on free-lance 
activities in addition to their employment, and information 
entrepreneurs struggling to develop their independent businesses 
often find it  necessary to supplement their income with library 
employment. The part-time employee/part-time business person can 
face a variety of conflict-of-interest situations. This essay establishes 
a framework for personal decision making for individuals confronted 
with questions of conflict of interest, through the examination of 
codes of ethics pertinent to the information professions, organ-
izational relationships, and sample institutional rules and guidelines. 
INTRODUCTION 
Substantial numbers of librarians today are taking on free-lance 
activities in addition to their employment, and information 
entrepreneurs struggling to develop their independent businesses 
often find it  necessary to supplement their income with library 
employment. The part-time employee/part-time business person can 
face a variety of conflict of interest situations. What guidance is there 
for the individual facing these challenges? 
This discussion focuses on the individual librarian who has 
participated in a professional program in a school of library and/ 
or information studies, who is employed within a traditional library/ 
information center, and who is simultaneously extending the work 
life beyond the walls of a particular library to some degree of self- 
employment in a field involving the provision of information or 
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the performance of information-related activities. Such activities may 
involve information brokering, document delivery, information 
analysis, indexing, writing, editing, publishing, consulting, training, 
or a combination of these or other activities. The outside pursuits 
are remunerated by payment to the individual or to an independent 
organization in which the librarian is the sole proprietor, a partner, 
or a principal of managerial/executive rank. It is assumed that the 
time and financial resources devoted to the outside activity are 
sufficient in quantity to qualify i t  as an activity of considerable 
importance to the individual librarian’s current and/or future career. 
In other words, this article is about individuals who have two 
employers of equal value. It is concerned with the possibility of ethical 
conflicts between the two aspects of the individual’s professional 
engagement when he or she is involved in similar activities within 
those two concerns. The discussion is directed to librarians who are 
in such a dual employment situation and to their employers. 
GROWING OF ENTREPRENEURIALNUMBERS LIBRARIANS 
Professional organization statistics show that a number of 
librarians are interested in entrepreneurial activities, whether instead 
of or in addition to, traditional library employment. ILERT, the 
Independent Librarians’ Exchange Round Table of the American 
Library Association (ALA), has grown to more than 225 members 
in the few years since its founding as a discussion group (American 
Library Association, 1988). According to its member brochure, ILERT 
includes the following groups among its constituency: free-lance 
librarians, information brokers, entrepreneur librarians, library 
association staff, indexers/abstractors, consultants, information 
managers, records managers, story tellers, vendors, publishers, 
trainers, database managers, and information systems analysts. Its 
members may be engaged in these activities full-time or part-time, 
but they uniformly consider themselves in some regard involved in 
the library profession, as their membership in ILERT presupposes 
membership in ALA. 
The Special Libraries Association has a Consultants Section of 
821 members within its Library Management Division (Special 
Libraries Association, 1989, p. 5) .  A large number of those members 
list their current membership mailing address at a corporate or 
academic library. 
The Association of Independent Information Professionals 
(AIIP), founded in 1987, has 150 members, 80 percent of whom 
acknowledge librarianship as part of their professional preparation 
(Association of Independent Information Professionals, 1989). Many 
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AIIP members include libraries and/or librarians among their current 
client base, and some define their services to include “library support.” 
ETHICALCONFLICTS? 
Are there ethical challenges for those individuals who combine, 
in various degrees and ways, traditional employment and independent 
entrepreneurial activities? Consider the following scenarios: 
Nancy and Patricia have worked for eight years to institute and 
develop a fee-based information service for industrial clients as 
a joint project between the library and school of business within 
the university. Although the service is successful in attracting 
clients, a general financial retrenchment cuts the personnel budget 
from 2 to 1.5 FTE. Patricia, whose hours were reduced, cannot 
continue to serve the same number of clients within her shortened 
work time as she once did. However, the clients keep on coming. 
Why not set up an independent business on her own at home 
with the purpose of serving those clients who would otherwise 
now be turned away? 
As an independent contractor, Owen is nearing the end of a year- 
long project-the writing of a technical manual. The word 
processing software on which the manual was developed was made 
available by the company with whom Owen contracted for the 
duration of the project. Now Owen, in his capacity as librarian, 
is getting ready to take on a big writing assignment within his 
library. He wants to use the software which, by now, he knows 
as well as the back of his hand, but i t  takes three months to get 
a purchase request through the library bureaucracy. Should he 
“borrow” a copy until the library copy comes through? 
0 	As consultant to a publisher, Joan has been asked to attend a 
national conference and take a turn in the publisher’s booth in 
the exhibit hall. She would normally be attending the same 
conference as part of her library employment. Neither her library 
employer nor her publisher will reimburse the total costs of 
registration, travel, meals, and lodging for the conference, but 
through thoughtful maneuvering, Joan has managed to coordinate 
a system that should satisfy her library, her publisher, her 
conscience, and the IRS. What affiliation should she list on her 
registration badge? 
Clearly, the environments in which these individuals work, and 
the variety of situations to which they are exposed, do not allow 
for easy solutions to their ethical dilemmas. Indeed, since ethics goes 
beyond the rules and legalities of any given environment, what is 
a problem for one individual may not be so for another. But regardless 
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of the environment, there exists the potential for problems when 
a library employee is also a business owner. 
Horner (1984) has described the situation of straddling the two 
worlds of children’s librarian and free-lance storyteller and pinpointed 
the essential issue involved. “It is very important for the free lancer 
to maintain a clear boundary between the institutional job and the 
independent business” (p. 285). She speaks of potential problems 
in combining her independent storytelling with her work in a public 
library in terms of fatigue, scheduling, public misconceptions of 
services and charges, and staff reactions to her high visibility. 
In discussions with librarians who combine employment with 
free-lance or other independent information work, and in reflection 
on this author’s personal situation during the past five years, i t  was 
found that the issues described by Horner are common to many 
situations of dual professional interest, regardless of where the 
librarian is employed and which activities are the focus of his or 
her independent and library interest. Problems associated with the 
situation of “dual loyalty” most frequently are characterized by an 
inability to maintain strict boundaries between the two pursuits. 
Independent business people usually have learned to keep good track 
of their time and business expenditures for the purpose of charging 
back to individual clients and therefore should be able to make equal 
distinctions between their employment environment and their 
business operation. But is the movement from the employment day 
to the business day as simple as removing one hat and replacing 
it with another? Even i f  the individual is conscientious about 
separating the aspects of his or her work, the demands of good service, 
the advantages of modern office technology, the flexibility of current 
work schedules, and human nature can all conspire to keep those 
hats in perpetual motion. 
If an individual puts extra hours into a rush job for the independent 
business, how much energy is left for the hours required by that 
individual as a staff member? If he stays late at the library to 
cover the reference desk during a staff illness, what happens to 
the three hours of independent work he was planning to do that 
night? 
What happens when an outside client telephones the independent 
at the library-even after a request has been made to delay those 
calls to an appropriate time? Is i t  fair to call a client from the 
library if the call is charged to the business? 
Is i t  inappropriate to consult a business reference directory in the 
library’s collection for an independent client while doing reference 
desk duty for the library? 
Of course i t  is wrong to steal supplies from an employer to supply 
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one’s own business, but sometimes pencils or paper clips 
inadvertently end up in the wrong desk; does this extend to 
computer disks, ribbons, or paper? Does one desk benefit more 
than the other? 
Is it wrong to check business electronic mail after hours at the 
employer’s location, since the business password will be used? 
Should one make phone calls to committee members in professional 
associations from the employer’s or the business phone? 
These situations illustrate examples of mingling business and 
library time and resources, both physical and mental. But some of 
the toughest problems occur when there is the potential for stealing 
clients or mixing services, or when the business client fails to 
distinguish between the employee’s organization and the in- 
dependent’s organization. 
0 	If an information broker works in a fee-based library unit which 
serves internal and external clients at differential rates and he 
performs a search at work for his own client, should he pay the 
library’s internal or external rates? 
0 	How hard will an independent storyteller push her library employer 
to expand its storytelling service beyond children to adults if she 
derives much of her independent business from the adult market? 
0 	Does the mention of a current library affiliation in the 
independent’s sales brochure create inappropriate expectations on 
the part of potential clients? How is this different from listing 
past affiliations on a resume? 
The purpose of this essay is not to list a multitude of instances 
in which there could be a possible conflict of interest. There are 
far too many situations to discuss in one setting, although many 
have been mentioned elsewhere (Dragich, 1989; Hauptman, 1988; 
Mintz, 1985; Stevens, 1986). Nor is i t  to posit definitive answers to 
what is right or wrong in a particular situation. It is rare that a 
single answer will satisfy all circumstances. 
This is an age of shifting societal expectations and conflicting 
values. Individual actions, when confronted with questions akin to 
those cited earlier, will inevitably be influenced by a person’s own 
ethical framework and the pragmatics of the situation. This discussion 
attempts to answer the question “When an individual faces an ethical 
challenge, where can he or she look for assistance in analyzing that 
challenge?” It describes three areas that can provide direction in 
formulating a personal framework for ethical decision making in 
the situation of dual professional loyalties: ( 1 )  professional codes of 
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ethics; (2) the organizational environment; and (3) institutional rules 
and guidelines. 
PROFESSIONAL OF ETHICSCODES 
The establishment of a code of ethics is one of the characteristics 
normally identified with the qualification of an occupation as a 
profession (Carey, 1966). Thus, professional societies may adopt codes 
of ethics for their members in order to legitimize their claims as 
professions. Codes of ethics serve other purposes as well. Frankel 
(1989, pp. 111-12) has described eight functions of professional codes: 
(1) they serve as enabling documents, pointing the direction for 
professionals to take when they encounter novel problems in their 
practice; (2) they serve as a source of public evaluation, letting the 
public know what they can expect from members of the profession; 
(3) they perform professional socialization by helping to foster 
member pride in the profession and strengthening professional 
identity; (4) they can enhance the profession’s reputation and public 
trust; ( 5 )  they may preserve entrenched professional biases; (6) they 
may function as a deterrent to unethical behavior by providing for 
sanctions and/or by requiring professionals to report unethical 
behavior of colleagues; (7) they may provide a support system to 
bolster the profession against unreasonable demands on its skills by 
outsiders; and (8) they may serve as a forum for adjudication of disputes 
among members or between members and outsiders. 
For whatever purposes a code is drafted, its adoption by a 
professional society signifies to society at large its most significant 
values. Frankel goes on to identify three types of codes: aspirational, 
educational, and regulatory. 
An aspirational code states ideals which professionals should use 
to guide their practice. An educational code provides extensive 
commentary and interpretation to demonstrate how its provisions 
can be helpful in deciding ethical issues in practice. A regulatory 
code includes detailed rules to govern conduct and attempts to enforce 
those rules through monitoring and sanctions. 
None of the codes included in the following discussion are 
regulatory in nature. To some degree, they each touch on educational 
issues, but, for the most part, they are aspirational codes. As such, 
they espouse ideals for behavior in the professional groups for which 
they are written and are open to interpretation by individual 
practitioners in relation to specific situations. Since the fundamental 
situation under examination crosses over the boundary of a single 
professional group, i t  obviously becomes incumbent upon the 
information professional operating as both a librarian and an 
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independent to consider the aspirational goals of both professional 
groups. 
The A L A  Code 
As a librarian, one might look at the Statement of Professional 
Ethics reprinted on the back of the American Library Association 
membership card (American Library Association, 1982, p. 595). The 
final provision within a code which otherwise espouses justifiably 
high minded ideals of quality of service, resistance to censorship, 
protection of the rights of privacy, and adherence to principles of 
due process and equality of opportunity speaks rather prohibitively, 
however, to the scenarios mentioned earlier in this discussion. 
“Librarians must avoid situations in which personal interests might 
be served or financial benefits gained at the expense of library users, 
colleagues, or the employing institution.” 
There are, perhaps, those who would take a narrow look at the 
above statement and conclude that any situation in which a librarian 
expected financial reimbursement outside of regular employment 
would be one to be avoided, and, that therefore, librarians ought 
not to be in business for themselves, or at least not if they are 
simultaneously employees of libraries. Those in business for 
themselves, however, commonly report that they perform information 
services beyond and outside of those generally offered by libraries, 
which must tailor their service offerings to what their funding agency 
is willing and able to pay. These individuals, then, are not gaining 
financial benefits at the expense of general library users; they are 
serving people who the library cannot satisfy under its current budget 
and charging directly for that service. As such, they may foreshadow 
a growing demand for a particular service. 
Adopted in 1981, the statement in the ALA code does not explicitly 
recognize the growing employment of librarians in alternative 
environments and consequently may be narrowly interpreted. The 
most distressing implication in the code statement is the ad-
monishment to avoid difficult situations; certainly what is wanted 
is responsible and ethical management of such situations. 
An aid in the development of responsible and ethical management 
of such conflict situations is given in Section V of the code: “Librarians 
must distinguish clearly in their actions and statements between their 
personal philosophies and attitudes and those of an institution or 
professional body” (American Library Association, 1982, p. 595). This 
statement, if carried beyond the intended purpose of drawing a visible 
line between personal and institutional philosophies and attitudes, 
to the drawing of a visible line between actions undertaken as an 
employee and actions undertaken in an independent professional 
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capacity, can serve as a positive guideline for those in dual 
employ men t. 
AIIP Code of Ethics 
Members of the Association of Independent Information 
Professionals adopted a code of ethical business practice in 1989 at 
their third national conference and annual meeting. It is reprinted 
here in its entirety: 
An independent information professional is an information entrepreneur 
who has demonstrated continuing expertise in the art of finding and 
organizing information. The independent information professional is 
unaffiliated with any institution, and provides information services to 
more than one client. Information professionals serve as objective 
intermediaries between the client and the information world. 
They bear the following responsibilities: 
1. 	 To uphold the profession’s reputation for honesty, competence, and 
confidentiality. 
2. To give clients the most current and accurate information possible. 
3. 	To help a client understand the sources of information used, and the 
degree of reliability which can be expected of them. 
4. 	To accept only those projects which are legal and are not detrimental 
to our profession. 
5 .  To respect client confidentiality. 
6.  To honor intellectual property rights, and to explain to clients what 
their obligations may be. 
7. 	To maintain a professional relationship with libraries, and comply 
with all their rules of access. 
8. To assume responsibility for employees’ compliance with this codc. 
This code reflects the engagement of association members in 
for-profit information enterprises and speaks to the majority of 
members who focus their businesses on providing research services 
to several clients. It should be noted that the code was written by 
a young organization which is striving to interpret a new profession 
to the public. It is difficult to write and agree on a code when an 
organization is composed of members from a variety of backgrounds 
(Shaver, 1988, pp. 103,106). Nevertheless, a preponderance of members, 
but by no means all, have been employed at one time or another 
within libraries. Several provisions (2, 3, 5,  and 6) formulate and 
state ethical principles that are markedly similar to the aspirations 
of reference librarians while provision 7 explicitly acknowledges links 
to libraries. 
The code attempts to explain the multiple client base of 
independent information professionals. “The independent in- 
formation professional is unaffiliated with any institution, and 
provides information services to more than one client.” Ir, the opinion 
of this writer, a more apt wording would be: “The independent 
information professional is not affiliated with any single institution 
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and provides information services to multiple clients.” Affiliation 
can take various forms; what is being said here is that the independent 
information professional accepts sole responsibility for her 
professional information service activities rather than sharing that 
responsibility with an employing institution. 
The  practice of serving multiple clients as independent 
information professionals can serve as a model for action in some 
dual employment situations. This code specifically mentions 
confidentiality as a characteristic that needs to be maintained in the 
multiple-client environment. The requirement of honesty is treated 
generally, but  the concept of honesty, in a multiple-client 
environment, may have some very specific applications. Consider 
the scenario involving sharing of software mentioned earlier; the 
temptation to share software among several clients-library or 
otherwise-abounds in the multiple-client environment due to the 
heavy investment of individual time in learning to use complex 
software tools productively. 
Code of the  American Society for  Information Science 
The ASIS Code of Ethics for Information Professionals, under 
development during the period in which this article was being written 
(Barnes, personal communication, October 31, 1989) looks at the 
problem of information professionals engaged in a variety of activities 
and offers a framework for individuals to reflect on their ethical 
responsibilities in whatever capacity they are serving within the 
information profession. The American Society for Information 
Science recognizes the broad base of the “information profession.” 
Its members share professional orientations with librarians, 
engineers, and researchers, among others, across employment areas 
in government, the commercial arena, and academia. The framework 
proposed, delineates four areas of responsibility: to individual persons, 
to the sponsor, to society, and to the profession. It is the notion 
of responsibility to the sponsor that provides help to the entre- 
preneurial librarian operating in a multiclient environment: 
The contribution of the information professional is most often made 
through the offices of a sponsor-i.e., a client or employer. As such, 
the sponsor acquires certain special information rights, which there 
is an obligation to respect. 
Information professionals should maintain confidentiality of 
information belonging to the sponsor and should strictly observe 
nondisclosure agreements. 
Information professionals should avoid conflict of interest 
situations involving multiple sponsors. 
330 LIBRARY TRENDWFALL 1991 
Information professionals should refuse assignments or contracts 
of a questionable nature and should inform sponsors of the 
objectionable nature of such an assignment or contract. 
0 	Information professionals should, within the limits of their other 
obligations, strive to serve the sponsor’s interests faithfully. 
This code specifically acknowledges conflict of interest as a 
problem with multiple sponsors, and i t  particularly notes that a 
sponsor may be an employer or a client. However, its admonition 
to “avoid conflict of interest situations involving multiple sponsors” 
does not prohibit or advise against the situation of having multiple 
sponsors. Such a prohibition would be out of character considering 
the funding patterns of academic research in which many ASIS 
members are engaged. Rather, i t  uses the preamble to alert the 
information professional to the possibility of conflict of interest in 
those situations and urges the individual to attend to that possibility. 
Moreover, the ASIS code absolutely denies any intent to be a 
regulatory code with sanctions against those who violate its 
provisions. By implication, i t  places its environment in Frankel’s 
(1989) aspirational and educational spheres and explicitly sets as its 
purpose “to articulate the distinctive goals and ideals of the 
information profession, to guide the activities of its members, and 
to direct their thoughts into reflection on the ethical aspects of the 
profession” (Barnes, personal communication, October 31, 1989). 
The double-hatted individual, involved in information activities 
in both the independent and employment arenas, may look to the 
foregoing codes of professional conduct as illustrative of the values 
prevalent from varying viewpoints within the information profession. 
That individual may further reflect on the ideals aspired to in the 
code statements and develop a framework from which to consider 
personal challenges within the specific situation in which he or she 
operates. 
ORGANIZATIONALENVIRONMENT 
In addition to considering the ethical aspirations espoused by 
librarians and by independent information professionals in their codes 
of ethics, individuals who share a professional life across two spheres 
should look toward the cultural environment within which their 
organizations operate-both the institutions in which they are 
employed and the organization by means of which they perform their 
independent activities. The potential conflict seems to be greatest 
when the independent organization provides the same type of service 
in which the principal is engaged in his library job. An example 
of this situation is the business of providing direct research services. 
An employed reference librarian also operates an information 
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brokerage outside of the library. The commonality between these 
two environments is that a single person is providing information 
service to distinct clients in exchange for some form of remuneration. 
It may be helpful to consider who is the employer of the service 
provider, who is the client, and who pays for the service. 
Gray (1988) has delineated the position of information 
intermediaries in three types of organizations for the purposes of 
examining personal liability in information distribution. His 
discussion focuses on “those who assist users in identifying and 
accessing reliable sources of information for the users’ own purposes 
or who themselves identify and access reliable sources on behalf of 
others and communicate the results to them” (p. 72). He dstinguishes 
“at least three categories of ‘information intermediaries’: reference 
librarians, special librarians, and free-lance, independent, in- 
formation brokers/specialists/researchers” (p. 72). 
Gray’s reference librarian is employed by an institution such as 
a public library, academic institution, government agency, or other 
such facility. The client of the reference librarian is the public or 
eligible users determined by the employer; the “client” receives the 
service at no cost (pp. 72-73). The cost of the service is paid by the 
employing institution. 
Spec ia l  l ibrarians,  according to Gray, are employed by 
organizations as “in-house librarians.” The organization’s employees 
are the “clients” and the employer pays for the service (pp. 72-73). 
Thus, in both the reference and special librarian environments, there 
is a marked separation between the agency paying for the service 
and the user receiving the service. Although the interactions of the 
service provider with various service receivers are probably individual, 
personal, and frequent, interactions with the funding agency may 
well be as infrequent and impersonal as a monthly direct-deposit 
paycheck. 
Gray’s information broker is a self-employed independent 
contractor whose clients are self-selecting and who pay directly for 
the service for which they contract. “The information broker is an 
independent contractor who does for a fee for his or her client what 
the special librarian does for pay and fringe benefits for his or her 
employer, while there is no exchange of consideration between the 
reference librarian and the patron. Although all three professionals 
provide ...the same ...services...the relationship to their respective users 
is different ....The distinction is crucial because the nature of t h e  
relationship determines the legal result regarding personal liability” 
[emphasis added] (p. 73). The nature of the relationship may also 
be presumed to influence the ethical responsibilities of reference 
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librarian/special librariadinformation broker even beyond the 
specific situation of liability. Surely the librarian/information 
entrepreneur has responsibilities to his respective users, in both 
capacities, and to his respective employers, including himself as 
business owner. 
Although helpful in clarifying the relationships of individual 
information providers, their clients, and their employers in traditional 
library and information broker environments, Gray’s definitions do 
not explicitly take into consideration fee-based information services 
within special, academic, and public library settings. He goes on, 
however, to acknowledge the change in relationships created when 
academic and public libraries establish policies allowing them to 
“provide specialized information services to specialized users on a 
contract basis for a fee” (p. 80). 
Warner (1989)has examined the issue of libraries charging fees 
for service and reports that special libraries charge fees in three ways: 
(1) charging back internally within the organization, (2) charging 
out to customers who are already clients of the parent organization, 
and (3) selling information services and products directly to not 
otherwise affiliated customers (p. 275). Presumably the first charge 
model classifies the librarian service provider within Gray’s sfiecial 
librarian category, with the consequent separation of service funder 
and service receiver. The third model classifies the organization (but 
not the librarian) in the information broker category, with the service 
provider being an employee of the information broker/special library. 
The second charge model, according to Warner, is “occurring 
increasingly in virtually all kinds of special libraries” and she names 
law firms; advertising agencies; research and development labs; 
medical cen ters; planning agencies; engineering design, and 
accounting firms as participating in the practice (p. 276). The second 
charge model-information fees charged out to the firm’s clients by 
the library/information center-may easily lead to alterations in the 
employer/clien t/service provider relationship by promoting direct 
contact between the client and service provider, with the possibility 
of removing the employer to an even more remote location. 
Gray categorized reference librarians, special librarians, and 
information brokers for the purpose of disputing the notion that 
“the person who provides the information is liable for harm caused 
by it” (p. 71) in the consideration of malpractice liability, and, among 
other conclusions, he determined that the individual reference 
librarian or special librarian could not be held legally liable for 
malpractice. This author concurs with his analysis but suggests that 
when the legal framework is broadened to an ethical framework, 
the matter of relationships among the various parties and the 
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consequences of those relationships becomes more difficult. When 
a distant relationship prevails between the service funder and the 
service provider, while a close relationship prevails between service 
provider and clients, the possibility of client poaching from library 
to independent organization can be tempting for the service provider 
and for the client, who reasonably may envision direct service from 
the independent competitor as faster, cheaper, more flexible, and equal 
in quality to the service provided through the library. Should the 
funderiprovider relationship turn negative for any reason, severe tests 
of that delicate balance may be expected. 
Maintaining a distinct separation between the type of service 
provided in the employment situation and that provided in the 
business position can be expected to minimize the likelihood of 
conflicts of interest. When a strict separation cannot be maintained, 
however, it may be helpful to review the structure of the relationships 
and consequent responsibilities among funder, provider, and client 
in the two organizational environments in which the service provider 
operates. 
INSTITUTIONALRULESAND GUIDELINES 
Increasing national sensitivity to problems of conflict of interest 
and ethics in business and government have prompted some 
institutions to address the issue with statements of policy and/or 
rules. Employees of such institutions must be cognizant of the policies 
so stated, for those statements may carry the force of regulation. 
Examination of such policies even by unaffected individuals, however, 
can be helpful in delineating issues and suggesting actions for dealing 
with ethical problems. 
The MIT Personnel Policy Manual (1989) includes the following 
statement in its Policy on Conflict of Interest: 
I t  is the policy of the Institute that its officers, faculty, staff, and others 
acting on its behalf have the obligation to avoid ethical, legal, financial, 
or other conflicts of interest and to ensure that their activities and interests 
do not conflict with their obligations to the Institute or its welfare. 
Essential to effective administration and adherence to this policy are: 
a) disclosure to designated Institute officers of outside activities and 
interests, including financial interests, which might give rise to conflicts, 
and b) ready availability of advice and consultation to individuals and 
to Institute Department Heads on any situation. (Section 3.5, p. 1 )  
Accordingly, staff within the organization are asked each May, 
in a one-page form, to summarize their outside professional activities 
and interests by listing activities in which they have engaged 
throughout the previous year, whether compensated or not, in 
consulting, teaching, board memberships, professional society 
committees, and the like. Specific information called for includes 
name of company or organization, nature of the work relationship, 
334 LJBRARY TRENDWFALL 1991 
number of days engaged per year, and a statement of whether 
compensation was paid (but not how much). In addition, staff are 
asked to disclose any company or organization in which they have 
substantial financial interest or managerial responsibility, and any 
full- or part-time appointments held outside the institute. Finally, 
there is space to answer the question: “Considering the Institute policy 
on conflict of interest, in your view, have any of the relationships 
reported above the potential or appearance of a conflict of interest? 
If so, please describe.” The forms are reviewed annually by the 
appropriate department head. 
This administrative procedure is good for several reasons. First, 
it requires the employee to review activities on a periodic basis. An 
annual review encourages comparison with activities listed on the 
prior annual form and makes i t  easy for the employee to spot new 
directions or increases in activity that may not be noticed as they 
actually occur. Thus, i t  promotes an annual employee assessment 
of time spent in outside activity, types of activity, and compensation 
received from outside interests (although the amount is not 
disclosed)-all in light of their possible effect on the employing 
ins ti tu tion. 
Second, the annual review relieves the administration of the 
responsibility of approving every instance of outside involvement 
on a case by case basis throughout the year. This procedure would 
be needlessly time consuming and diverting. 
Third, the procedure is affirmative rather than prohibitive. The 
form does not specify types of actions that are not permitted and 
the report is requested only after an activity is completed or at least 
begun. Thus, the procedure in and of itself does not inhibit outside 
professional activity. 
Fourth, the procedure assumes the responsibility of the 
professional employee in making judgments regarding the conflict 
potential of a specific activity. The honesty and integrity of the 
individual is presumed, and no penalties are threatened. 
Fifth, i t  is allowed that the afifiearance of a conflict may exist 
without there actually being a conflict. There is the opportunity 
to explain an apparent conflict, advising the employee and the 
department head of the situation in the event of a question. 
Sixth, fiscal privacy is preserved. There is no need to reveal on 
the form the amount or type of compensation received in a transaction. 
Finally, the review by the department head keeps the nature and 
extent of outside professional relationships a matter between 
employee and ultimate supervisor. While encouraging confidentiality, 
the procedure also encourages consultation between those two 
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individuals on questionable matters. Such consultation can go a long 
way in preventing irresolvable conflicts from developing. 
Supplemental to the annual review of outside activities is a system 
of established resources to give advice and consultation to individuals 
seeking an opinion at the time actions are questioned. This review 
policy begins but need not end with the department head. The policy 
statement acknowledges that “there are situations sufficiently 
complex that judgments may differ as to whether there is or may 
be a conflict of interest” and therefore suggests an appeal policy 
should a subordinate differ with a supervisor on a potential activity. 
The specification of this part of the policy encourages consultation 
before the fact and therefore may minimize the occurrence of problem 
areas on the annual form. 
The MIT Personnel Policy Manual specifically addresses the 
problem that can occur when an opinion is expressed by individuals 
in their outside affiliation capacity that is mistakenly inferred as 
an official statement or endorsement by the institute. The manual 
warns against the use of institute stationery in these instances as 
a safeguard against the wrong interpretation and additionally advises 
the use of an office address without corporate name in personal 
professional correspondence. In addition to discussing situations in 
which unintentional misrepresentation might occur, the policy 
admonishes that “the Institute should not allow its name to be 
associated with business enterprises, when the obvious intent is to 
provide undue prestige to the business” and mandates that “all 
proposals for the use of the name of M.I.T. in advertising and 
commercial publicity ...be submitted to the Director of the News 
Office” (Section 3.9.3). 
Obviously, awareness of an employing institution’s rules and 
policies on conflict of interest is of prime importance to any employee. 
An employee actively engaged in extramural business activities is 
advised to seek out applicable policies in advance of any problem. 
Not all institutions will have policies that are as permissive as the 
one examined earlier; some institutions may not have policies at all. 
When none exists, it is advisable to observe actual practice and 
determine any general applicability to the particular situation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is inappropriate to generalize about libraries’ attitudes toward 
the employment of professionals who also provide information 
services independently outside the institution. In reading and 
inquiring about this issue for the purpose of this discussion, this 
author encountered institutions that seemed blissfully unaware of 
any possible conflict of interest, even though they had employees 
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so engaged. Individuals were also encountered who assumed that 
an employee with loyalty to an outside business interest could not 
possibly honor traditional library ethics and consequently would not 
hire someone in that capacity. 
Libraries that are not fearful or contemptuous of employing 
independent information professionals stand to gain good value for 
their personnel investment. Independent practitioners can bring 
experience and insights from their outside activities back to the library 
at no expense to the employer. Professional development op-
portunities pursued for the outside concern can frequently have 
positive spillover value. Independents circulate in a broader 
environment when they are outside the library and, to the extent 
that their library affiliation is acknowledged, they can act as a positive 
marketing agent for the library (Horner, 1984, pp. 289-90). 
The first safeguard against conflict of interest between the two 
responsibilities is for both the entrepreneurial library employee and 
the employing library to recognize the possibility of conflict. The 
next step is for both parties to affirm a positive attitude toward 
potential conflict situations. The employee has the responsibility to 
be aware of circumstances that present a potential or appearance 
of conflict and to bear the demands of business life in such a way 
as to minimize their impact on the employer. The employer needs 
to make clear its expectations regarding the impact of its employee’s 
outside activities. Both employer and employee need to keep channels 
of communication open for discussion of possible conflict issues on 
a regular and as needed basis. 
It is the librarian, though, who bears the major responsibility 
in  managing conflict of interest between dual professional 
commitments. The librarian is the only party who has detailed 
knowledge of the service goals and clientele served by both the 
independent business and the library. The librarian must develop 
a work schedule and style that maintains a separation between the 
two venues of activity. Normally the librarian will be the first to 
suspect apotential conflict as i t  occurs. Clear-cut solutions will seldom 
present themselves. The following self-dialogue may be helpful in 
finding an ethical course of action in specific situations when 
negotiating between multiple clients and two employers: 
Who is sponsoring this work? 
Who is benefiting from it? 
Could any of my affiliations be damaged by this practice? How? 
If I did this, would I be guilty of mismanaging the time, resources, 
or other assets of one client for the benefit of another? 
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Would I be embarrassed to see this described in the headlines 
of the Wall Street Journal? Library Hotline? (McGonagle 
paraphrased in Berkman [19891). 
If there is still doubt, share the decision making with your 
affiliations. 
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Some Ethical Considerations Regarding 
Scholarly Communication 
GORDONMORANAND MICHAEL MALLORY 
ABSTRACT 
THISARTICLE DISCUSSES academic in  tolerance, peer review 
suppression, and resulting de facto academic library censorship. 
Included are some ethical considerations regarding scholarly 
communication (and scholarly excommunication), academic 
librarianship, and academic whistle-blowing. One of higher 
education’s most deeply rooted ethical tenets is a commitment to 
the search for truth. However, the truth is often upsetting (to say 
the least) to powerful academic leaders, as the history of science, 
for example, has made obvious. In tolerance toward, and suppression 
of, truthful ideas of a scholarly nature, can lead to de facto academic 
library censorship, even though academic librarians may not be aware 
that they are involved. Historically, peer review authorities in 
academia have been the enemies in intellectual matters of academic 
whistle-blowers. Ethical conflicts arise when reliance and deference 
in regard to peer review authorities lead to suppression of ideas, 
unwittingly or otherwise, by academic librarians. To the extent that 
true ideas are suppressed and censored throughout the scholarly 
communication system, that system might also accurately be called 
a system of scholarly excommunication. Without compromising their 
neutrality, academic librarians, by giving access to ideas and 
information on all sides of academic questions and controversies, 
can serve as illuminators of the truth for scholars seeking the truth. 
A proposal is made for the institution of intellectual freedom (IF) 
committees and groups within academic libraries and academic 
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library associations in order to help these librarians detect academic 
and peer review suppression. The very existence of such IF groups 
might have a salutary effect on the quality of peer review in academia. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a recent trend to regard academic libraries not only 
as separate entities serving specific institutions of higher education 
but also as mere links-and even subordinate links at that-within 
a larger system known as scholarly communication. This article is 
an introductory discussion of some of the ethical considerations and 
conflicts that might accompany the so-called information explosion 
and the enormous technological advances in the transmission of 
information among scholars. 
ACADEMIC AND ACADEMIC ETHICSETHICS LIBRARY 
Following the upheavals on many campuses during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, some recent literature on higher education has 
attempted to reaffirm, with ringing rhetoric, the principle that the 
search for the truth is the foundation of academic ethics. For example, 
Nolte (1983) asserts that the “first requirement of the academic ethic 
is the obligation of methodically striving for the truth” (p. 161). 
Likewise, in a discussion of “The Academic Ethics,” Ruegg (1986) 
maintains that “the absolute commandment of respect for the truth 
is fundamental to the exercise of scientific and scholarly professions” 
(p. 408). 
If the search for the truth in any given academic discipline is 
a basis or foundation of academic ethics, it would follow that a tenet 
of academic library ethics would be the attempt to provide the user/ 
scholar with access to material containing the truth and to provide 
such access in the most effective manner possible. Along this line, 
Meador and Buthod (1982) cite the following from the American 
Library Association’s (ALA) guidelines regarding reference service: 
“Information provided the user in response to an inquiry must be 
the most accurate possible” (p. 144). This common bond for scholars 
and librarians in regard to truth is expressed by Altick (1974) (a well- 
known English professor), in his work entitled “Librarianship and 
the Pursuit of Truth.” Altick refers to himself as “a pursuer of truth” 
and to his audience of librarians as “the dedicated custodians of truth” 
(p. 4) and also as “curators and disseminators of truth” (p. 16). He 
also lumps himself and librarians together as “devoted and in some 
instances veteran pursuers, preservers, and disseminators of truth” 
(P. 5 ) .  
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COMPUTER AND ACADEMIC VIRUSESVIRUSES LIBRARY 
Scholars pursue the truth, and academic librarians collect, store, 
and disseminate the truth. Unfortunately, this description is not a 
complete one. The pursuit of truth is often a task that proves to 
be elusive, ambiguous, and very complicated. For one reason or 
another, scholars at times end up  publishing false information, 
believing it to be true. Also, in the classroom, some false information 
is taught as if i t  were true. As a result, falsehoods, masquerading 
as truths, find their way onto academic library shelves and into library 
catalogs. 
Altick (1974) believes that “most error” has its origins “in haste 
or misunderstanding” (p. 14). But whatever the cause of error, the 
resulting falsehoods that are masquerading as truths in academic 
libraries create obstacles to scholars who are searching for the truth. 
Some recent newspaper headlines have noted sensational cases of so-
called “computer viruses” in which information systems have been 
changed by the suppression/destruction and alteration of intended 
information and by the insertion in its place of unwanted information. 
If the search for the truth is the basic tenet of academic ethics, and 
if providing scholars with access to the truth is a consequential tenet 
of academic library ethics, the intended scholarly material in the 
academic library would be that which contains the truth. It would 
follow, in such a case, that the presence of falsehood masquerading 
as truth in an academic library would amount to a form of academic 
library virus. And the greater the degree of such falsehood, the more 
severe the virus. 
Although the cases of computer viruses that have made the 
headlines have apparently been, for the most part, carefully 
programmed events designed to have specific effects, academic library 
viruses of the sort just described are ongoing phenomena that are 
constantly changing as knowledge itself changes. In fact, Altick (1974) 
observes that “the progress of knowledge consists in large part of 
proving received statements faulty, exploding myths, reordering the 
sequence of events ...” (p. 15). A possible cure for academic library 
viruses would include the library’s own selection of material that 
corrects the errors and exposes the fdsehoods. Presumably this selected 
material would already be included within the library’s holdings. 
(As will be discussed, such selection does not mean that material 
that contains errors and falsehoods should be “weeded,” although 
in some cases, as in medical libraries, “retractions” are sometimes 
issued which amount to a form of weeding.) 
So far, so good. Academic librarians help correct error, explode 
myths, and reorder sequences by selecting the latest scholarly research 
results that set the scholarly record straight. However, often scholars 
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themselves do not agree with each other on given subjects, and 
academic debates and controversies develop, sometimes becoming 
bitter and long drawn out affairs. In addition, the subject matter 
of such controversies is sometimes very highly specialized and 
technical, for which the librarian might not have very much expertise. 
How can the librarian judge what is true and what is false? And 
where would librarians ordinarily find the time to do thorough 
research for such questions? Must the academic librarian look on 
helplessly as library viruses exist and possibly spread? 
ACADEMICCONTROVERSY 
In cases of controversial issues, library ethics oblige librarians 
to make accessible all sides of a question. Davis (1982) proposes the 
following: “[Ilt is our duty to provide more information...by 
promoting discussion and insuring that the widest range of 
information and ideas possible are available” (p. 40). The academic 
librarian, by remaining neutral, can stay above the fray and does 
not need to take sides in order to provide scholars with access to 
the truth. As a collector of information, rather than an arbiter and 
judge in academic controversies, the librarian provides the scholar 
with material on all sides of a controversy. Once again there might 
be reason to say, “So far, so good.” If the librarian does not know 
the precise cure for an academic virus, he or she at least provides 
the medicine that allows the scholar to come up  with a possible 
cure. 
PEER REVIEW COMMUNICATIONAND SCHOLARLY 
It is, however, at this point that some real problems begin, and 
these are conflicts that no amount of rhetoric can hide or gloss over. 
In more general terms, Altick (1974) describes such conflicts as follows: 
“In effect, there is a sort of conflict between the persistence of the 
old and the demands of the new” (p. 13). More specifically, there 
are well-documented controversies among scholars about whether the 
truth should be accepted as truth and be disseminated and made 
widely known. There is also conflict, real and theoretical, between 
scholars and librarians, and among librarians themselves, about 
whether or not academic librarians should let the truth be known. 
Specific conflicts of such a nature often take place within the academic 
process known as peer review. These conflicts have a relationship, 
directly or indirectly, to academic library ethics. (For the purposes 
of this article, the term peer review is not considered only in its 
narrow definition of referee reports, but also in its broader definition 
of how scholars evaluate each others’ works. In this broader definition, 
a published book review is as much a part of peer review as an 
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unpublished referee’s rejection-carried out in secrecy-of a scholar’s 
manuscript.) 
As long as secrecy remains a cherished practice of so-called peer 
review authorities, accurate and reliable in-depth stuhes of peer 
review seem impossible. An attempt to make such a study would 
appear to be the equivalent of examining how successful or 
unsuccessful the operations of the CIA and KGB are without having 
access to the classified material relating to the actual operations of 
these organizations. Moreover, it seems that some recent examinations 
of peer review, such as those of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1987-1988, the Institute of Medicine 
in 1987-1989, and the American Medcal Association (AMA) in 1989 
have been marred by conflict-of-interest situations of their own (a 
study that includes some analysis of these situations is underway 
and is planned as part of a larger hscussion of academic ethics). 
At any rate, i t  should seem obvious to everyone interested in, 
and concerned about, academic librarianship that peer review 
suppression can have a negative and stifling effect upon the academic 
librarian’s attempts at “insuring that the widest range of information 
and ideas possible are available.” To what extent does peer review 
suppression/censorship take place in academia, if at all, and if i t  
does take place, what should academic librarians do when examples 
of i t  are brought to their attention? 
Some scholars have written negatively about peer review in 
general terms. For instance, Leslie (1989) observes: “Almost everyone 
who has ever submitted anything to a journal has a horror story 
or two to tell” (p. 125). Armstrong (1982) is also highly critical: 
“Recent research shows that journal reviewing practices are neither 
objective nor fair .... Is ‘peer review’ simply a nice term for censorship? 
....Major innovations tend to refute current wisdom. From the evidence 
above, we would suspect very innovative articles to have difficulty 
gaining acceptance from major journals, particularly if they came 
from low status sources and they challenged commonly held ideas .... 
Peer review is not as fair as i t  appears. Nor is i t  helpful to scientific 
achievements” (pp. 62-63, 65, 67). And Cude (1987) suggests that, 
“scholarly tolerance for innovation-for one reason, if not another- 
i s  actually rather low” (p. 51). 
Recently, the Office of Scholarly Communication of the American 
Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) conducted a survey of more 
than 5,000 scholars. A very large number (71 percent) of those surveyed 
replied. Morton and Price (1989) describe the results: 
About three out of four respondents think the editorial peer review system 
is biased.... About 40 percent think bias is so prevalent in their discipline 
that it merits reform .... The question is, therefore, not whether bias exists 
in the peer review system, but whether it is prevalent and whether it 
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systematically interferes with the free exchange of information and ideas 
by discriminating against particular subjects, opinions, and classes of 
authors.... The survey shows that suspicions of bias appear to be held 
by scholars in all types of universities and among all the disciplines 
sampled.... The unease is pervasive, not an occasional outcropping of 
discontent. (pp. 7-9) 
(There seems to be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy to these 
results, for soon after they were released and made known, the Office 
of Scholarly Communication was closed down and its scholarly 
journal, Scholarly Communication, was discontinued.) Cude 
(personal communication, April 15, 1988) comments further about 
what he perceives as the breadth and depth of peer review suppression: 
In the name of collegiality, students are victimized, considerable 
intellectual resources are being squandered, and the general public is 
deliberately misled. Worse yet, the free pursuit of knowledge is itself 
threatened: useful information is altered or nullified, valuable arguments 
are suppressed, and highly-respected institutions are manipulated to serve 
meanly personal ends. We cannot convincingly pretend this sort of thing 
isn’t occurring on a hsmaying scale, and we only harm ourselves 
professionally by refusing to address the difficulties openly and 
vigorously. 
More than a century ago, many women were killed by childbirth 
fever soon after giving birth. According to &line (1975), the death 
rate at various times around 1846-47 ranged from about 18 percent 
in Paris, 26 percent in Berlin, 32 percent in Turin, to about 40 percent 
in Vienna (p. 57). A doctor named Semmelweis discovered the cause 
of many of these deaths and also devised the means to prevent them. 
But his discoveries were vehemently rejected by the peer review 
authorities of the day on an international level. He was fired from 
his job at the university, apparently as a direct result of the 
embarrassment that his discoveries caused among the peer review 
authorities. Many years and deaths later, i t  was finally recognized 
that Semmelweis was right, and long after his death a monument 
was dedicated to him in Budapest. Ciline describes the opposition 
to Semmelweis’s discoveries by peer review authorities as intellectually 
blind, mendacious, stupid, and evil (p. 74). How many women suffered 
and died because of the nonscholarly suppressive reactions of these 
peer review authorities? 
Suarez and Lemoine (1986) discuss a somewhat similar case of 
academic and intellectual suppression, namely, the opposition of peer 
review authorities to the findings of Beauperthuy that yellow fever 
was spread by means of insectile transmission. Based on their account, 
i t  seems obvious that Beauperthuy hit a raw nerve among some of 
the medical research leaders of the day. Although Beauperthuy 
managed to publish some of his findings, they were apparently 
ignored during his lifetime and then attacked vigorously after his 
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death in 1871. Moreover, i t  seems that there is, in this case, a 
documented example of how such intellectual suppression on the 
part of peer review authorities can lead directly to de facto academic 
library censorship inasmuch as the 1895 bibliography of the medical 
school at the University of Caracas, according to Suarez and Lemoine, 
did not mention Beauperthuy nor his works. Around 1900, the United 
States Yellow Fever Commission validated Beauperthuy’s findings. 
But how many people suffered and died in this case because peer 
review authorities of the day suppressed an innovative scholarly idea? 
Suarez and Lemoine describe their lengthy article as “an example 
of how the processes of academic resistance to new findings evolve” 
(pp. 383-410). 
It is not necessary, however, to look back a century or so for 
examples of peer review suppression. In the by now infamous Cell-
Baltimore case, Walter Stewart and Ned Feder, scientists at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), wrote (personal communication, 
May 20, 1987) that senior officials at NIH had forbidden them to 
submit a rebuttal article to a scholarly journal. In a letter sent by 
Moran on June 9, 1987, the Director of NIH, James Wyngaarden 
was asked: “If scientists either within or outside NIH uncover 
inaccurate material in research supported by NIH funds, or if such 
scientists come up with hypotheses which contest the results of such 
research,...would NIH in any way stifle the publication of such 
opposing views?” In a letter of September 25, 1987, written on behalf 
of the director by another NIH official, Mary Miers, the following 
answer is tendered: “I cannot envison a situation in which NIH would 
seek to suppress a rebuttal article ....” Yet Miers had received a copy 
of an NIH memorandum to Feder and Stewart on December 12, 1986 
and signed by another NIH official, J. E. Rall, in which the following 
is written: “I am withholding approval of your manuscript for 
publication....” Moreover, in a letter of April 2, 1987, the same Rall 
wrote Baltimore, whose article was being rebutted by the Feder- 
Stewart piece: “Meanwhile, I have told Feder and Stewart that their 
manuscript cannot be submitted to a journal ....” Rall also wrote to 
Moran on December 15, 1986: “It is clearly not NIH policy to 
discourage or indeed otherwise suppress publication of hscussions 
and corrections of errors....” Apparently i t  took about a year, and 
help from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to have this 
decision reversed. The article by Feder and Stewart was then finally 
submitted to several journals but  was rejected by them. A 
Congressional investigation ensued, which turned out to be very 
embarrassing for the NIH leadership (Greenberg, 1988, pp. 1-6). 
Recently, three scientists, Sprague (1987), Hollis (1987), and 
Jacobstein (1987), related how retaliation was launched against them 
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when they uncovered information of a scientific nature that upset 
academic authorities. At the University of Pittsburgh, Breuning 
engaged in erroneous research and was later charged with fraud 
(Greenberg, 1988, p. 5 ) .  After exposing Breuning’s error, Sprague 
describes how his own research funding was “deferred” and “stopped 
for four months” (p. 12). Hollis (1987) recounts how “superiors” 
at Case Western Reserve University “made it  clear” to him that he 
“would pay dearly” for his discoveries that had so upset academic 
authorities (p. 11). Jacobstein (1987) comments that his “own 
experience [at Cornell University] suggests that i t  is nearly impossible 
to get a fair investigation of the facts ...” when a scholar comes up 
with unsettling findings (p. 11). Additionally, Martin (1989) has 
recently reported on three cases of suppression by peer review 
authorities in Australia. He describes the reactions against scholars 
who uncovered information that was upsetting to academic 
authorities: “Many colleagues who tried to present the allegations 
encountered difficulties. Jim Rossiter received hundreds of 
threatening phone calls after he persisted with his allegations in 
the Briggs case. The careers of Vardy and French at Foundation 41 
suffered when they raised the issue of McBride’s fraud” (p. 101). 
In the wake of the Breuning scandal at the University of 
Pittsburgh, another scholar is apparently having a difficult time after 
he attempted to publish a “dissenting” article. Despite all the rhetoric 
about academic freedom that flows in speeches on campuses and 
throughout the literature of higher education, i t  seems that Cantekin’s 
submission of a dissenting point of view to a journal was regarded 
by some academic authorities as “unauthorized” and, as such, was 
considered “improper and a source of grave academic concern.” 
Randal (1989) comments on some peer review aspects of the case: 
At the same time, the university’s actions have come under fire. At last 
fall’s congressional hearing, for example, Weiss said of medical school 
officials, “They have now achieved what they want to do. They have 
shut up Dr. Cantekin. They’ve stopped him from doing any research, 
and he can’t publish his information because they have intimidated the 
journals as to what they can or cannot print.” (p.9) 
Peer review suppression occurs in reference works as well. One 
possible effect of such suppression is that scholarly errors are 
perpetuated. In turn, a consequential effect is that reference librarians 
and scholars might end up getting hoodwinked. Altick (1974) 
comments on this situation: “Unless the persons responsible for new 
editions of standard works are tenaciously abreast of developments 
in scholarship, there is always the danger that statements once 
accepted as truth, but now discredited, will persist without 
amendment” (p. 15). The Lexicon of the Middle Ages claims that: 
“Its primary aim is absolutely reliable information ....” Further, its 
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promotional literature (or literature with information for scholars, 
whichever the case may be), clearly states: “In the case of controversial 
problems and theories the L e x i c o n  also gives the protagonists of 
opposing positions a chance to express their views ....” A controversy 
that has been called “the case of the century” has been going on 
for several years in studies of art of the Middle Ages. Over f i f ty  specific 
issues have been raised by the present authors in the debate as evidence 
that the highly cherished and traltional views on the subject are 
clamorously wrong (as might be expected-in view of the examples 
of peer review suppression cited earlier-it has been difficult to get 
these f i f ty  or so issues published in the so-called core literature). 
A request was made to some of the editorial leaders of the Lexicon 
to allow the protagonists to express their views in the journal’s pages. 
Along with the request was included a reminder of the editors’ claim 
that all sides of a controversy could be found in the pages. 
Nevertheless, the request was flatly denied, in large part on the basis 
that the journal does not have room for dissenting views on the subject 
and also on the basis that the knowledge of one of the editors indicates 
that the traditional view is the prevailing view in the scholarly 
literature (documentation and discussion for this case is scheduled 
for publication in a future issue of The Reference Librar ian) .  
SCHOLARLY AND SELECTIONCONTROVERSIES 
OF MATERIAL LIBRARIESFOR ACADEMIC 
By their very nature, scholarly controversies are of ten situations 
in which scholars disagree about what the truth is in a given subject 
or study. Sometimes the disagreements are narrowly defined by fine 
points that are comprehensible to, and considered significant by, a 
relatively small group of specialists. But other controversies, 
illustrated by the Semmelweis and Beauperthuy cases among others, 
involve wide disagreements about issues that are in fact matters of 
life and death. 
It would seem that the very existence of scholarly controversies 
have created some ethical problems for academic libaries regarding 
the selection of materials for their collections. In general terms, it 
would seem logical that selection would be based on what the scholars 
at the university (college, research center) need and want, and also 
on an intrinsic priority of material that contains the truth over 
material that contains falsehoods masquerading as truths (if such 
distinctions can be detected at the time). But what if some scholars 
do not want the truth to be known regarding a specific subject? Such 
a situation is implicit in at least some, if not many, scholarly 
controversies, and i t  is also implicit in some of the peer review 
suppression cases cited earlier. And what should the academic 
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librarian select if some of these scholars who do not want some specific 
truths to be known have powerful positions in the university? 
It seems that there are two likely responses to the question of 
what should be selected for the academic library in the case of 
controversies: either all sides of the question or only the information 
that the peer review authorities sanction. Davis (1982, p. 40)regards 
access to all sides of a question as a librarian’s duty. Sanford Berman 
(personal communication to I. Hueck of the Kunsthistorisches 
Institut, Firenze, Italy, September 12, 1986) goes even further in his 
description of how the Guido Riccio controversy in art history should 
be handled by art research libraries specializing in Italian art: 
Good library procedure would dictate-with respect to a major 
intellectual and academic dispute like that surroundmg Guido Riccio- 
that extra measures to be taken to IDENTIFY AND MAKE AVAILABLE 
T H E  ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF VIEWPOINTS AND DOCU-
MENTATION....Beyond that, given the unquestionable interest in this 
particular matter, a proactive, truly helpful and alert librarian would 
also prepare-and possibly duplicate for broad distribution-a special 
bibliography on the case. Such a resource-list should be posted 
prominently in the library and updated frequently. In addition, it should 
be published in an appropriate art journal, in order that all interested 
scholars, historians, and others have the opportunity to fully and 
dispassionately investigate the dispute and reach their own, informed 
conclusions. 
Berman also writes that he is “frankly appalled and disgusted-as 
a professional librarian committed to basic tenets of intellectual and 
academic freedom-by the transparent censorship conducted at the 
Institut Library ...” (see the article by John Swan in this issue of 
Library Trends). 
Sowards (personal communication, February 23, 1989) also 
believes that the goal of an academic library collection “is to present 
the fullest possible range of opinion and information,” and he states 
there are two ways to attain this, “first, to tap the judgements of 
the recognized experts within a field as aids to selection, and second, 
to make a place for dissenters in the collection ....” On the other 
hand, Osburn (1989) is of the opinion that academic librarians should 
follow, and carry out by means of selection, the wishes of the so-
called peer review authorities. In any case, it would seem that the 
two responses are in conflict on ethical grounds. 
PEERREVIEWAUTHORITIESAND 
ACADEMICWHISTLE-BLOWERS 
Peer review authorities are generally regarded as members of 
the academic community who have the power to decide what gets 
published in the university presses (and other major scholarly 
publishing houses), what appears in the prestigious scholarly 
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journals, who receives grants for research, and who receives 
professional promotion. To some extent, they are also the authors 
of the texts that comprise the so-called core literature in their fields 
and also that comprise some of the ideas and material taught in 
classrooms. They are also often editors, authors, and members of 
advisory boards of specialized reference works in their academic 
disciplines. In short, peer review authorities are regarded as being 
the leading experts in their fields. 
Academic whistle-blowers are commonly perceived as scholars 
who feel they have made discoveries, or come up with findings, that 
contradict and contest scholarly ideas, facts, and information that 
have been accepted as true, valid, and reliable. As scholars seeking 
the truth, whistle-blowers can feel obligated to make these new ideas 
known within the scholarly communication system (in this sense, 
Semmelweis and Beauperthuy were classic examples of academic 
whistle-blowers). It is obvious that the hscoveries and findings of 
the whistle-blower might well contest some deeply ingrained and 
highly cherished traditional beliefs in academia, and also contradict- 
and prove wrong-some of the pet theories and ideas of the peer 
review authorities. Such a situation can obviously create tension and 
animosity to say the least. It seems natural that an adversarial situation 
might develop, with the peer review authorities possessing the power 
to suppress the new ideas insofar as the core literature is concerned. 
Peer review suppression can be vicious and determined, as illustrated 
by some of the cases cited earlier. Such suppression can also include 
the use of intimidation and retaliation as well as censorship of the 
ideas themselves. In a text entitled Academia, Journdism and Politics 
(in press), Lang writes: 
There are strong forces which inhibit criticism, from within or without. 
One of these forces is “collegiality” ....There are other forces of 
intimidation, of various kinds ....Some influential academics are giving 
priority to protecting their tribe; they close ranks behind each other...and 
they obstruct, in so far as they can, criticisms of “their own” ....There 
are pressures to shut people up: social pressures, use of bylaws, use of 
the pecking order, intimidation, etc .... 
A recent example of censorship was that on January 29, 1990, 
the editor of a scholarly publication wrote the present authors: “I 
hope that I can tell you one day what happened to me, after I have 
published your article” (for the time being, it might be better not 
to reveal the identity of this person lest more retaliation take place). 
Some time ago, the managing editor of Viator (the scholarly journal 
of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at UCLA), actually 
returned material to a scholar without even opening the envelope 
(the unopened envelope was enclosed by the managing editor inside 
a larger envelope and then sent back to the scholar). 
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ACADEMIC REACTIONSLIBRARIAN 
TO ACADEMICSUPPRESSION 
What should academic librarians do in the face of academic 
suppression once the suppression is pointed out to them? As an ethical 
matter, potential answers to the question can create conflicts regarding 
the concepts of academic freedom and patrons who the academic 
library “serves” within the university, college, or research center. On 
the other hand, students and their families pay tuition and other 
fees to attend a university and to “get an education.” There is no 
question that the library should serve them. If students go to a library 
in search of information, i t  is natural for them to assume that 
librarians are trying to help them find information that is true, 
reliable, and accurate (at least in nations that purport to have open 
democratic societies and governments). At the same time, faculty 
members enjoy academic freedom, which allows them to choose the 
subject matter for their courses. 
Suppose, in a hypothetical situation, that a faculty member 
requests that the librarian set up  a reserve shelf for a course. Then, 
while the course is in progress, the library receives a gift of a book, 
or an off-print that contests and disproves some of the material that 
the faculty member has chosen for the reserve shelf. In this case, 
should the librarian provide the students access to this relevant 
information? Or does the concept of academic freedom take precedence 
even to the extent that contested and possibly untrue information 
be allowed to reign in the library as well as in the classroom? Does 
academic freedom in a case such as this impede the academic librarian 
from giving students access to information and ideas of the widest 
range relating to all sides of an academic question? 
It seems that similar ethical conflicts exist currently on a broader 
scale in relation to scholarly communication. On the one hand, the 
ethical principle that librarians should give access to the widest range 
of ideas and information would indicate that librarians should react 
negatively to academic suppression and censorship the way librarians 
react negatively with rhetorical word and zealous deed to censorship 
proposed (or actually instituted) by government leaders or agencies 
or by religious leaders (e.g., the Moral Majority). And, to be sure, 
who is in the position of power to, in a large part, effect suppression 
and censorship of academic material if not the peer review authorities? 
The government has also been known to try to suppress 
“sensitive” scientific information. Nonetheless, Charles Osburn (1989) 
apparently firmly opposes having academic librarians make a place 
for academic whistle-blowers if peer review authorities do not include 
these whistle-blowers in the so-called core literature. Apparently 
speaking for some academic librarians, he writes, “we have discovered 
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our place in what is now called the scholarly communication 
system....The relative importance of a given output of scholarly 
communication is determined through its acceptance or rejection by 
the peer review authority in each field” (pp. 277, 281). Osburn also 
refers to an overloaded information system that contains “noise” (p. 
285). If “noise” in this case refers in any way to the ideas that peer 
review authorities reject, perhaps the question can be raised about 
whether the “noise” created by Semmelweis and Beauperthuy 
drowned out, from academic librarian ears, the cries of pain and 
suffering of the victims of childbirth fever and yellow fever. 
Osburn was questioned about his views, specifically those 
regarding whether or not errors made by peer review authorities 
should be corrected. In his reply (personal communication, October 
31, 1989), he stated that errors should be corrected, but only by the 
peer review authorities themselves. Therefore, it would seem that, 
according to Osburn, if peer review authorities do not correct their 
own errors, or if their peer review colleagues do not correct their 
errors for them, the academic librarian should let the erroneous 
material (masquerading as truth) stand, even if more accurate (and 
therefore more truthful) material on the same subject arrives in the 
library but via nonpeer review authority channels. In his letter, he 
writes: 
For an item of communication to be entered into the formal system, 
it is reviewed first by duciplinary peers ....The library does not and should 
not lead the system of scholarly communication ....I believe that the flaws 
of the system should be corrected directly. Changing the role of the library 
in the scholarly communication system will not accomplish that at all: 
moreover, such actions would merely serve as another, larger corruption, 
rendering the system of scholarly communication incomprehensible and 
very incoherent. 
In essence, Osburn states that since academic librarians cannot 
collect everything and therefore must be selective, their selections 
should be based on what the peer review authorities deem most 
important and significant. This view certainly has some useful and 
practical aspects to it, since the authorities usually have more expertise 
on specific subjects than librarians do. On the other hand, i t  is difficult 
to understand how, if an academic librarian at the University of 
Vienna a century or so ago had placed Semmelweis’s findings on 
the shelves and in the bibliographies, or i f  academic librarians at 
Paris and Caracas had provided access to Beauperthuy’s works, such 
actions could be part of “another larger corruption, rendering the 
system of scholarly communication incomprehensible and very 
incoherent.” Nor is i t  easy to understand how Osburn’s views apply 
to an academic librarian who has recently requested a large amount 
MORAN 8c MALLORY/ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 351 
of nonpeer review material relating to the Guido Riccio controversy 
for the library collection. 
A defect in Osburn’s proposed scholarly communication system 
might be that it does not sufficiently acknowledge that the history 
of science and other fields, to a large degree, constitute a history 
of academic whistle-blowing. Schneider (1989) writes: “If the 
knowledge expounded by recognized scholars to their students should 
prove to be of dubious reliability, then their authority is open to 
question. Thus, scientific progress and changing theories are natural 
enemies of authoritarian tradition” (p. 137). Schneider’s observations 
place in sharp relief what is perhaps the biggest flaw in Osburn’s 
“system,” namely, that he is proposing that academic librarians select 
materials more on the basis of authority than on the truth that the 
material contains. Insofar as librarians follow the advice of authorities 
to make selection in the first place, Osburn’s views have merit. But 
when he insists that academic librarians should exclude the works 
of academic whistle-blowers from their collections until the 
authorities themselves allow such works into the core literature on 
the subject, then Osburn’s system seems more appropriate for 
totalitarianism. Along this line of reasoning, Swan and Peattie (1989) 
write: “access to the broadest range of ideas and information is 
conducive to the practice of democracy. This means that denying 
such access is an action that should be sharply questioned” (p. 120). 
Religious authorities punished Galileo and other scientists whose 
ideas did not jibe with authoritative doctrine, and they went on to 
suppress their ideas. What academic peer review authorities did to 
Semmelweis, Beauperthuy, and other whistle-blowers might be 
considered an  academic’s form of similar punishment and 
suppression. And if academic librarians carry out the peer review 
authorities’ suppression on library shelves and bibliographies, then 
it seems that Osburn’s system might be more accurately defined as 
a “system of scholarly excommunication,” with “out-of-cite, out-of- 
mind” procedures that suppress ideas that are “excommunicated” 
in terms of the peer review authority dogma. 
ACADEMIC AND ACADEMICLIBRARIANS WHISTLE-BLOWERS 
Without giving up  their neutrality, academic librarians can 
consider both whistle-blowers and peer review authorities as their 
allies. Academic authorities are allies by providing expertise as a guide 
for selection. Whistle-blowers are natural allies to the extent that 
they provide material that makes corrections and provides new ideas 
that the authorities overlooked or tried to suppress. 
In any case, the attitude of the academic librarian toward the 
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whistle-blower reflects to a large extent the librarian’s attitude toward 
truth and censorship. Oboler (1982) takes a firm stand against 
censorship: “Among the many important tasks to be performed by 
the librarian-by the professon of librarianship-not the least is that 
of perpetual, unceasing awareness of and combat against censorship 
on every level, of every type, whenever and wherever it occurs” (p. 
99). He does not seem to be the kind of person who would censor 
the works of Semmelweis, Beauperthuy, or other academic 
whistleblowers. Not all academic librarians take so strong a stand, 
however. In requests for information that dealt with gifts that 
contained material upsetting to authorities in academia, Margreet 
Wijnstroom (at that time the secretary general of IFLA) wrote: “I 
would suggest you let the matter rest, and in any case cease to bother 
the members of my Executive Board and my staff with matters beyond 
their control” (personal communication, December 10, 1986). 
ACADEMIC LIBRARIANS, ASSOCIATIONS,LIBRARIES, LIBRARY 
AND INTELLECTUALFREEDOM A PROPOSALCOMMITTEES: 
If a government official (Meese for one and Joseph McCarthy 
for another) issues a call for a clean-up against pornography, immoral 
literature, or subversive material, there is a natural feeling among 
librarians that they are being asked to do things that run counter 
to their professional ethics, as a sampling of the rhetoric against 
the Meese Report at ALA meetings confirms. Although there was 
effective suppression during the so-called McCarthy era, nowadays 
intellectual freedom groups and associations at various professional 
levels can be quick in cranking u p  their rhetoric and activity to protest 
such suppressive moves as part of the librarian’s anti-censorship ethic. 
Rightly so, at least for librarians who believe in fighting censorship 
“on every level, of every type, whenever and wherever i t  occurs.” 
On the other hand, i t  seems that if peer review authorities suppress 
material that purports to correct error in the core literature, some 
academic librarians apparently regard the suppressed material as 
“noise” that does not belong in the library in the first place. Swan 
(personal communication, December 12, 1989) writes, “it may be 
significant that the ACRL has no Division IFC, and there is nothing 
explicitly related to ethics or intellectual freedom in its goals.” This 
situation seems to indicate that there might be something amiss, 
or misdirected, about the word intellectual, as used by some librarians 
or in the use of the term “intellectual freedom.” In other words, 
there are IF groups set u p  and established for various library 
associations at various levels, but apparently not specifically for 
academic library groups. Smut peddlers can turn to specific IF library 
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groups for assistance when their wares are censored, but what special 
committees can scholars turn to when their discoveries, findings, and 
ideas are censored? 
A proposal for academic library groups to establish IF committees 
is not necessarily a question of trying to second guess the peer review 
authorities about what the truth of the subject matter is in specific 
cases. Rather, it is more a question of whether academic librarians 
are really committed to providing accurate information, to fighting 
censorship, to “insuring that the widest range of information and 
ideas possible are available.” It also involves the question of whether 
or not academic librarians will look the other way when bona fide 
scholars, after a long time of routinely using a library, are suddenly 
denied permission to study there solely because the scholars published 
articles of which peer review authorities do not approve. (If a person 
were denied permission to use a library based on race, religious, or 
sexual preferences, what would the IF reactions of various 
anticensorship librarians be?) IF groups for academic library 
committees would be a part of the academic librarian’s effort to help 
scholars attempt to determine what the truth is in their given studies. 
Neither would there be a need for academic librarians to suddenly 
become experts and specialists in academic disciplines, nor would 
it mean that peer review rejections are the equivalent of censorship. 
In some cases, if not many, librarians themselves can detect 
academic and intellectual suppression and censorship of a blatant 
sort by the very nature of the peer review rejections and by the attitudes 
of some peer review authorities toward the truth. A few examples 
can help illustrate the point. In a rejection letter (December 9, 1987), 
Ethan Shevrach, editor in chief of the Journal ofzmmunology, wrote: 
“Whether or not your interpretation of the data is correct or not 
is irrelevant.” The article in question was a rebuttal that purported 
to expose, if not correct, an alleged serious error in the core literature 
recently published in the field. If the correctness of the interpretation 
of the data is “irrelevant,” it would logically follow that Shevrach 
does not really feel too strongly about whether the interpretation 
in the published article is correct either. Moreover, the rejected article 
was one that NIH authorities had originally denied permission to 
be submitted for publication, though subsequently the American 
Civil Liberties Union finally intervened. But that is not all. The 
same rebuttal article provoked the following negative reaction from 
Patricia Woolf (personal communication, July 23, 1987): “It is 
uncomfortable to live with error but important to remember that 
correcting a specific error at the expense of collegial trust will not 
and cannot restore that comfort.” (Woolf’s ideas certainly would have 
brought comfort and joy to the peer review authorities who did not 
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wish to have their errors corrected, with ensuing loss of collegial 
trust, by Semmelweis and Beauperthuy. But what is more “un-
comfortable” to Woolf, the discomfort of scholars who have to bear 
the pain of having their scholarly mistakes corrected or the intense 
pain of the many persons who suffered and died because scholarly 
error was not corrected?) It would seem that rejections based on 
reasoning that accuracy is irrelevant or that collegial trust should 
take priority over correction of error, can serve as warning signs to 
academic librarians that academic censorship might be taking place. 
In addition, there may be other telling signals. Suppose peer 
review authorities return material without opening it  or refuse to 
acknowledge receipt of a manuscript submitted for publication? 
Likewise, Catch 22 type rejections might raise an eyebrow among 
anticensorship minded librarians, as well as rejections listed by Remus 
(1980) such as the following: “The referee criticizes the paper for 
vices i t  does not have, and suggests i t  not be published” (p. 88). 
There are also evasive and stonewalling tactics of peer review 
authorities that can be telling. For example, in a situation paralleling 
one experienced by the present authors, a paper is submitted. A 
reviewer requests some changes, but neither the editor nor the reviewer 
tell the authors precisely what changes are required. The authors 
write asking for clarification, but neither the editor nor the reviewer 
nor even the President/Chancellor of the university who is on the 
editorial board ex officio, answer these repeated requests. Finally, 
after the stonewalling becomes glaringly obvious, an assistant to the 
President/Chancellor informs the authors that they are responsible 
for the delays because they did not make the required corrections 
in the manuscript. Once again, there is no indication of what these 
corrections should be. In the face of this situation, Serebnick’s opinion 
comes to mind: “I do not feel that the editor has an ethical duty 
to tell the authors what the referee recommended” (personal 
communication, August 20, 1989). (The original context of the quote 
by Serebnick was a case in which the referee suggested publication 
of the article, but the editor turned around and rejected it  outright 
without informing the authors of the referee’s judgment. At any rate, 
i t  is obvious that if authors are not informed of corrections that 
they should make in the text, an article can be suppressed forever 
without the editor ever having to write a rejection letter.) 
None of this discussion about shady peer review tactics means 
that academic librarians should intervene or try to overturn unfair 
and suppressive peer review decisions. But knowledge of such 
situations might help the librarian realize that the ideas and 
information rejected by peer review leaders might be more than mere 
“noise” if such ideas show up eventually in noncore publications. 
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It is difficult to imagine, on ethical grounds, objections and 
opposition to the establishment of IF groups for the ACRL and other 
academic library associations. To the contrary, such IF committees 
would reinforce and enhance the academic librarian’s commitment 
to truth and to providing access to the widest range of ideas, especially 
in the case of controversies. While not setting themselves up as arbiters 
of the truth, librarians can serve more effectively as illuminators of 
the truth in service of scholars seeking the truth. Besides, the very 
establishment of such IF committees, with their statements of 
anticensorship goals, principles, and objectives, might have a salutary 
effect on the quality of peer review in academia. Such IF groups 
might also have a positive effect on tolerance for new and truthful 
ideas in academia that are in contrast to older and false, but highly 
cherished, ideas. 
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Identifying Unethical Practices 
in Journal Publishing 
JUDITH SEREBNICK 
ABSTRACT 
UNETHICALJOURNAL PRACTICES have received extensive analysis in 
opinion pieces. However, research studies are few in number and 
limited in design. This article identifies unethical practices of authors, 
editors, and reviewers, with attention given to current concerns and 
proposals for eliminating misconduct. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, the National Association of Social Workers had to decide 
whether to take disciplinary action against William Epstein, an 
independent consultant in social policy, who had submitted a 
fictitious article to 146 journals in social work and related disciplines. 
Epstein has said that he fabricated the article to investigate the 
confirmatory bias of editors and peer reviewers-in this case, their 
possible tendency to accept articles that confirm the value of social 
work intervention and to reject others that do not (Coughlin, 1989b, 
p. A5). 
Confirmatory bias is related to publication bias, which is defined 
as “the tendency on the parts of investigators, reviewers, and editors 
to submit or accept manuscripts for publication based on the direction 
or strength of the study findings” (Dickersin, 1990, p. 1385). 
In half of the articles he submitted, Epstein pretended that the 
intervention of a social worker had had a positive effect on the 
condition of an asthmatic child. In the other half, the intervention 
was judged ineffective. He found that reviewers of the positive version 
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were more likely to accept the article for publication than were 
reviewers of the negative version. Though experimental work similar 
to Epstein’s is rare, his findings support those in previous research. 
In one of the first controlled experimental studies of the journal 
review process, Mahoney (1977) showed that otherwise identical 
manuscripts submitted to seventy-five reviewers of a psychology 
journal received different publication decisions depending on the 
direction of the data. Positive results-those that supported popular 
theoretical perspectives-were evaluated significantly higher than 
were the negative results manuscripts. 
Epstein was charged with two kinds of unethical behavior: 
deceiving the journal editors who reviewed the manuscripts and 
failing to get their informed consent to be in the study. The “Code 
of Ethics” of the National Association of Social Workers (Gorlin, 
1990) states: “The social worker should not participate in, condone, 
or be associated with dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” 
(p. 270). Also, according to the code: 
The social worker engaged in research should ascertain that the consent 
of participants in the research is voluntary and informed, without any 
implied deprivation or penalty for refusal to participate, and with due 
regard for participants’ privacy and dignity. (p. 271) 
When Mahoney was asked to comment on the charges against 
Epstein, he revealed that after he did his similar study in 1977, three 
editors tried unsuccessfully to have him fired or denied tenure 
(Goleman, 1988). Mahoney added: “The whole machinery of science 
revolves around the journal editor. ... Along with the spread of ideas, 
journal publication determines career success and promotions. If your 
findings are not in print, they don’t exist” (p.25). Other commentators 
observed that the Epstein case had “less to do with ethical concerns 
than the outrage of editors he duped” (p. 25). They pointed out 
that Epstein’s research could not have been conducted without 
deception; informed consent would have changed the conditions 
Epstein was studying. In their view, informed consent is intended 
to protect people more vulnerable than journal editors and reviewers. 
In December 1988, the social work board reviewing Epstein’s 
case found that he hadviolated two sections of the association’s ethical 
code related to deception and failure to get informed consent. Epstein 
appealed the decision. Subsequently, the executive committee of the 
association’s board of directors decided that the case was a 
“disagreement about proper research methodology” rather than a 
breach of ethics (Goleman, 1989, p. C8). Epstein was exonerated. 
QUESTIONSRAISEDBY THE EPSTEINCASE 
Epstein’s case was reported in the national press as well as 
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professional journals. The attention paid to i t  then and now is 
indicative of both an ongoing concern with unethical practices and 
a general recognition that journal publication is indispensable in 
spreading ideas and establishing the credibility of a scholar’s work. 
The case provokes a number of questions. How do we define 
unethical behavior? Although the social work board found that 
Epstein had acted unethically in conducting his research, the 
association’s executive committee saw no breach of ethics. Fabrication 
of data is generally considered a serious transgression. Is fabricating 
data warranted under particular circumstances? Also, Epstein’s case 
strongly suggests the existence of confirmatory bias among editors 
and reviewers. Are other types of bias equally evident among these 
gatekeepers? How extensive is research about unethical journal 
practices? Though studies employing experimental designs are rare, 
are studies using other methodologies more common? Also, the case 
included a response from the national association of which Epstein 
was a member, and the code of ethics of that association was applied 
to journal publishing. Can the codes of ethics of other associations 
be applied similarly? How interested are professional associations 
in the ethics of journal publishing? 
In part, this article examines several questions raised by the 
Epstein case. Also, additional questions concerning practices of 
authors, editors, and peer reviewers are identified and discussed. 
Lastly, suggestions for dealing with unethical journal practices are 
specified. 
UNETHICAL BY AUTHORSPRACTICES 
In addition to the questions raised by the Epstein case, equally 
compelling ethical questions occur in related contexts. For example, 
if one considers it unethical for an author to fail to get informed 
consent from editors and reviewers, is i t  also unethical for an author 
to submit a manuscript to two or more journals simultaneously 
without informing each editor of the multiple submissions? Is the 
answer to this question dependent on whether the two manuscripts 
are identical, largely identical, or similar in content but different 
in form? Is i t  unethical for an author to fail to correct errors in 
a manuscript? Perhaps the author had no intention of making errors. 
Is “intention” a factor in defining ethical behavior? Is it unethical 
to skip mentioning the source that funded the research reported in 
a manuscript? Imagine that the research concerns comparison of 
databases and the study was sponsored by a database producer or 
vendor. 
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Coauthorship,  Data Sharing, and Underrelborting 
How is credit for authorship determined? Nowadays, many, if 
not most, articles in scholarly journals are coauthored. Is i t  unethical 
to include as an author someone, perhaps a senior person, who did 
not contribute significantly to the paper? How is significantly 
defined? If the paper is published and later considered fraudulent, 
are the coauthors equally responsible? What happens if some 
coauthors consider themselves not personally responsible for the 
fraud? Can they threaten to sue for libel? 
In another context, gratuitous coauthorship is of ten examined 
as a publication practice that is partly responsible for paper inflation. 
Broad (1988) has commented that at least 40,000 journals currently 
roll off presses around the world and scientific literature doubles 
every ten to fifteen years (p. 15). Probably “the increases stem not 
from a sharp rise in productivity but rather from changes in the 
way people publish” (Broad, 1981, p. 1137). Broad specified the 
increased frequency of interdisciplinary papers; extensive multiple 
publication of the same data, including premature publication of 
studies still in progress; and decreasing length of papers. The 
fragmentation of data has concerned both educators and students: 
“Students confronted with a half-dozen short papers have a hard 
time seeing the forest for the trees” (p. 1138). 
Also, ethical questions may come to the fore when authors are 
asked to share their data with others. Do “the rigorous demands 
of open scientific inquiry [require] an ethic of sharing” (Cordes, 1986, 
p. 35)? Stanley (in Cordes, 1986) has maintained that “the advantages 
of sharing ...accrue mostly to the recipients of the data, or to science 
or society in general,” while “the disadvantages ...mainly fall on the 
backs of those who do the sharing” (p.35). A second researcher could 
find an error that invalidates the original researcher’s findings, or 
the information could be released before the original researcher has 
examined i t  thoroughly thus allowing the second researcher an 
unearned scoop. 
Unethical practices attributed to authors also include under- 
reporting of data. Chalmers (1990) has noted that though scientific 
misconduct is usually associated with deliberate data falsification, 
“sins of omission may be even more important” (p. 1405). In the 
medical literature, about one in two trials initially reported in 
summary form is “never reported in sufficient detail to permit an 
informed judgment about the validity of its results” (p. 1405). Also, 
research is not submitted or published because of the direction and 
statistical significance of the findings. This selective underreporting 
is more likely to have adverse consequences for patients rather than 
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the publication of false data, since replication of published data can 
identify false inferences (p. 1405). 
Although Chalmers (1990) thinks that the ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring that full reports of clinical trials are published rests 
with heads of the departments with which principal investigators 
are affiliated and that research-funding organizations and research 
ethics committees should require full reports, still he believes that 
authors and editors as well have responsibilities (p. 1407). Editors 
should accept or reject papers based on whether they are well 
conceptualized and well executed, not on the basis of direction or 
statistical significance of study results. Also, editors should exploit 
the potential of electronic publishing rather than use “shortage of 
space in printed journals” as an excuse for underreporting (p. 1407). 
In discussing what they term prepublication bias, Chalmers et 
al. (1990) mentioned factors that may influence the undertaking and 
performance of research and thus its eventual publication (p. 1392). 
These factors included an author’s ignorance of previously related 
studies, sloppy reporting of research, and a preoccupation with 
personal career advancement rather than with ethical reporting. This 
preoccupation with personal advancement was of ten related to the 
pressures of tenure and promotion decisions and the “fight to be 
first” to make a scientific discovery (Merton, 1984, p. 1265). 
A Study of Actions of Authors 
Serebnick and Harter (1990) investigated ethical practices of 
library and information science journals, focusing on actions of 
authors from the perspective of editors. Their purpose was to identify 
generally accepted ethical norms in journal practices. A questionnaire 
describing twenty-two action scenarios was completed by thirty-five 
editors. All the actions stemmed from concerns that had been 
identified by writers as possibly involving ethical issues. The editors 
were asked to rate each action as either ethical, unethical, possibly 
unethical, or not an ethical issue. 
Analysis of the answers showed that 60 percent or more of the 
editors responded in common to two-thirds of the actions, indicating 
substantial agreement on the majority of actions. However, divided 
or uncertain opinions were found for some actions that are of 
increasing concern to ethics analysts. 
The actions examined in this research focused on a number of 
practices identified earlier. Every responding editor considered it  
unethical i f  a manuscript contained instances of plagiarism or 
deliberate falsification or fabrication of data. Using the 60 percent 
decision rule, Serebnick and Harter (1990) found that editors thought 
that dual submissions of manuscripts and multiple publication of 
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identical or largely identical manuscripts without informing editors 
were unethical actions. On the other hand, actions in which authors 
informed editors of submission of identical or largely identical 
manuscripts were considered ethical actions. However, two actions 
related to manuscript submission received divided or uncertain 
opinions from editors. In one, a manuscript different in form but 
not in content was submitted to two journals without informing 
the editors, and in the other, a similar manuscript was published 
in conference or symposium proceedings without informing the 
editor. 
Of the editors surveyed, 73 percent judged one action by authors 
as not an ethical issue, namely the action of having submitted a 
manuscript that contained instances of error resulting from sloth, 
negligence, or carelessness. Many editors considered this “poor work, 
but not unethical” (p. 112). 
Serebnick and Harter found that four of the actions that received 
divided or uncertain opinions from editors concerned watering down 
research (the fragmentation of data), undeserved coauthorship, 
authors who refused to acknowledge the source of financial assistance, 
and authors who refused to share relevant raw data with interested 
readers. Though some editors were seriously concerned about these 
actions, relatively small numbers of editors considered the actions 
as clearly unethical. The dimensions of possibly unethical and not 
an ethical issue were checked frequently. 
A number of findings from the Serebnick and Harter study were 
expected. Certainly multiple submission of identical manuscripts 
without informing edtors is generally considered unethical. Other 
findings, for example those concerning error resulting from 
negligence, reflect ambivalent opinions shared with analysts in other 
disciplines. In the widely reported “Baltimore case” that concerned 
error in an immunology research paper, two opponents, Baltimore 
and Stewart, agreed that “error is the stuff of science” and “the only 
way to avoid error in science is to avoid work” (Culliton, 1988a, 
p. 18). However, Baltimore and his supporters took a passive stance 
toward the incidence of error and asserted that science is self-
correcting-that eventually error will be found and corrected. On 
the other hand, Stewart with Feder and others took an activist position 
and recommended that scientists should root out error, admit mistakes 
rather than conceal them, and honor rather than punish whistle- 
blowers. 
Also, several of the majority opinions of the editors seem out 
of step with current thinking about ethical actions. Only 18 percent 
of the editors considered it  unethical for an author to fail to 
acknowledge the source of funding assistance. Some editors 
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commented that authors-and editorial boards-may not realize that 
funding sources should be reported. However, Leary (1989) has stated 
that “scientists, administrators and lawmakers are increasingly 
worried that the lure of money threatens to compromise the quality 
and conduct of scientific and medical research” (p. 1). Alarm over 
a few publicized cases and the threat of government intervention 
in the research process have led institutions, including universities, 
to issue or revise rules intended to prevent conflicts of interest. Kelman 
(1986) asserted that information about sponsorship and funding must 
be shared not only with indviduals and organizations asked to 
cooperate with the research, but also “must be revealed at the time 
of publication, particularly when the sponsoring agency maintains 
the right of prepublication review” (p. 27). He added: 
Readers have a right to be informed of any factor that might introduce 
a systematic bias. Even the most meticulous scholars may be influenced 
by their sources of support-at least in the questions they raise, their 
definition of the problem and their interpretation of the findings. (p. 
27) 
For thirty-four of the journals in their study, Serebnick and Harter 
examined guidelines given to authors. Of the journals studied, 36 
percent had no guidelines that included information on ethical issues. 
Though a majority of the guidelines specified that manuscripts 
should be “original,” originality was not defined similarly and often 
it was not defined at all. Only 39 percent of the journals informed 
authors that manuscripts should not have been published elsewhere 
and should not be under consideration by another publication. 
The American Library Association (ALA) (1983) Guidelines for 
Authors, Editors, and Publishers of Literature an the Library and 
In format ion  Field includes ethical requirements and recom-
mendations related to originality, dual submission, timely response 
by editors and reviewers, accurate checking of citations and quotations 
by authors, and compensation to authors. Yet most of the 
specifications are not a part of the guidelines of most of the journals 
in the Serebnick and Harter study. Also, the majority of potentially 
unethical practices described in this article are not discussed in the 
ALA guidelines. Nor are they part of the ALA Statement on 
Professional Ethics (ALA, 1981). For example, neither the guidelines 
nor the statement men tion misconduct related to plagiarism, 
fabrication of data, or many other examples of fraud and deception 
sometimes practiced by authors, editors, and reviewers. 
ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF EDITORS 
The ethical responsibilities of journal editors have received less 
attention than have the ethical responsibilities of authors and peer 
reviewers. Woolf (1981) has cited those who believe that editors must 
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necessarily assume the objectivity, integrity, and honesty of authors 
(p. 10). Across disciplines, most journals do not have clear policies 
spelling out ethical guidelines. Though Thier (in Wheeler, 1987) has 
recognized some responsibilities, he has also stated that journals are 
“not regulators of research; they do not take responsibility for, and 
cannot take responsibility for, the data presented in their articles” 
(p. 13). For example, most editors do not require that researchers 
indicate in a published paper who is responsible for what parts of 
the paper. Nor is it usual practice to spot-check research by asking 
for original data. 
However, in light of recent and continuing revelations of bias 
and fraud in scientific publishing, editors are seriously considering 
the shortcomings of current practices. At the 1989 First International 
Congress on Peer Review in Biomelcal Publication, sponsored by 
the American Medical Association, two-thirds of the nearly 300 
participants were editors of journals. Numerous papers at the congress 
addressed the ethical responsibilities of editors. As an example, 
researchers reported the responses of editors to notifications that their 
journals had published articles that included data subsequently found 
to be questionable or fraudulent. Friedman’s (1990) study showed 
that “many journals lacked policies or procedures for responding 
to requests for retraction” (p. 1418). A large number of the thirty 
journals in his study were either late or uncooperative in publishing 
retractions. Also, the editors were inconsistent in how they labeled 
and placed retractions in their journals; only a minority of the 
retractions could be retrieved electronically. In another research 
report, Pfeiffer and Snodgrass ( 1990) found that “methods currently 
in place to remove invalid literature from use appear to be grossly 
inadequate” (p. 1423). Friedman was not alone in asserting that 
journals have a “duty to science and to their readers” to develop 
written policies and procedures for responding to allegations of 
fraudulent or questionable research (p. 1419). 
Additional concerns related to ethical responsibilities of editors 
are discussed in the literature. Should editors explain to authors and 
reviewers the review process for each publication? Should editors 
provide authors with thorough explanations of decisions, particularly 
unfavorable ones, about their manuscripts? Should editors always 
publish manuscripts in a timely manner (Rodman, 1970)? In 
commenting on editorial practices, Banner (1988) has suggested that 
“editorial authority and independence should be scrupulously 
protected so that editors acting on their own considered reflection 
and judgment ...have the freedom to override negative reviews of works 
that may fail to gain approval principally because of their novelty” 
(pp. 113-14). Peer review, he added, can inhibit innovation; editors 
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have a “delicate responsibility” to recognize distinctive, challenging, 
and controversial work. However, the specific role that editors should 
have in overriding decisions of reviewers has been contested; clear 
guidelines are difficult to find. 
THEETHICSOF PEER REVIEW 
In explaining the origins of the First International Congress 
on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication and the Journal of the 
American Medical Association’s (JAMA) decision to publish 60 
percent of the papers from the congress, Rennie (1990) stated: 
We at JAMA, considering that publication lies at the heart of the scientific 
process and that at the heart of publication lies peer review, were 
impressed by the evident lack of research into a process that occupies 
our energies daily and on which we, as editors, are disposed to rely heavily. 
(p. 1317) 
Rennie explained that the organizers of the congress sought 
investigative research reports on peer review with the intention of 
developing a database for future research. At the congress, 
approximately 70 percent of the thirty-five papers were the results 
of investigations, while the remaining papers were opinion pieces. 
Though there is no standard definition of peer review, one 
assumes that in scientific publishing it means the use of a professional 
person’s peers to evaluate his or her work. At the congress, in 
discussing the philosophical basis of peer review, Horrobin (1990) 
attempted to answer the question “What is peer review for?” One 
purpose generally accepted is that peer review is for quality control. 
Horrobin saw an additional purpose, namely “to facilitate the 
introduction into medicine of improvements in curing, relieving, and 
comforting” (p. 1438). He recognized that these dual purposes may 
sometimes conflict. For Horrobin, peer review must be judged by 
“how it  handles those rare articles that genuinely offer the possibility 
of new approaches that might eventually lead to improvements in 
curing, caring, and comforting” (p. 1439). By this standard, he found 
peer review sadly lacking, and he documented examples of the 
rejection of innovation (pp. 1439-41). Since “peer review in the grant- 
giving process is so restrictive that most innovative scientists know 
they would never receive funding if they actually said what they were 
going to do,” scientists have had to tell lies in their grant applications 
(p. 1440). 
Despite the problems attached to the peer review process, 
approximately three-quarters of the major scientific journals use peer 
review for evaluating at least some articles they publish (Altman, 
1986). In his analysis of forty-eight library and information science 
journals, Budd (1988) found that if one defines peer review loosely 
(to include editorial staffs and editorial boards), then the majority 
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of journals in his sample employ a peer review process (p. 128). He 
noted that the formal use of referees who are not staff or board members 
has risen in the last decade. 
Bias on the part of reviewers was a recurrent concern in the 
papers of the congress. In addition to prepublication bias and 
publication bias, which are discussed earlier, Chalmers et al. (1990) 
mentioned postpublication bias, which was defined as the “possibility 
of bias in the reception and interpretation of published research data” 
(p. 1394). The authors maintained that this kind of bias has received 
scant attention in the literature. It occurs when review articles present 
previously published research findings inaccurately. 
Blind Submissions, Anonymous Reviews, Cronyism 
The study that captured the most interest at the congress (Sun, 
1989, p. 910) was led by McNutt (McNutt et al., 1990) and investigated 
the effects of blinding reviewers-masking the names of authors and 
their institutions-on the quality of the evaluations written by the 
reviewers. Blinding reviewers is of ten associated with decreasing the 
potential for reviewer bias or dishonesty. Previous research 
investigated the ease or difficulty of blinding reviewers to the 
identification of authors. However, McNutt et al. reported that to 
their knowledge their study was the first on blinding’s effect on review 
quality (p. 1375). Their study design employed a randomized, 
controlled, double-blind trial using blocked randomization. They 
analyzed reactions to 123 manuscripts, each of which was reviewed 
by a blinded reviewer and a reviewer who knew the author and his 
or her institution. Both editors and authors were asked to rate the 
quality of the reviews; neither group knew if the reviews were written 
by blinded or nonblinded reviewers. 
McNutt et al. found that blinding reviewers improved the quality 
of reviews from the editors’ perspectives. The editors rated blinded 
reviewers higher than nonblinded reviewers on how they addressed 
importance of the question, key issues, and research methods. 
However, authors found no differences in the quality of blinded and 
unblinded reviews. Also, authors considered the reviewers similar 
with regard to courteousness, fairness, and knowledge (p. 1375). All 
the reviewers had the option of signing or not signing their reviews. 
McNutt et al. noted: “Signing was not randomly allotted, and 
conclusions must be interpreted with more caution” (p. 1375). Of 
those surveyed, 43 percent of reviewers chose to sign their names. 
No association was found between signing and quality of reviews. 
In general, editors and other ethics analysts have been divided 
on how they relate reviewers’ signing of reviews to subjectivity and 
possible bias: 
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Some editors believe that signing will introduce more subjectivity into 
what should be an objective endeavor and that reviewers who sign may 
not be as critical. Others believe that signing is valuable and that it 
will ensure that the reviewer’s opinions will be better documented. (p. 
1375) 
Unsigned reviews are much more widely used by journals in all fields 
than are blinded submissions (Coughlin, 1989a). However, the 
concerns of women and junior scholars have led to an increase in 
blinded submissions. That change at P M L A ,  for example, has resulted 
in “a significant increase in articles by women, by junior members 
of the profession, and by colleagues from lesser institutions” (p. A7). 
Critics of blinding have maintained that to judge scholarly arguments 
in the literature adequately, one must know the identity of the scholars. 
Cronyism is an ethical issue for some analysts. If a crony-a 
personal friend, colleague, or collaborator-of an author is asked 
by a journal editor to review a manuscript or review a book authored 
by the friend, should the crony dlsqualify him or herself? In the 
Serebnick and Harter study, cronyism received divided or uncertain 
reactions from the editors: 27 percent of the editors considered 
cronyism (not disqualifying oneself) clearly unethical, 53 percent said 
cronyism was possibly unethical, 7 percent considered cronyism an 
ethical practice, and 13 percent said cronyism was not an ethical 
issue. 
Although blinded submissions, signed reviews, and cronyism 
have elicited divided opinions from ethics analysts, no strong 
differences of opinion seem to exist regarding the ethics of borrowing 
ideas from, or disclosing the contents of, a manuscript that one is 
reviewing. Of the editors surveyed in the Serebnick and Harter study, 
91 percent said i t  was unethical for reviewers to borrow ideas from 
manuscripts being refereed. Ethics analysts have consistently 
maintained that reviewers are not supposed to make use of the contents 
of reviewed manuscripts for their own work before the manuscript 
is published (Altman, 1986). 
Another ethical concern in the peer review process is the 
perception that i t  is generally unreliable in judging the objective 
merit of a work. The research of Peters and Ceci (1982) not only 
showed the inconsistency of reviewers’ judgments, but also raised 
questions about possible bias against authors who lacked high status 
and a prestigious institutional affiliation. Authors’ status and 
institutional affiliation have been investigated in widely known older 
studies of reviewer bias (for example, Crane [1967]). However, studies 
have also indicated that “the great bulk of reviewer disagreement 
observed is probably a result of real and legitimate differences of 
opinion among experts about what good science is or should be” 
(Cole et al., 1981, p. 885).In addition, the level of disagreement among 
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reviewers may reflect “overall levels of scholarly consensus and that 
consensus varies across disciplines” (Hargens, 1990, p. 1352). 
ELIMINATING UNETHICALOR LIMITING PRACTICES 
Analyses of unethical practices in journal publishing have a long 
history and many suggestions have been made for eliminating or 
limiting fraud and deception. Some proposals are mentioned earlier. 
Currently, the suggestions are coming from a broad range of concerned 
analysts. Though a number of changes have been implemented, most 
are not without their detractors. 
At the peer review congress discussed earlier, several proposals 
were made to make authors, editors, and reviewers more accountable 
for their actions (Sun, 1989). Rennie suggested random audits of raw 
data from studies accepted for publication. The audits would be 
conducted by senior people with research experience, and they would 
be financed by the journals, foundations, and the government. 
Presumably, the audits would help determine the extent of research 
malpractice and let the government know that scientists are “getting 
scientific about science” (Hamilton, 1990, p. 30). Some observers 
considered such audits costly and lfficult and warned that they will 
create suspicion and “poison the scientific process” (Altman, 1989, 
p. C3). 
Rennie and Relman have suggested that journals mandate that 
each coauthor sign a statement that he or she has read and approved 
the paper and is “responsible” for the work described (Sun, 1989, 
p. 91 1; Coughlin, 1989a). However, some scientists maintained that 
requiring such a statement will be impractical, particularly if the 
research project was interdisciplinary and if some coauthors were 
responsible for only minor portions of the research. Perhaps coauthors 
could accept responsibility for only those parts of the work in which 
they were involved, and journals could clarify the specific 
responsibilities. Others have suggested that categories of authorship 
be established: primary authorship for those who contribute to the 
conception, generation of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; 
and a second tier of authorship for those who fit the categories of 
“with the assistance of” or “in collaboration with” by contributing, 
for example, “a moderate bit of advice” (Culliton, 1988b, p. 525). 
Many analysts have suggested that journals develop more explicit 
guidelines for authors, editors, and reviewers. These guidelines should 
clarify the rights and responsibilities of each group, informing them 
about the potential for misconduct and the necessity for acting to 
prevent misconduct. For example, Chubin (1985) has recommended 
that editors inform reviewers of the desirability of pursuing suspicions 
of data manipulation (p. 200). 
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Research institutions have also responded to the current interest 
in unethical journal practices. Recognizing that the pressures of tenure 
and promotion may lead to an emphasis on quantity, not quality, 
of publication and a potential for fraud and error, Harvard University 
Medical School published revised guidelines for promotion and tenure 
decisions (Culliton, 1988b). The guidelines “dare to suggest that 
someone up  for promotion to full professor should be judged on 
no more than ten papers. Those up  for associate professor could make 
the grade on the basis of a mere seven papers, presuming they were 
pretty good ones” (p. 525). The Harvard guidelines also specify that 
researchers should keep original data and that as authors they should 
be held responsible for papers that carry their names. Nobel (1990) 
found that only two medical schools among the 133 that responded 
to his survey have guidelines addressing most of the important ethical 
issues related to misconduct in biomedical research (p. 1435). 
Suggestions have also been made that educational institutions 
should take more responsibility for educating and training about 
research ethics (LaFollette, 1989). LaFollette decried the “shocking 
lack of adequate...formal, required instruction on research ethics in 
the curriculum” of her university and many other universities (p. 
72). She also thought scientists should be taught about the publishing 
system. Sweetland (1989) urged the improvement of training of 
researchers in library and information science. He focused on training 
in the theory and methods of citations, noting the responsibilities 
of librarians, authors, publishers, and referees to provide accurate 
citations and thus to correct a worsening situation of high error rate 
in citations. 
Additional suggestions for eradicating unethical journal practices 
include: funding duplication of research to resolve allegations of 
misconduct (Hamilton, 1990); registration of all trials, perhaps all 
research studies, undertaken (Dickersin, 1990); regular publication 
by more journals of “an accounting of the length of time it  takes 
peers to review a paper, authors to make the suggested revisions, 
and editors to decide whether to publish” (Altman, 1989, p. C3); 
instructing reviewers to refuse to accept repetitive papers and 
requiring authors to sign documents guaranteeing that the 
information in their articles has not been accepted or published 
elsewhere (McDonald, 1985); and encouraging the scientific 
community to agree on “the level of inaccuracy required to mandate 
a retraction vs an erratum” (Pfeifer 8c Snodgrass, 1990, p. 1423). 
CONCLUSION 
Admittedly, this article raises more questions than it  answers. 
Unfortunately, the answers are not at hand. Most of the literature 
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on unethical journal practices consists of opinion pieces, and opinions 
are inconsisten t-perhaps for good reason, since the variables related 
to the practices are complex and difficult to analyze. Systematic 
investigations are rare; experiemen tal designs are invariably 
controversial. Many scientists seem unwilling to encourage or 
participate in examinations of possibly unethical research and 
publishing practices; whistle-blowers can face intimidation and 
unemployment. However, some investigations, including the Epstein 
and Baltimore cases, receive extensive media attention and heighten 
concern with unethical practices. Also, events such as the First 
International Congress on Peer Review demonstrate that rigorous 
investigations are needed and that a few are actually completed. 
In library and information science, the literature on unethical 
journal practices is minimal. Although editors are concerned about 
misconduct, many fail to recognize ethical implications in practices 
that are coming under increasing scrutiny. The ALA publishing 
guidelines and Statement on Professional Ethics do not address most 
of the unethical practices identified by ethics analysts. 
Journal publication is inhspensable in spreading ideas and 
recognizing scholarly research. Unethical practices may promote 
misleading or harmful information and deny a forum to innovators. 
Such practices need more atten tion than they have received. 
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